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SAMUEL ALEXANDER

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IN Samuel Alexander, who died on September 13th, we have lost the thinker who, since the death of F. H. Bradley in 1924, has been the leading figure in British philosophy, and whom all schools, whatever their differences, have delighted to honour as their chief. Closely united with Bradley as one of "those from whom he learned most," and as himself for eleven years Fellow of a neighbouring College in Oxford, he developed a philosophy which in its starting point, method, and apparent results was poles asunder from that of his teacher. Yet it would be strange if two men who both inherited the same great European tradition, and pursued what they conceived of as its inner significance with the same absolute sincerity of purpose and the same talent, amounting to genius, for speculation should have been so wide apart from each other as the letter of their teaching seemed to indicate. Alexander might not perhaps have been willing to ask, as Whitehead does, whether "the type of thought involved (in his own metaphysics) be not a transformation of some main doctrines of Absolute Idealism on to a realistic basis,"[1] but I believe it could be shown to be true that by a kind of "meeting of extremes in contemporary philosophy," different from that which Bosanquet had in mind in his book with that title, these two philosophers stand for different perspectives of the same world: the one starting from the axiom that "if you would see a thing as it truly is you must watch it in its beginnings," the other from the opposite "if you would see the reality of a thing you must see it in the light of what it aims at becoming;" the one meaning by reality that which is actual, the other that which is ideal; the one

[1] Preface to *Process and Reality*, p. vii.

emphasizing existence, the other value, as the clue to the truth of the universe. If this or anything like it be true, what these two leading thinkers have left to the coming generation is not so much a choice between two diverse philosophies as a call to the task of uniting what is true in each in a more truly "synthetic philosophy" than Herbert Spencer was able in his time to achieve. It is hoped that the present article may be followed by others in the same journal in which in the different departments of philosophy something of this kind may be attempted. It has seemed, however, to the editor that any such articles should be preceded by a more general one on Alexander's life and work as a whole, and he has asked me to undertake it. If old acquaintance, dating from 1878, when, coming from Australia, he won his Scholarship in Baliol for a like excellence in Classics and Mathematics, and admiration for a life as lovely in its entire unselfishness and unworldliness as in its devotion to truth, as he saw it, were sufficient qualifications for the task, I might have more confidence in my ability to perform it. It is another thing to hope that, in the bare outline which alone is possible in a single article, anything like justice can be done to the immense scope and statuesque completeness of the work he has left behind him, and to the debt which not only our own generation but others after us will always owe to it, and I am full of diffidence of my power to do what is required of me.

Alexander has himself indicated two different ways of approaching a great philosopher[1]—one, "the study of his precise teaching, setting it in relation with his age"; the other, that of inquiring what he "can teach us in our present problems." But there is a third which, while not without reference to the former of these at the beginning and to the latter at the end, should occupy itself in the main with the steps by which he arrived at the great generalizations that he sought in his chief work to expound. It is this, as more suited to my own turn of mind, that I propose to adopt. If I venture, with still greater diffidence, to add a reference to certain difficulties, which one approaching these problems from a different point of view still feels about the letter of his work, it will be with the view of justifying what I have just said of it as a perspective which requires to be supplemented rather than superseded. In itself it may still be possible to say of it, *stat mole sua.*

Though, by his own work and that of others, the terms "realist" and "idealist" have largely ceased to form any clearly dividing line between different schools, there remained in the formative period of Alexander's thought a fairly definite distinction between those who approached philosophy from the point of view of a human

[1] *Spinoza and Time*, p. 19.

experience everywhere interlaced and, in its higher forms, dominated by ideas in a way that separated its method from that of the empirical, and particularly the physical, sciences, and those who approached it from the side of the latter, and conceived of philosophy as consisting in only a wider application of the same method, differing chiefly from the special sciences by the inclusion of the elementary "categorical" forms that run like a warp beneath the woof of experience in every field. It had been the unfortunate legacy of the Kantian philosophy to treat these forms, of which substance, causality, universality are the chief, along with extension in time and space, as contributions of the mind, and so to make every object into which they enter mind-dependent. Idealism was burdened with this tradition, and formed a challenge to a realism that was prepared to treat these, along with everything else that could be made the object of contemplation, as empirically given. Whether Alexander ever accepted the Kantian form of idealism I do not know, but his whole bent of mind was against it, and the historian of the time[1] is within his right in classing him with the writers who, in the book with that title, represented the "New Realism." "The temper of Realism," Alexander himself wrote in 1914, "is to de-anthropize, to order man and mind to their proper place among the world of finite things: on the one hand to divest physical things of the colouring they have received from the vanity or arrogance of man, and on the other to assign them, along with minds, their due measure of self-existence."[2] He was careful, however, to add in the spirit of that "natural piety"[3] which he held to be the mark of the true investigator: "Realism strips mind of its pretences, but not of its value." It was this, along with a profounder acquaintance with the history of philosophy, that distinguished him from some of the writers just mentioned and made him reject with growing decisiveness the extremist view which was prepared to treat consciousness as merely "a cross-section of the external world," and so to lapse into "behaviourism." While in its appeal to non-empirical elements, such as he conceived Green's "eternal self" and Bradley's "Absolute" to be, idealism required a wholesome lowering, the new realism called for an equally wholesome raising of its temperature.

This attitude is already clearly manifest in his first book, *Moral Order and Progress*, published in 1889. It was based on the essay for which he obtained the Green Moral Philosophy Prize in 1887 upon the subject, "In what direction does Moral Philosophy at the

[1] E.g. Rudolf Metz in his *Hundred Years of British Philosophy*.

[2] "The Basis of Realism," *Proceedings of the British Academy*.

[3] *Space, Time and Deity*, ii, p. 47. Elsewhere he speaks of it in another mood as that "deliberate innocence," that "strenuous *naïveté*" which was the chief qualification of the philosopher.

present time seem to you to admit or require advance?" By this time Spencer's *Data of Ethics* was already in its fifth edition, and Leslie Stephen's *Science of Ethics* had followed on the same general evolutionary lines. From his study of these writers Alexander "had come to the ideas borrowed from biology and the theory of evolution, which are prevalent in modern ethics." But he had come to them also "with a training derived from Aristotle and Hegel," and claimed that what he had found was "not antagonism but, on the whole, fulfilment."[1] It was this training that enabled him to go beyond at once Spencer's mechanical treatment of society as an aggregate of individuals and Stephen's idea of the "social tissue," while remaining true to the realistic spirit of both these writers.

The first part, on Moral Order, is a modern version of Aristotle's doctrine of the mean, interpreted in terms of an "equilibrium" established, on the one hand, between the individual and the society with which he is organically connected and, on the other, between his own instincts, desires, and interests. The second and more original part, on Moral Progress, is an application of the doctrine of evolution in a field where the struggle for survival is no longer between individuals and groups, terminating in the physical extinction of one or other of them, but between ideals, with all that this implies in the gradual and peaceful victory of those which are more in harmony with the needs of a truly social life.

On re-reading the book to-day one is struck by the anticipation we find in it of all that the writer taught us to look for in his work: the learning so lightly borne, the power of expression and of finely chosen, often humorous, illustration, the scrupulous fairness to opponents, finally, the sense of the limitations within which his own conclusions held. Whatever we may think of the adequacy of the formula of "equilibrium" and of "social," or what Bergson calls "closed," morality to cover the full scope of moral goodness, the book stands along with Green's *Prolegomena* and Bradley's *Ethical Studies* as the high-water mark of nineteenth-century Oxford thought in this field.

While he had become convinced from the side of ethics, as Bradley in those same years had come to be from the side of logic, that neither of these studies could be pursued with success apart from a sound basis in metaphysics, Alexander was aware that problems still awaited him in psychology and the theory of knowledge the solution of which must supply further data for such an advance. For some twenty-five years accordingly we find him occupied with a series of papers on these subjects, in every one of which he may be said to have broken new ground by his insistence on

[1] Preface, p. viii.

a thoroughgoing empiricism. It would be tiresome to enumerate them; but one or two are of particular interest as anticipations of his later metaphysical doctrines.

He was one of the first to see the importance that was coming to be attached to the idea of Value, and his article upon it in *Mind* of January 1892 formed a transition from his empirical treatment of moral values to a similar treatment of value in general. He is still occupied mainly with the moral ideals interpreted as "nothing but the formulations of desires" and "but forms of healthy social life," but he recognizes that there are other kinds of value, namely, aesthetic and scientific, which admit of being treated on the same basis in reply alike to hedonist, intuitionist, and rationalist theories. However closely related to metaphysics the corresponding sciences are as furnishing further data for it, his method removes them from its domain and classes them as "the last or psychical class of the natural sciences." He was to return to all three with new clues to their nature in the light of his own metaphysics. Meantime his interest centred in psychology and epistemology in preparation for a higher flight.

It was, so far as I know, in his contribution to the Symposium in the Aristotelian Society on "The Nature of Mental Activity" in 1908 that he first announced the view that mind or consciousness consisted essentially in activity or conation, and that what were commonly treated as the objects or "contents" of consciousness, whether sensations, perceptions, images, or conceptions, are in fact physical objects, part of the real world, entirely independent of mind. The conation differs according to the nature of the object, colour, figure, etc., but "consciousness is one and the same thing working only in different directions." When we try to make our idea of it more definite and explicit, "it is always referred to brain." In other words, "consciousness or mental activity can never be a presentation": "I cannot attend to my attention as I attend to what I write." He had not yet arrived at the distinction between the object as something "contemplated," the activity as something "lived through" or "enjoyed," still less at an answer to all the questions which are thus left over to be settled by metaphysics; but it is easy to see that we have here the foundation of everything that was to come.

The article in the same journal of the next year contains a further explanation of what is meant by "direction" ("consciousness exists in space just as greenness is spread over a leaf"), together with an application of the doctrine to willing and the problem of universals. With regard to the will, his comment upon Bradley's view of it as "the self-realization of an idea" is that in an act like that of lifting the arm "in nine cases out of ten there is no image of the arm

being lifted, but only a felt direction, as yet disconnected with the system of mental movements which is the consciousness of present reality." "The fiat of the will, which some writers love to regard as mysterious, is nothing but the snapping together of the temporarily imperfect and disconnected system with the general trend of the mind's activity." With regard to ideas or universals, again starting from Bradley's doctrine of them as inseparable from reality but as having a psychical existence, Alexander appeals to a greater authority than his: "Unless Plato has lived and written in vain, why should not ideas be realities?" What is true of the universal in things is true (again *pace* Bradley) of the universal we call the "self." There is no continuity between myself and the part of it we isolate as an object to it (e.g. an idea which it has) "in the sense in which there is continuity between my different mental actions." Throwing down the gauntlet to the whole idealist epistemology, he declares that it is only "because subject and object are supposed to constitute an experience, to make that unity within duality which alone is real, that we are disposed to accept the proposition that a part of the self may become a not-self and be turned into an object to the self from which it is cut off."

The challenge was not long in being taken up. In a paper at a following meeting of the Aristotelian Society, G. F. Stout, whom Bosanquet in those days called "our one psychologist," on the subject "Are Presentations Mental or Physical?" sought to show the deep line of division between presentations such as we have in sense-perception, in memory, or in dream images, and the physical objects which they represent. Stout did not deny that conation and feeling were underlying elements in all mental existence, but he contended that there were "certain existents so connected with conation and feeling as to form with these part of the simple system which we call an individual mind."[1]

In his reply in the following number of the same journal, in a paper on "Sensations and Images," Alexander admitted that he had gone beyond his record "in calling all objects of cognition physical": "The vital question is whether they are independent of mind." But he was still prepared to insist that *sensa* and images (as distinguished from seeing or imagining) are physical in the sense of having the characteristics of physical objects, and to drive the doctrine home by what seemed a greater paradox still, namely, that "perceiving a thing means that mind and the thing are together in the same sense as the table and the floor are together." That is not to say that there is not a personal element in experience, as is shown in illusion and error. But this means merely that "inappropriateness in the action of the mind distorts its vision of things.

[1] *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1908–1909, p. 241.

The man who is in error is wry-necked." He is "thrawn" like Janet in Stevenson's story, and the object of Science and Philosophy, as Plato said long ago, is to twist him round so that he can see. The illusion is a partial appearance which, though not "true," is nevertheless "real."

In these articles the lists were set for a tournament which has lasted to the present day. Meantime opposition and criticism only stimulated Alexander to the further development of his own thesis. What strikes one in looking through these and the succeeding articles is the sureness and rapidity with which he advanced along his chosen road. In that on "Self as Subject and as Person"[1] he rejects all doctrines that appeal to a "pure" or "timeless self." The self is "thoroughly empirical and yet, though it is so, it is rightly called 'I,' because it is not an 'object' experienced but an 'experiencing' experienced." "It is enjoyed or suffered, but it is not revealed to itself, it is not contemplated." If we try to contemplate it, we find that it is not the mental self we are contemplating, but the complex of neural activities, of which mind is the "effluescence." He has, however, so far advanced on his former view as to recognize other features in the activity besides direction, namely, duration and succession, degrees of intensity, a variable toning of pleasure and pain, and emotional excitement. He admitted the difficulty of treating these last as objective. "If anyone chooses to maintain that they are the varying qualities of consciousness, I have as yet no answer to give." So far as I know, it was not till he came to write the section on Feeling in *Space, Time and Deity*[2] that he renounced the view hitherto shared with Stout that pleasure and pain are modalities of conation, and boldly announced that they are "objective experiences of the order of organic sensations."

The paper in the *British Journal of Psychology* of the same date as the last-mentioned, on "Foundations and Sketch-Plan of a Conational Psychology," is chiefly interesting as showing what he might have done had he chosen psychology instead of metaphysics as his subject in the coming years. How strongly his mind was by this time bent, and how far it had already proceeded in the latter direction, we can see from the article which has the leading place in *Mind* of 1912, on "The Method of Metaphysics and the Categories." After repeating what he had already said of mind, he uses it to exclude two principles of method: first, the principle that other things depend on it (in other words, idealism), and secondly, the principle that mind is co-extensive with physical things (in other words, pan-psychism). From this he goes on to define metaphysics in distinction from the particular sciences as "the attempt to describe the ultimate nature of existence and the pervading charac-

[1] *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1910–1911. [2] Vol. ii, p. 132.

ters of things," a definition which he holds is "sufficiently near to that of Aristotle to be regarded as identical with his." But, though thus distinguished from Science in the extent of the matter with which it deals, its method is the same: "through and through empirical." It takes existence and its pervading characters as given entirely independently of mind, either as a contributor or as a constituent. So far from being either, mind is only one among other things so given—albeit "endowed with the highest quality we are aware of," and thus "the most gifted individual in a democracy of things," the summit of a hierarchy of levels each of greater complexity of structure than that which goes before it but founded upon it. To this apparent commonplace of observation his distinction between the contemplated and the enjoyed enables him to add that, while each higher can enjoy its own form of existence, it can only contemplate itself in terms of the level below it, the living in terms of physical and chemical matter, the mental in terms of the living organism. If there are higher beings than human minds (as we may well believe there are, or are coming to be), minds will be there for them to contemplate "spread out in space and occurring in time, just as we see vital processes in a plant occurring in space and time," while they will enjoy a form of being of their own the nature of which we can only vaguely anticipate. Again it is easy to see that in all this we have the first sketch of the argument of his great book, the subject of which is further anticipated at the end, when he puts to himself the "old question of the nature of being itself. Is time, for instance, the real tissue of things? Or space? Or both? . . . What the enumeration of the categories is?" Finally, as there is no identical quality which belongs to all things in the same sense as they are all in the "infinite foundations" of space and time, "it would be the business of a profounder study than this to explain the secret of the breaking up of the whole continuum into these 'finite centres' of existence."

It was these questions that were to occupy Alexander during the immediately succeeding period. Whether he would have been stirred to carry out this formidable programme in anything more than isolated studies like those just mentioned is a question. At times he would complain of his own laziness and inertia, perhaps not unconnected with the feats of physical energy he displayed in those days on his bicycle. Certainly the social and political disturbances of the time might have formed sufficient excuse for the indulgence of such a weakness. Fortunately, the invitation in the middle of the War to deliver the Gifford Lectures at Glasgow came as the strongest incentive to adopt a wider plan, in which the various strands of his thought as hitherto developed should be woven

together into a single pattern. The result was given to the world in 1920 in his great book on *Space, Time and Deity*, to take its place beside Bradley's *Appearance and Reality* and one or two others as a landmark in the history of latter-day metaphysical philosophy in England. Much of it was already familiar to those who had followed the previous development of his thought. But even in this there was no mere repetition of what he had already written. Everything was recast to fit into the new mould, and came with a freshness derived from the new context. The features that were distinctively new were the doctrine of the unity of Space and Time as comparable to that of body and mind,[1] which occupies so large a portion of the first volume, and the doctrine of Deity as a quality of the universe which has still to "emerge," which occupies the latter part of the second.

It would lead me too far to attempt to condense the difficult arguments by which Alexander sought to establish these doctrines, still more to attempt any criticism of them. It will be sufficient to recall the respects in which they came as a challenge to both the current idealism and the current realism. The first challenged the criticism of idealists by its apparent attempt to find the secret of the universe in the earliest, most abstract, and empty form of unity, that of space and time, instead of in the latest, the most concrete and the fullest, as we have it, in the mind-discovered worlds of science, history, art, morality, and religion. The second challenged the criticism of realists by the flight it seemed to take from the solid ground of space-time existence into the azure of an unexperienced and to us inexperienceable quality called Deity. It was while his book was being assailed by this cross-fire of criticism that Alexander once ruefully complained to the present writer of his failure to have found any important following. But this was to forget that a philosopher, more than anyone else, casts his bread upon the waters in the hope of finding it after many days; and that, in any case, his success is to be measured not by the number of his disciples, but by the sincerity and consistency with which he has sought to apply some single great principle to throw light on the world of experience. As the Scottish philosopher Ferrier long ago said, "It is more important that a philosophy should be reasoned than that it should be true." If any was ever reasoned from the foundations, it was Alexander's.

With regard to the truth of it I will venture only on one remark, and that in the form of a question following on what I said at the beginning. Bradley, in his last years, is said to have been visited by misgiving as to his own entire consistency. This is a wholesome

[1] Time in Alexander taking the place of thought or idea in Spinoza as the other known "attribute" of Substance.

visitation, even when it may be too late to remedy the fault. I do not know whether Alexander, with all his modesty, ever seriously confessed to one of the same kind. Yet if he had done so, might there not have been some ground for it, in view of the at least seeming inconsistency of seeking the matrix of everything that is in the empirically, or, as he preferred to say, intuitively, given fact of existing Space-Time, and yet endowing this with a *nisus* to ever higher forms of being, each of which takes up and gives meaning to that which went before—in a certain sense (to use a phrase of his own in speaking of human imperfections) "redeems" it?[1] It may be a misnomer to speak of this *nisus* as the purpose of a creator embodied in the world, but does it not bear a strong family resemblance to the transformation which things undergo, according to Bradley, in the Absolute, and may it not be legitimately read as another example of how in the great dialectic movement of thought which we call philosophy "the incensed points of mighty opposites" may bear in themselves the promise of their reconciliation?

After the main harvest of his long sowing had been reaped in 1920, Alexander lived long enough to glean a still rich aftermath in the indulgence of the interest he shared with so many of the younger generation in the theory of art. No one can read even the most technical of his writings without being struck with the fineness of their literary expression. His own outlook on life may be said to have been that of the artist. He had the poet's love of "all things both great and small" in nature and human life. His heart went out to birds and dogs, to children, and to the subtler, more humorous and lovable traits of men and women.[2] Deprived by his life-long deafness of the full enjoyment of the freedom of human intercourse and of music, he found his chief resource in literature.[3] In his frequently solitary walks it was his habit to carry a book of poetry with him, and to employ himself in committing favourite passages to memory.[4] It was, therefore, no surprise when in his later life he became engrossed with the problem of the nature of Beauty.

[1] *Space, Time and Deity*, ii, p. 421.

[2] There is doubtless a record in Manchester University of the words in which as "public orator" he introduced the recipients of honorary degrees. Nothing that he has written would more vividly illustrate this charming feature of the man.

[3] Among his lesser writings are "Molière and Life," "The Art of Jane Austen," "Pascal the Writer," to be found in the *John Rylands Library Bulletin*, 1926 and following.

[4] One of my own liveliest reminiscences of him was once in Edgbaston in the twilight before the lamps were lit, when it was suggested that he should recite some poetry to us, and he unhesitatingly responded with long passages from Shelley in the rich tones of his beautiful voice.

He had already, in *Space, Time and Deity*, dealt with it in conjuction with those of truth and goodness under the head of "Tertiary Qualities," where, to the surprise of some of his readers, he had seemed to abandon his realistic basis by treating it as a character which "the external thing receives from its connection with mind."[1] The explanation was that the development of his "conational" psychology had given him a new point of view from which value in general could be treated as issuing from the demand to satisfy fundamental impulses when these reach a certain degree of consciousness, and the objects towards which they are directed are sought for their own sakes. Each of the so-called values has a nature of its own according as the impulse is to be satisfied: in the case of truth, by the exclusion of personal elements and submission to the teaching of things; in the case of practice, by the adaptation of things to human needs; in the case of beauty, by the infusion of new meaning into things as objects of impassioned contemplation. In all cases these qualities appear, in contrast to the primary and secondary, as a joint product of mind and object. It was this doctrine that had been applied in his book; but there was much left over to say about them, and particularly about beauty. True, natural beauty seemed to offer a difficulty, and in discussing it Alexander is apt to use words reminiscent of ordinary realism, as when he distinguishes it from artistic beauty and claims for it that it "is presented to us ready made for inspection, or rather for discovery: our hands or voices have had no part in fashioning it."[2] But in *Beauty and Other Forms of Value*,[3] published in 1933, he leaves no doubt as to his view, namely, that "the beautiful, whether in art or nature, is of course a reality. It is not mere physical (or human) reality because it mixes the mind with the physical or, it may be, human topic which suggests it. But being an amalgam of two real things, the one physical and the other mind, the product is also real and has its own autonomous reality." Why, he elsewhere asks, should that which is the product of two things that are real be itself less real on that account? To which our reply would be, "Why indeed?" but further to ask whether on this principle we might not here again find a ground of reconciliation between heated opposites in the long, by this time somewhat wearisome, discussion of the objective reality of empirical qualities, including space and time themselves, by taking them, as Meredith in the *Ode to Colour*, which Alexander delighted to quote, took them, if not mind-created, yet as much spiritual as physical.

[1] Vol. ii, p. 293.

[2] *Art and Instinct* (Herbert Spencer Lecture, 1927).

[3] P. 143. Cp. "Artistic Creation and Cosmic Creation," p. 12, Herz Lecture, *John Rylands Library Bulletin*, 1927.

As a member of the great Jewish community, Alexander would have been false to that profound interest in religion and the destiny of man, of which it is the historical representative, if he had not had the bearing of his philosophy on these subjects constantly before him. In his first book he mentions them at the end, only to postpone the fuller treatment of them as belonging to metaphysics. He returns to them in the last two chapters of his second book. On the problem of human destiny, his view of the organic connection between mind and body forbade him to entertain any idea of immortality in the sense of individual survival. But his doctrine of the universe as groaning and travailing for the revelation of a Deity, which is "on the side of goodness,"[1] brought him very near to the conception of the fatherhood of God: "On the one hand, we finites reach out to God, who is the goal of our desires; on the other hand, God, who is sustained by us, meets us with support and 'the solution of our uneasiness,' " in what theologians have called "grace and redemption or forgiveness of sins."[2]

In the course of his life Alexander was loaded with honours. Besides receiving honorary degrees from six universities, he was a Fellow of the British Academy, an Honorary Fellow both of Baliol and Lincoln College, and in 1930 he received from the King the Order of Merit. In the obituary notice in *The Times* it was reported of him that he once remarked: "I may be wrong in the way I see the fact, but if they inscribe on my cinerary urn *Erravit cum Spinoza* I am well content." If we would not inscribe that upon it, we might well inscribe instead *Ut alter Spinoza philosophatus*.

[1] *Space, Time and Deity*, ii, p. 413. [2] *Ibid.*, pp. 398–9.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY OF POLITICS[1]

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I VENTURE to take as the subject for our consideration the philosophical study of politics. However imperfect the treatment of such a subject, it seems to me opportune that attention should at this point of time be directed to the question. The study of politics is of increasing importance in the curricula of our universities and in general adult education. There is also the plain fact that we live in times when a deep unrest of spirit and a great variety of experiment challenge ideas and institutions which have received wide acceptance. There has been, in short, a return to politics. It is well that we should consider afresh the value of the study and the methods by which it is studied.

Forty years ago there was very little place in our universities for the study of politics. Looking back on my undergraduate days, I recall that in the University of Glasgow there was no study of politics as an academic subject. Much the same could be said of all the universities of this country, with the exception of Oxford and Cambridge. Economics had already established its claim. But apart from the general consideration which might be given under the subject of ethics, politics was not in the curriculum of the faculties of arts. At Oxford, more than at any other academic centre in this country, there had been a tradition of political philosophy in the school of *Literae Humaniores*, and later in the school of Modern History—a classical and a historical tradition of great value which was enriched and stimulated by the lectures of T. H. Green on *The Principles of Political Obligation*. But very little attention was given to the study of modern institutions and forms of government. In Oxford it was not until 1910 that a university readership in political theory and institutions was established, and two years later the Gladstone Chair was founded. In Cambridge there was even less recognition given to the subject of politics, though Professor Sidgwick had in his *Elements of Politics* prepared the way for the more systematic study of government, analytical and comparative. But it was not until after the war that a chair of political science was established at Cambridge. On the other hand, the establishment of the London School of Economics and Political Science in 1895 was a notable step in the recognition of the impor-

[1] Wright Memorial Lecture: delivered on Tuesday, June 28th, at University College, Gower Street, London W.C.1.

tance not only of economics but of politics as a subject of academic study and research. It was of particular significance, as marking an advance in the study of the institutions of modern government, ranging from the constitutional forms and functions of the State to the machinery and methods of administration. Since 1920 there has been a considerable growth in political studies, inside and outside of our universities. But it is still noteworthy that, apart from the Universities of Oxford, Cambridge, and London, the provision for this subject in the universities of this country remains very restricted, and in only one of the Scottish universities is there a chair of Political Science. When we reflect on the importance and scope of the subject-matter, it is, I hope, opportune to direct attention to the position of the study of politics in our universities and colleges. The contrast with the practice in the United States of America is marked. In that country, both at the older and at the younger universities, Politics and Government have been firmly established in the curriculum of studies, and while criticism can fairly be directed to the methods of study as developed in many of the American universities, the place given to the subject is assured.

The traditional study of politics in England has been philosophical. This, developed with historical study, formed the background of our academic political education. But politics, deeply affected by scientific method, has turned to the examination of the data of politics, to the study of institutions and of administration, and to the use of comparative methods of inquiry. This inductive procedure has greatly enriched the study of politics. But it has also had its dangers. Classification and comparison of constitutions may easily deteriorate into a formal and arid study. The data are so vast and so complex that there is a danger of a mass of information with very inadequate illumination and evaluation. The teaching of politics in not a few institutions, and not least in the United States of America, has suffered from the weakness of the more theoretical study of the subject. An emphasis, therefore, of the philosophical side of political studies is the more important because of the great advance in the study of the forms and methods of government.

But there is also another aspect which has come into greater evidence—the psychological approach to politics. Graham Wallas more than anyone in this country opened the way, and it is to be regretted that others have not followed up his work to a greater extent. But even the psychological method has its dangers unless it is accompanied by a well-thought-out philosophical background, and by a proper sense of values.

We have, then, to remark the wide and growing appeal of political studies. Man is a political animal, and there is especially in our

Anglo-Saxon peoples a natural aptitude and interest in the subject of politics, in practice and in theory. Like religion, politics has a wide human appeal, and political education, adapted to meet the requirements of widely varying conditions, can be a great instrument of international understanding.

We have, therefore, to bear in mind the unique opportunity which the instrument of political education offers, and to see that such education is thought out in a way which can be assimilated most easily and be most truly beneficial to the great mass of people. For it is in the advance of political education that one great hope of continued progress lies. It is, then, all the more important that in the academic field we keep a true sense of proportion. In this approach to politics from so many sides—the historical, the comparative, the psychological—the philosophical approach is now more valuable than ever so that synthesis and perspective may be maintained. Not only is this important for the study of politics in itself, but also for the relations between politics and other subjects. For politics is the architectonic science in human relations. It has to weave together the different elements in a whole as seen in the pattern of the good community and the good man in that community. It is the sequel and complement of ethics, and they both must rest on a sound theory of knowledge. For this reason there was great wisdom in the older academic curricula in which there was a related and balanced order of studies. The increasing range of subjects claiming academic recognition, and the methods of free choice and the equality of studies, have led to a less unified and less systematic mental training than the older order with all its limitations secured. One can see this tendency writ large in the American universities. The right way of meeting the danger is in the recognition of the place of philosophy at the centre of all our academic studies. But this also affects the content and the concept of philosophy itself. It is the science of values and of relations which helps to set out that which is fundamental and to see the order in which things stand one to another. The content is greatly enriched by the range of modern studies, but we need a development true to line with that which was laid down by the great masters. Therefore we must see to it that in our academic curricula, while we provide the opportunity for all the branches of knowledge, we secure that there is this essential common study which should be claimed to be of the province of philosophy. If this is done in the great study centres of the universities, the influence of this method of treatment will pass over their walls into the fields of the wider community and influence the whole character and value of adult education. And it will be welcomed. For the plain man—if we may use such a term—in virtue of his social nature and experience has

a strong sense of values. He wishes to get what can help him to a way of life which he feels to be worthy of a man and a citizen. It is because it appeals to this sense that politics, like religion, has been, or can be, so universal an agent in the progress of mankind. To-day, in the complexities and distractions of modern life, it is therefore more than ever important to consider the main lines of constructive social thought, from a philosophical standpoint.

Let me then try to state some of the essentials which belong to such a philosophical view. First, there is not simply the recognition that man is a political animal, but that he is a creative being, in whom not only social sense, but imagination and, above all, will are the directing powers. The will to create is the deepest urge in man. It is true not simply of the individual, but also of the society or community in which men realize their social nature. History has been rich in illustrations of the power both of the individual and of what we may call the social will—the will of orders and groups, of States and communities. Surely to-day one of the most striking things in the modern world has been the will-power and the creative energy which have brought into so great a place the new forms of government which have emerged since the war. Whatever we may think of their qualities and their objects, they offer signal evidence of the power of will of the leaders to create a new order of State—Soviet, Fascist, or Nazi—to take the most familiar examples. These forms—because of their very will-power—challenge our own Anglo-Saxon society, whether in the old or in the new world, to give proof of a will and energy no less vital and no less able to re-create and to provide a way of life as good or better than the new forms of government have achieved or can achieve. It is then of first importance to recognize that, while nature in its manifold and complex influences shapes our way of life, the will to the good life is the unique and the most essential quality of man, and that he is the conscious architect of the society in which he is to live. It is the challenge to the policy of drift. It is the policy of planned effort. The will of the organized community is something which can overcome mountains of difficulties. The power of the organized community is something of which we only yet dimly know the possibilities. There is no inevitability in poverty and unemployment and slumdom. The will of the society can conquer all of them. It is fundamental that we should have as strongly as others this sense of the creative will in politics. For it is on this that the whole structure of our thought and action is based.

Second, we must be clear as to the purpose and end of political society—that it is to make possible the good life in which all its members may share. "Treat every man as an end and not a means

only" is a condition of the good society. This is one of the tests by which we try the merits of any political society.

A third principle is, that to see the nature of the parts we must see the whole. However far from its realization, we must keep in view a world order which completes the life of the individual States which are only parts of the wider political society. The very difficulties and failures which have marked the efforts to advance towards a world order do not remove the need for it, but only help to show by what means it has to be sought and with how great patience. The discontents and dangers of the times in which we live make it clearer than ever that there is no peace, and no safe prosperity and well-being, until the principles of world order have been secured.

Further, we must frame for ourselves the idea of the good community, so that we can see the different elements which enter into it and their significance. This is the sequel to and consummation of the foregoing points. For we sum it all up in our idea of the good community. Here it is that we bring theory into practice. It is the philosopher in all of us translating into terms of government and of community organization the theory which we approve. We have our principles by which we assay the goodness of the constitution. If a constitution fails to provide what we know is essential to the good life, then we cannot accept that type of constitution. We see to-day more clearly than ever the need of such tests. The philosophical question is "What is the good community?" The student of politics has to be asking himself time and time again this question, and the concept of the good community, step by step, becomes more defined and complete. There is no single pattern, but in various forms we may find the variety of expression of the idea of the good community. We have to face the evidence that different types of State, and different organization of functions in similar types of State, can be the expression which suits best the history, the conditions of life, and the mental characteristics of different peoples. In fact, it is only through the experience of varieties of types, and through the cross-fertilization, if I may say so, of these types, that we are able to discover how the social end can be best expressed. For it is by experience that we discover ways and means of achieving the expression of the good life. The forms and functions of government are continually changing. There is constant growth and adaptation. And we cannot at any point of time be certain how a particular type of State may develop. We thought the way of progress and of the expression of the political nature of man was so much simpler than it is. Lord Bryce, in what we may regard as his political testament, puts forward the view that we have reached the stage in which it is not so much in the form and constitutional

framework of States that interest and experiment lie, as in the functions of the State. But even in the seventeen years since that was written we have seen great new experiments in the form of national States, and we see in the international sphere one great constitutional experiment which has still left unsolved the problem of the form of international government. Progress comes largely by experiment, by trial and error. But throughout it is necessary to have the philosophical critique of value, seeking to assay the breadth and depth of each stage in our experiments. It is the critical Socratic spirit which is necessary to progress, and never more so than in the complexity of modern experience. But this variety of experience does yield conclusions. We have the comparison of the working of different types, and gradually by trial and error certain forms tend to predominate. If forms are found unequal to meet the fundamental aspirations of man as a social being, they adapt themselves—or give place to other forms. For more and more the importance of good government is being realized. In the modern world the powers of government have so greatly increased —and the powers not only of government but of combinations whether of capital or labour—that control and direction are of vital consequence in the pursuit of the good life of the community. Government can do great damage to the whole social and economic well-being of the community. There is a new realization of the importance of good government, and men are asking again the question—What is good government?

There is always a danger of forgetting things that are simple, perhaps even obvious. Politics is not something abstruse. The very term—the good life—which it is so difficult to analyse completely, yet expresses the fundamental simplicity of politics. There has been a tendency in the present generation to belittle the creeds of the preceding generation. The "rights of man" may not express the sum of political endeavour, but they give an answer of permanent value. That all men are equal contains a great truth as well as something that is contrary to experience. The rights of freedom of speech, of freedom of association, and of freedom of movement are great elements in the good life. The claim to life, liberty, and property expresses much that is vital to every man. All such rights are conditioned—and especially is this true of the right to property. But the study of the nature of rights and of sovereignty is still of the essence of political education. There is a danger that we pay too little attention to thinking and re-thinking the various conditions and qualifications of rights and of sovereignty. No study of constitutions and of administrative method can have the fruitful character which it should have unless it is accompanied by this constant reconsideration of the nature of rights and sovereignty.

We are apt to find the history of political thought, or the comparison of constitutions, an easier and more concrete study, and politics is enriched thereby, but it is necessary to have the philosophical evaluation of each phase of thought and of each form of constitution. And for this purpose we must have our principles and standards of value clear. I find, therefore, that in the study of politics we must not dispense with or give second place to the more abstract study of the nature of the State, of rights and sovereignty, but that we must carry on this method of political examination enlarged and enriched by the great variety of experience which illustrates the nature and conditions attaching to rights and sovereignty. Power politics tend to discourage and even to deny the value of such speculation. It is in the pursuit of liberty and in the free association of men for their political and spiritual development that such speculation has its great value. The rights of man are the essentials of a good constitution. If by reason of their abuse, or because of the dangers which temporarily threaten the safety and existence of the community, these rights are limited or even suspended, this is an abnormal condition. The end in view of any good State must be the establishment of those fundamental rights, the denial or the restriction even of which limits the capacity of the members of the society to attain the good life. The study, therefore, of these fundamental conditions is a way in which societies can emerge from the dominion of power politics. It is also in this way that functions and forms of government tend to approach nearer to one another. For is it not a reflection which has arisen in our minds from time to time, that while there is in some States the denial of the rights of free speech, of association, and of other such fundamental rights, yet there is at the same time a growth of social functions and a realization in other respects of much that contributes to the good life? We disagree deeply with many things that we see in the Fascist or Communist forms of government of the day, but we must recognize also how large has been their positive contribution. We must try to find the specific good as well as the evil, and to see how that, under conditions in which fear and ambition are less dominant forces, these fundamental rights, which are so large a part of liberty, may be re-established.

Let us try, then, to express what is our idea of the good community. That idea comes out of a long political experience through which our Anglo-Saxon peoples have been passing. We believe that representative responsible government is the best way of releasing the political energies of man; that Cabinet government is the best of the forms of representative and responsible government; that the nation forms the unit in a system of international government and order; that by means of representative government we can advance,

on the one hand, towards the best form of organized world government, and that, similarly, by representative institutions in local government we are in the process of building up a differentiated yet integrated political life, which reaches down to the smallest unit of the parish and stretches up to the institutions of international government; that the citizen thereby enters into and shares in the life both of his local community, of his State, and of the larger federations or unions which have their final consummation in the field of world government; that the distribution of powers is by experience being continually adjusted between the different planes of government, and that the flexibility of the constitutional framework is an essential quality if the system of government is to respond to the changing conditions of a progressive community.

But there is another aspect no less important. Great as has been the gift of representative government, we have also learned, especially in this twentieth century, that the community is an organization greater than the State, greater than the machinery of representative government and its statutory authorities, and that the power of free association expressing itself through voluntary bodies of a wide variety of functions in co-operation with the statutory authorities is a type of community far more capable of realizing the good life than is possible under a simple representative, and still more a mainly bureaucratic, type of government.

Now in this new development of the community idea there is deep significance—in line with the evolution of democracy, as we understand that term. The idea of democracy is that as far as possible the members should be associated with the work of government and that there should be full and free opportunity for groups of members and for individuals sharing in and contributing to the life of the community. The form in which this has been expressing itself with increasing activity in recent years has been not only in the growth of the functions of the State and the devolution of power to local authorities of a representative character, but also in the part which voluntary organizations have to play in co-operation with statutory authorities. This co-operative commonwealth of statutory and voluntary bodies, central and local, is developing before our eyes, and in none of the great industrial States of the world has it been carried so far as in this country. It is still far from its full expression, but the associative principle, springing from the free exercise of initiative, is enabling a great variety and richness of community effort to advance the standard of well-being, is bringing about a breaking down of class divisions and the growth of good neighbourliness, and, what is also very important, is increasing the power and usefulness of public opinion. Democracy is governed by enlightened public opinion. This experi-

ment in community life is in its nature as significant as the growth of representative government. For while there have been in other generations strong elements of community life, especially local, here and now is a much wider community consciousness, developed largely through the social services in which voluntary associated effort has so often pioneered the way for State action. This new community sense which calls out the initiative of the individual and which seeks to provide increased opportunities for self-expression in the service of the community has a significance which is being appreciated in countries with very widely differing conditions of life. Forms of voluntary social effort may succeed in stimulating community life even where representative government at least in its responsible forms, may not be suited to the conditions of a community. In some countries the introduction of representative government has not worked easily, because there is not a sufficient development of the social and associative qualities of the individual in ways which enable him to take a responsible share in even local government. In such cases we must get down to the education of simple voluntary activities in communal life. Thus in its sense of values and in seeing the whole range of social development, from the primitive to the more advanced forms, the philosophical study of politics should help to interpret the past, to see the relations of things one to another in the present, and to re-state for each generation the complex nature of that end which is our goal—the Good Community.

SCIENCE AND MORALITY

Professor A. E. TAYLOR

"I do not think that moral philosophy can be of the use of which it should be, unless it struggles, at least, to cope with the greatness and complexity of the problem which there is before it and to face the difficulty of the variableness and vastness of the nature of man."—*J. Grote.*

Can there be such a thing as moral science, or a science of morality? And if so, what sense has the word *science* in such a connection? In the middle of the last century such a question would probably have seemed superfluous. Utilitarians, Comtists, and not a few "evolutionists" would all have claimed to be moralists, with this advantage over the metaphysical or theological moralists of an earlier day that their own moral doctrines were "scientific" (which meant apparently that they formed an integral part of a wider view of things for which the principles of the natural sciences provided the foundations). Mill, Spencer, Stephen, to name no others, would presumably all, if challenged, have claimed to be scientific moralists in this sense, as distinguished from the "unscientific" moralists who filled University Chairs of Moral Philosophy or occupied pulpits on Sundays. The intellectual climate of to-day is very different; in view of the current tendency to exalt the "irrational elements" in life it is now not only possible but pertinent to raise the question whether the very phrase "moral science" is not an attempted conjunction of incompatibles, a *contradictio in adiecto.*

Plainly our answer to the question will depend very much on the precise significance we give to the word *science,* and it is to some extent arbitrary how we are to use that word. But it would, at least, be generally admitted that before any body of assertions can be called a science it must satisfy two conditions: the assertions which compose it must be true, and they must be systematically interconnected by logical interrelations. The most coherent body of *false* assertions is not a science,[1] and again a number of assertions, however true each of them may be, does not constitute a science if one can detect no systematic logical connections between its members. Consider, for example, the entries in a chronicle, or the items in a list of historical dates. Every item or entry may be a record

[1] Thus the consistency with itself of an astrological system would not entitle astrology to be considered a science. Yet it is quite conceivable that the astrologer's initial postulates should be mutually compatible and that his inferences should be drawn from them with logical correctness.

of truth, but the construction of such a chronicle or list of dates is not the writing of "scientific" history (if there is, indeed, such a thing). At best, the chronicler, or the compiler of the list, is providing materials for "scientific" history (if there is such a thing), not making a contribution to it. The very possibility of moral science, then, depends on our ability to make assertions about right and wrong, moral good and evil, which are (*a*) true, and (*b*) systematically interconnected. It follows that "moral science" must at once be confessed to be an impossibility unless we can dispose of a doctrine which is beginning to be expressly formulated by some of the more thoroughgoing of our "logical analysts." According to this doctrine, sentences which contain an ethical predicate, such as *right, wrong, obligatory, undutiful,* cannot properly be said to be either true or false, or, in fact, to have a *meaning* at all. They *state* nothing, and so, I suppose, should not properly even be called propositions, but are merely "emotive" utterances, whatever that phrase may mean. What it does actually mean to those who employ it is more than I can tell, but I should like to ask what it *should* mean if it is to justify the radical distinction between such "emotive" use of language and the meaningful use of it.

To say that certain sounds are an "emotive" expression, or are expressive of emotion is to say something highly ambiguous; we need therefore to be very careful to fix the precise sense of such a phrase before we allow ourselves to assume that language which is "emotive," or "expresses emotion" cannot also be language which has a value or disvalue as true or false. If all that is meant in calling an utterance "emotive" is that the speaker or writer is *moved* to make it by some emotion, and would not have made it if he had not felt the emotion, almost any form of words we employ in normal waking life may be said to be "emotive." A sane man in the waking state does not commonly make any statement, however true it may be, unless it is relevant to a situation which *interests* him, and interest has always its emotional side, though it may not always be very prominent in consciousness. No one but a "freak" like "Mr. F.'s aunt" in Dickens makes remarks like "there's milestones on the Dover Road" apropos of nothing in which an interest is felt. Hence a normal sane utterance is regularly "emotive" in this minimal sense, though its primary purpose is not to call attention to the speaker's emotion. If I say to you, "that girl dances well," or "that tree will be the next to fall in the autumn gales," my remark is certainly prompted by admiration of the dancing, or by some kind of emotional concern in the fate of the tree, though it is not the fact that I am feeling admiration or concern (a fact about myself), but the fact that the dancing is graceful or the state of the tree precarious (a fact about the dancer, or the tree), to which I want to direct your

attention. And these statements are certainly capable of being true or false. It is thus no proof that sentences containing an ethical predicate cannot properly be called true (or false) to say that the utterance of them is prompted by emotion; the same thing might be said of all normal utterance.

Again, it would not be true to say that at any rate utterances which are *passionately* emotional, intensely charged with emotion, need be in any way removed by the intensity of the emotion which inspires them from the class of meaningful utterances with a "truth-value." The bare statement of fact may itself be charged with the deepest emotion, as when Macduff says of Malcolm, "He has no children," or Lady Macbeth in the sleep-walking scene, "the thane of Fife had a wife," or Lear that the "little dogs" bark at him. So in everyday life, "He'll go over the edge," is a statement which will very soon be shown to be true or false by the event, and "What a liar you are," does not cease to be a true assertion about a man because it may have been prompted either by intense disgust or by keen admiration. Even if it were true, then, that utterances containing an ethical predicate are always expressive of emotion in an exceptionally high degree—and I think this not true, since it seems to me that I often pronounce some act right or wrong without feeling any remarkable degree of emotion—it would still not be proved that these statements are not also true or false, as the case may be.

Even if we took what seems to me the certainly false view that the purpose of enunciating a statement with an "ethical predicate" is simply to proclaim the fact that the utterer is, at the moment of speaking, feeling a certain emotion, this would be no reason for denying that such statements are true (or false, as the case may be), in the proper sense of the words. For if such phrases are "emotive" in that sense of the word, then the sentence "this is good (or evil)" states an alleged fact, the fact that the speaker is now feeling "moved" to approval or disgust, and since he may sometimes lie about his emotions and sometimes be honestly mistaken about them, it is as pertinent to ask about a moral judgment as to ask about any other judgment, whether it does or does not represent the "facts" as they really are. It would not help an opponent to suggest that a relevant difference is made by the impossibility that *B* should "verify" *A*'s statements about *A*'s emotions. It is true that this is strictly impossible. Since I can never actually inspect the feelings of anyone else, it is always conceivable that the assertions the other man make about his feelings are untrue. But to be untrue is one thing, to be unmeaning in the sense of being incapable of a "truth-value" is another. If the privacy to myself of the emotions which, on the proposed interpretation, my moral judgments assert me to be experiencing were a good reason for holding that such judgments

—or rather such "sentences indicative"—lie outside the field of the true and the false, it would equally follow that such a statement as "my tooth aches badly" can be neither true nor false, since, though you can "verify" by inspection the fact that there is a cavity in my tooth, you can never "inspect" my pains.[1]

There is, as it seems to me, only one interpretation of the language which the rest of us regard as expressing moral judgments left open to the "analyst" who wishes consistently to deny that such language can be true (or false). His meaning in what he says about "emotive" utterance must be not that these deliverances *communicate* information about the emotional mood of the speaker, but that they are intended purely, like political propaganda, to *excite* or induce certain emotional moods in the hearer. When I say, "that is an act of heroic courage," or "that is a despicable meanness," I must be taken merely to be making a noise which will stimulate the hearer in the first case to shout "Bravo" and in the second to yell "Boo" or "Yah," and it is as irrelevant to my use of this language whether or not I, the speaker, feel the emotion I am trying to arouse in my audience as it is irrelevant to the platform politician whether he shares the emotions he is trying to produce in *his* audience. For, on this interpretation, when I call one act heroically right and a second damnably wrong, I am not even trying to inform you that I feel admiration for the one and horror at the other; I am only

[1] I know that the "analysts" seem commonly to hold that "verification" may be effected in two different ways: (1) By observation of *sensa*, and (2) by introspection. But the admission of introspection as a method of verification—though indispensable in fact—seems to me a fatal weak point in the theory, since if there is one way of ascertaining the truth of a statement other than the inspection of *sensa*, and radically different from it, there seems to be no antecedent reason why there may not be a plurality of such ways, in which case it will be possible to "verify" statements which cannot be shown to be true either by examination of *sensa* or by introspection. I suspect, indeed, that the "analyst" only consents to recognize introspection because he is not alive to the radical difference between it and all examination of *sensa*, imagining both to be ways of inspecting objects presented to our notice. If so, I am sure that he is mistaken about the whole nature of what is called introspection. My awareness of pain or anger, while I am feeling them, is emphatically *not* observation of what lies in the field of objects attended to; it is awareness of an attitude on the part of the subject who is attending to them. James Ward long ago used to complain of the mischief wrought in psychology by extreme "presentativism," but his warnings seem to me never to have borne all the fruit they should.

(It is not strictly relevant, perhaps, to add that in my own opinion it is a complete mistake to describe even the process by which we "verify" a statement about the "world outside" as inspection of our own *sensa* in the sense in which that word is employed by those who make prominent use of it. I mean that what we try to inspect, and succeed in inspecting whenever we really "verify" such statements, is never "private" to ourselves, but always a "public" fact.)

trying, for some unknown purpose, to make you feel these emotions, and it may well be that I shall often be most successful if I am a consummate actor, like Antony in his oration over the body of Caesar, undisturbed by the emotional tempest I am awakening in the breast of others.

If it were really possible to interpret "ethical" language in this fashion, it would, of course, follow that it is senseless to ask whether such language can be *true*. It would be like asking whether "Hurrah!" "*à bas!*" "go it!" "damn!" are true or false. Or I may take a closer analogy from an incident which dwells in my memory after the lapse of over forty years. I recollect being present with one or two friends at a Liberal political meeting where the speakers were careful to begin as many sentences as they could with such grammatical subjects as "The Tories," "Lord Salisbury," "Mr. Chamberlain," and to make a long pause after the enunciation of these names, obviously in the hope that the audience would be excited by the sound of them to hisses and similar "emotive" reactions. (I am glad to remember that my friends and myself, being securely encased in a gallery from which we could not be dislodged, were able to spoil the effect by sedulously filling up the pauses with loud cheers and applause which, I am afraid, was far from being sincere.) Now here was a genuine employment of language for the *mere* purpose of evoking "emotive" reactions, it would be senseless to ask whether "the Tories," or "Mr. Chamberlain," is a true or a false enunciation; the intention was only that the sound of the syllables should provoke a manifestation of hostile feeling (and it was our resentment of this abuse of language which prompted my friends and myself to do what lay in us, to disconcert the proceedings).

Now it is, of course, open to the bright young logical analyst, if he pleases, to profess that when he uses the language of moral approval or condemnation, he intends only to employ it in this fashion. If he likes to say that when he utters the words *good, bad, right, wrong*, he is merely employing them as "expletives" which he finds successful in producing an entirely unintelligent reaction from his auditors, no one can prove that he is lying or deluding himself (though one may have one's suspicion on the point).[1] But if he pretends that this is how the rest of us use these "ethical predicates," then, I think, he is simply stating the thing that is not. Our intention—or at any rate our hope—is that our language will awake an emotional response, favourable or unfavourable, but also, and primarily, to call attention to a character present in the act we call good or evil, right or wrong, which *justifies* this response. Our analyst

[1] Such a profession reminds me, for one, of Morris Finsbury's explanation that when he referred to "Dent" Pitman he was only using an "expletive," a statement which was naturally not credited by the interlocutor.

may assert (very rashly, I think) that *he* detects no such ethical characters in the acts in question and that our language consequently has no meaning intelligible to him, but that gives him no right to say that it has not a meaning which is perfectly intelligible to us. He may be like a colour-blind person who should say that other men's statements about the colours of the rose and the turf can be neither true nor false on the ground that if they are taken to have a "truth-value," they presuppose qualitative differences which *he* is unable to "verify." It may be barely conceivable that all mankind, with the exception of a few "sophisticated" young men of the present generation, have deluded themselves into imagining they discern purely non-existent contrasted moral characters of human actions; though, as Butler long ago said, the supposition is extravagantly improbable: "it cannot be imagined that all these authors, throughout all these treatises, had absolutely no meaning at all to their words, or a meaning merely chimerical."[1] But, at any rate, if we who are less "sophisticated" are convinced that we do discern moral distinctions between acts and can make a whole body of coherent statements about these distinctions, our conviction is not proved to be "chimerical" by the "analyst's" declaration, however sincere it may be, that the distinctions are imperceptible to *him*. He may be "colour-blind" or "tone-deaf" in these matters.

This suggests a reply to the suggestion, if any one should think of making it, that there are notorious cases of purely "chimerical" beliefs which have imposed on mankind generally for ages. The most obvious example is perhaps that of the once universal belief in witchcraft. If there is a whole literature of ethics, so, it may be said, there is a whole elaborate literature dealing with witches, their crimes, and the methods by which they can be detected and frus-

[1] To take a particular illustration, I happen just to have re-read John Grote's *Examination of the Utilitarian Philosophy*. I have found myself often agreeing with the "ethical" propositions of the writer, sometimes dissenting from them, but only rarely perplexed by a sentence which appeared to make no assertion, true, or false. And in these rare cases I seemed always to have reason to believe that my perplexity was due merely to some failure in the author to put his thought into unambiguous language. It is possible, of course, both that I may have mistakenly thought some of his assertions true when they were actually false (or vice versa), and that I may have thought his meaning ambiguous where it is not really so, but is it credible that through a work of 350 pages I should have been deluded into the fancy that there was meaning, true or false, when in fact there was none at all? If it is credible, then it is equally credible that the writings of the logical analysts themselves may equally have imposed on me in the same way, and that I am deluding myself into the notion that I disagree with them, when there is really no asserted meaning to be agreed or disagreed with. They also, perhaps, are only making noises which evoke certain emotive dispositions in me?

trated. Yet, it will be argued, the existence of the *Malleus Maleficarum* and its likes are no proof that there are or ever have been witches; why then does the existence of treatises on ethics prove that our moral distinctions have a meaning which is not "chimerical"? But here we need to make a *distinguo*. The literature of witchcraft does really prove the real existence of something; it proves that there really have been multitudes of persons who have claimed the extraordinary powers attributed to witches and have used their position as the supposed repositories of these powers for criminal purposes. It is no "chimera," but an historical fact, for example, that "covens" of such persons were common and active in Scotland in the seventeenth century. On any sane theory, what was "chimerical" in the beliefs of the writers on witchcraft was their *explanation* of facts which were themselves genuine enough. And the objection to the explanation, as it seems to me, is not that it is meaningless, but that it is most probably false. In the same way, it is perfectly possible to put forward *explanations* of "moral facts" which are "chimerical," but the emptiness of the explanations is no proof that the facts themselves are not genuine facts. And Butler seems to me justified in treating the preoccupation with the moral characteristics of human acts to which the serious literature of all ages is witness as a sufficient presumption that our acts have the characters indicated by the great pairs of contrasted moral predicates. *Φήμη δ' οὔτις πάμπαν ἀπόλλυται ἥντινα λαοί . . .*

In a word, I agree altogether with Dr. A. C. Ewing that the whole case for the "meaninglessness" of sentences with ethical predicates falls to the ground unless we can make the initial assumption that all meaningful statements can be "verified," and that this assumption—which seems to me plainly false—being itself unverifiable, ought, in consistency, to be regarded by the "analyst" as meaningless, and therefore *a fortiori* not true. And I would add the remark that if a discourse of moral exhortation or rebuke proves effective in arousing the "emotive" reactions desired by the speaker, it succeeds only because the listeners assume the ethical predicates employed to have a meaning and to be truly applicable to the conduct to which they are being applied. Your audience will *not* be got to "boo" at a man by describing his conduct as wicked if they either attach no meaning to the word *wicked*, or give it a meaning which is not true of the conduct you are describing. I shall not be wrought to a frenzy against a Nero by denunciation of his cruelty unless I already believe that *evil* is a word with a meaning, and that cruel deeds have the character, whatever it is, meant by the word *evil*. If I thought it simply unmeaning to call any conduct evil, or false to call cruelty in particular evil, your eloquence would leave me unmoved. Purely meaningless language, recognized as such, will

have no "emotional" effect on the hearer, except possibly to bore him.[1]

(It is, no doubt, true that a crowd might conceivably be wound up to a high pitch of excitement by a vehement appeal in a wholly foreign language, but the thing is only possible because the general bearing and demeanour of the foreigner speaks for him; it suggests, rightly or wrongly, to his hearers that he is struggling to convey a meaning, and one which they believe themselves, in part, to grasp. Dr. Johnson—if it was he—is said to have stirred an old market-woman to fury by calling her a "noun substantive," but the reason of her wrath was, of course, that she took the unfamiliar vocables to be equivalents of others whose meaning was only too familiar.)

There is thus no objection in *limine* to the description of the moral life as the subject-matter of a science, when the word *science* is understood to mean any body of true propositions (or judgments, if you prefer the name) systematically interconnected through discoverable principles. Even on a naturalistic theory like Hume's "moral science" remains *scientific* in this sense, though there may be nothing distinctively *moral* about it. It does not simply present us with a string of records of isolated social approvals and disapprovals, but connects them systematically by a principle; the approvals are all of "acts or qualities" either "agreeable" or "useful," and the disapprovals are all of the useless or disagreeable. To live by it would be not merely to conform to a set of rules, but to have a *principle* of "choice and avoidance."

This otherwise superfluous remark is introduced here simply to lead up to the important point that to recognize morality in conduct as the subject-matter of a possible science commits us to no view whatever on the question of the methods appropriate to that science. In saying that we are entitled to presuppose the existence of principles of consistent moral approbation and disapprobation, and to expect them to disclose themselves when sought for by the proper method, we are making no assumption that any particular method for their discovery will prove to be the right one. What methods will succeed in conducting us to the discovery of principles in any field of inquiry must naturally depend on the character of the field.

[1] Cf. John Grote's comment on the suggestion that by calling action conducive to happiness *right* or *good*, philosophers have intended merely to convey praise and incite their readers to the performance of such action: "I am disposed to think that Mr. Mill would agree with me that such is not the way in which the human race could act; that language could not be made by contrivance to give the notion that action was valuable for one reason, while the men who made the language had in their minds all the time the notion that it was really valuable for another reason; could not in fact be employed to conceal or disguise the thoughts of the whole human race" (*op. cit.*, 272).

In particular the question whether the methods which have proved fruitful in the natural sciences will prove equally fruitful, or fruitful at all, in moral science can only be answered by first answering the question whether a moral fact and a natural, or physical, fact are facts of the same kind. Natural, or physical, fact, we may perhaps be content, for our purposes at the moment, to describe as the occurrence of a specific event in a determinate region of space and time. (Whether there are or are not irreducible differences in kind between some of these natural facts and others—whether, for example, biological facts can or cannot be regarded as peculiar and highly complex chemical facts—is an issue which need not concern us.) By a moral fact, or fact of the moral life, I mean here any action which can be truly said to be either good or right, or deserving of approbation, or evil, wrong, deserving of condemnation. Now it may be that there is a radical distinction between an *action* and an *event*, as I propose in due order to contend that there is. At any rate, we are not entitled to take it for granted without discussion that there is no such distinction. Until we have satisfied ourselves that there is not, we have no right to presuppose that the methods which disclose principles when applied to natural facts will be equally applicable to moral facts, or even applicable to them at all. It is pure *petitio principii* to take it for granted that if morality is the subject-matter for a science, the methods of that science must be those of the experimental sciences, or that the ethics of a philosopher like Kant who rejects this assumption must be less "scientific" than those of a philosopher like Herbert Spencer.

The extent to which either deserves to be called a scientific moralist is to be measured by the thoroughness with which he has envisaged the field of facts with which he is professing to deal in their full concreteness, and compelled the facts themselves to disclose the principles they presuppose, and we are not at liberty to assume in advance that the advantage in this respect must lie with the more "naturalistic" and less "transcendental" thinker. His naturalism may prove to mean that he has ignored the specific character of *moral* fact, and is therefore, in his ethics, the more "unscientific" of the two.

Now if we take an initial broadly comprehensive view of the whole field covered by the natural sciences, we can see at once that they are all concerned in finding the answer to a question of definite character, and that the nature of this question determines for us the type of answer which will satisfy it, and so decides what shall be, for our purposes, relevant fact. Our question has always the form *quid eveniet si . . . ?* If events of a certain kind occur, then what? If particles with such and such masses are set moving in such and such directions, what will follow? What will happen if such and such

chemicals are mixed in such and such proportions and at such and such a temperature? If such and such a plant is placed in such and such conditions in respect of sunshine, moisture, nutriment, and the like, how will it be affected? The question is always what will happen if some process is allowed to run its course without our interference, and the assumption made in putting it is that there is a definite way in which that course will be run. It may be that the situations of which we wish to know the outcome are presented for us without any action of our own to prepare them, as when astronomy as a science began with the attempt to answer the question in what orbits we may expect to see the planets moving. It may be that we have experimentally to produce the initial situation of which we wish to study the outcome by elaborate arrangements of our own. But the important point is that in either case, a certain situation once secured, we "leave things to take their course" and watch to see what it will be. Even when, as in a prolonged series of experiments, we introduce one modification of the conditions after another, it is always with the purpose of then noting what will "happen of itself" after each new modification introduced into the situation. The distinction popularly drawn between observation and experiment is a secondary one, as it is largely arbitrary where the line of demarcation is to be drawn between them. The one point of importance is that we should know precisely the character of the situation we are interested in studying. It is a great practical convenience, for this purpose, to be able to produce the precise situation we want for ourselves, but in principle it makes no difference to the type of method available in our study whether we have done this or nature has provided us with our situation unsought. In either case, the question before us is, as I said simply, "this being the situation, what next?" And it is no objection against such a description of the problem of natural science to say, truly enough, that some natural sciences, such as astronomy and geology, are largely concerned not with answering the question "what *next*?" but with telling us what was the condition of the earth's crust, the sun, or the Galaxy millions of years ago. For the answers to these questions of natural history are provided on the strength of previous answers to other questions of the "what next" type. Before astronomers could raise any problems about the past history of the solar system, for example, they had already to be in possession of a generally correct account of the way in which the members of the system do move, i.e. an answer to the question given their present positions, masses, velocities, and accelerations, where may we expect to see them go?

What I may call the typical problem of natural science is thus of the form *quid eveniet si . . . ?* By using the word *eveniet* I mean

that the problem is always how a certain situation will be continued if left uninterfered with; I add the *si . . .*, of course, to indicate the hypothetical character of all "scientific laws." They do not assert that the situations of which they describe the continuations ever actually occur exactly as they are described. In many cases we can be quite sure that they do not, but are simplified "ideal pure cases," and in no case can we be theoretically certain that our description has not omitted some relevant, or included some irrelevant circumstance. The probability that we have committed one of these errors may be so little as to be negligible for practical purposes, but it is never zero.

The orientation of "reason in its practical use" is entirely different. Here the question to be answered is never *quid eveniet*, but always *quid mihi faciendum, quod vitae sectabor iter?* The moral problem, which even the most resolute logical positivist can never ignore in the management of his daily life, however stoutly he may deny its existence in his speculative theory, is never what will happen "of itself" if a given situation is allowed to develop itself, but always what kind of change I am to introduce into it. It is, of course, possible to ask the other type of question with reference to situations in which the constituents are ourselves and other personal agents. An "introvert" with a marked interest in psychology can, at times and for a time, by an effort attain an attitude of detachment in which he *seems* to be watching the spontaneous development of the "mental events" of his own life without intending to deflect their direction. We can, and sometimes do, say and do various things, merely to see, as the phrase is, how other persons will "take them." But this sort of interest in ourselves and in other persons is not the attitude of morality. No precept or maxim of any conceivable moral code is a mere answer to the question what will come of it if certain persons are placed in a situation of a certain type; the question which even the most "naturalistic" of moral theories sets itself to answer is the very different one in what situations I am to place myself and others, what direction I am to give to any initiative. I want to know, for example, not what will come of it *if* I revenge affronts and what if I pardon them, but *whether* I am to pardon them or to revenge them. I cannot, of course, answer this second question without knowing *something* about the answer to the first, but it is still a wholly different question and remains to be dealt with when the first has been disposed of. Even the logical analyst who theoretically professes to regard "ethical" statements as meaningless cannot escape the daily and hourly necessity of having to make decisions. Like the rest of us, he has to decide whether he will or will not take a certain journey, accept a certain post, or make a certain offer of marriage or a certain business proposal. Whenever he is faced with

the need to come to a decision, he is treating his life not as a course of events to be watched and described but as a thing to be made, and a thing which may either be made as it should be or made otherwise, according to the use he makes of his initiative. Thus whereas in making a scientific experiment the problem how we are to intervene by our own initiative is secondary and can be at once answered in principle by saying that we are to do so to realize the situation in the development of which we are interested and then to let things take their own course, in practice it is the question how we are to intervene, what we are to make of our lives, which is paramount and the further question what will come of it which is subsidiary.

It is a consequence of this that the moral problems, properly stated, is not *quid mihi faciendum si . . .* but *quid mihi faciendum* without any further qualification. When I have to take a decision, I may already be satisfied that if I decide in this sense, I shall increase my income, or add to my reputation, or gratify a cherished longing, or improve my expectation of living to advanced age, if I decide in that I shall diminish my income, shall risk my reputation, shall disappoint my hopes, shall impair my "expectation of life," yet I have still to decide whether I will take this course or that. It is not a sufficient answer, for example, to the question whether I am te close with a certain proposal or not to say that if I do so, I have every expectation of affluence; if I do not, I am pretty certain to remain poor. An adviser who regarded such considerations as decisive would be tacitly implying the doctrine of Jim Pinkerton that "it is every man's duty to die rich if he can," and no intelligent recipient of the advice could well avoid retorting on him, like Lothian Dodd, with the awkward question "Why?" It would not be much more satisfying to say, "Decide for this alternative against that because this line of action will probably in the end give you whatever it is that you want most, and the other will not." For though I may *perhaps* know what it is that at this moment I want most, I can never be sure that I shall continue to want that thing most; one of the results of any important decision will be that the making of it will affect my whole "scale of values" in all sorts of subtle ways, and so that by taking my decision I am determining what I shall want. What I shall want out of life will depend on the sort of man I come to be, and I make myself that sort of man by the decisions which I take throughout my life.

None of us are born into the world ready-made devotees of "women, wine, and song," of wealth, fame, power, virtue, or anything else. At most it can only be said that some of these things have a stronger attraction for one man, others for another. It is each of us who decides for himself in the main by the way he directs his

choices which of them he shall care for most. The moral shaping of our lives is no simple matter of selecting means to some end which is prescribed for us once for all from the outset and which we might, by taking sufficient time for reflection, envisage in advance; we have to decide for ourselves what our ends, as well as the means by which we compass them, shall be. Indetermination of this kind is a fundamental characteristic of the life of practice which we are bound to recognize as a fact, independently of any speculative theory libertarian or anti-libertarian, by which we may try to co-ordinate the facts of human life with the rest of our knowledge. Any rule for the practical direction of life must therefore be based on the presupposition of a *faciendum* which is *faciendum simpliciter*, not *faciendum if* some particular consequence is to be achieved. There we have the unassailable kernel of truth in the Kantian doctrine that the precepts of the moral law are *categorical* imperatives.

To make my precise point clearer, let me take a simple illustration of it from my own personal history. As a young man I received and declined the offer of a post which would have meant passing years of my active life, and perhaps the whole of it, in India. When I look back upon that decision and ask myself whether it was justified or not, it would not be enough to say that it is justified because the life I have in fact led has been productive of certain results which I now find satisfactory, but should not have achieved if I had accepted the post offered to me, that I have got what I wanted out of life; and should not have got it if my decision had been different. For it is reasonably clear that if I had closed with the offer and had spent my life between twenty-five and forty or forty-five in India, my interests would have been in many ways different from what they actually are. I should not have had the life which I now pronounce satisfactory, but I should have had one which would very possibly have been at least equally satisfactory in retrospect to the man I should now be if I had then chosen differently.[1] It follows, then, that in deciding at the time whether to accept or decline, I could not have reached any issue by merely asking myself which course would provide me with the life on which I might expect to look back with the greater satisfaction in my later age. If I could have been shown in advance in some magic mirror the life I have actually led and the life I should have led if I had migrated to India and then asked "which picture will give you the more content when you come to review it at the end?" I could not have answered in either sense, since the answer must depend to an

[1] E.g. it would not be enough to say, "If you had gone to India, you would never have written books about Plato," since if I had gone there, and wanted to write books still, I should probably have wanted to write them about something different.

unknown degree on the very choice which I should be illogically trying to make dependent on *it*. If the choice was to be made not on blind impulse but on grounds which could justify it to the intelligence, those grounds must be looked for in some conception of a life to be lived, an activity to be pursued, independently of any hypothesis about what met my wishes at the time of deciding, or might be imagined likely to meet my wishes in later age, simply because it is "the thing to be done," *τὸ πρέπον, τὸ καθῆκον.*

If we are to have any rules we can trust for the direction of life, there must be a discoverable standard of "appropriateness" wholly independent of the particular tastes and antipathies of any of us or all of us. And it must measure the "appropriateness," or "fitness" not merely of different ways of acting as conducive or not conducive to some presupposed "end," but of alternative "ends" themselves. It must indicate to us a standing orientation of the will which will be ideally fitting in all the contingencies of any possible human life. And this clearly means that our knowledge of this standard must be strictly *a priori*; it cannot be derived from any information furnished by experience about the ends which men actually set themselves to attain, since it is itself the standard by which we adjudicate on the "fittingness" of all of them. It must, from the very nature of the case, have—and here I am glad to find myself in full accord with Professor Guzzo—precisely the character of a "separate" and "transcendent" *εἶδος* which Plato ascribes in the *Republic* to the "good" and in the *Symposium* to the *καλόν.*

Further, it follows from the "transcendence" which must belong to such a standard precisely because it is the standard which it is that any knowledge we can have of it must be "abstract" in the sense in which "abstractness" is commonly, but in my opinion quite wrongly, said to be a fault of the ethics of Kant. One thoughtless writer after another has made it a reproach to Kant that his supreme moral principle will not of itself tell them unambiguously just what it is my duty to do here and now. I should rather say, for my own part that the only ground for justifiable criticism of Kant in this particular respect is that he apparently (though, I think, only apparently) allows himself to speak in one or two well-known passages as though information of this kind could be extracted from his principle.[1] As it seems to me, this is not the case and ought not to be

[1] I am thinking particularly of the unguarded language sometimes used in the *Fundamental Principles* about the ease with which the plain man can satisfy himself of the path of duty by merely applying the test of "universalizing his maxim." Kant over-simplifies there by considering only cases where there is already a known "middle axiom" provided by the current moral code, and the problem is whether I am free to disregard that "axiom" in the present case. Unconsciously he presupposes his "person in doubt" to know already that, generally speaking, it is wrong to violate the current precept,

the case if Kant's principle is really *the* ultimate moral principle. What is the one thing "fitting and proper" in one practical situation may be the very thing which is least fitting and proper in another, and the very same principle may therefore demand sharply contracted courses of action.

Two men, for example, may have exactly the same conception of the obligations imposed by marriage and the same respect for them, yet the one may be led to regard it as his bounden duty to marry and leave children behind him, the other, on the same principles, to hold it his duty to live in life-long celibacy, and both may be right. A king, for instance, who knew that his death without a son would probably lead to a war of disputed succession would be doing wrong not to marry, even though all his strongest personal preferences were for the life of virginity; a soldier, an explorer, a Christian missionary, whose work could be ruined by the cares and distractions of domestic life, would be equally doing wrong in marrying, however difficult he found the practice of continence. Since the principle of dutifulness (or whatever other name we may give to our ultimate moral principle) is equally illustrated by the marriage of the one and the celibacy of the other, the principle, taken by itself, cannot prescribe either. A principle implied in all rules of right action cannot itself be identical with any of the rules. And therefore anyone who comes to the study of moral *principles* expecting to learn from it just what "good thing" he in particular is to do in life is bound to find that study distressingly "abstract." It is as though a poet or musician were to go to a work on æsthetics for rules which could tell him just how to shape the tragedy or the symphony on which he is engaged. Just how Shakespeare was to make a great tragedy out of the crude materials of the story of Hamlet or Lear is something which no philosophy of æsthetics could have told him. At most he could have been given some general warnings against faults like the brutal blinding of Gloucester on the stage in *Lear*, but the most punctilious attention to these warnings would not have sufficed to produce the great play. And the warnings themselves

and it therefore becomes easy to show that to violate it would be to put "inclination" in the place of principle, and must therefore be immoral. It is easy enough to convict a man who already grants that it is a duty to make no lying promises of want of principle if he proposes to make such a promise in order to suit his convenience. It would be quite another matter to deduce from the general principle of duty that there is a duty to make promises. It is inconsistent to maintain that promises ought to be kept but that I am dispensed from keeping them when it is inconvenient to me to do so. But it is not obviously unprincipled to lay it down as a rule for every one's conduct that a verbal undertaking not substantiated by a guarantee of performance is not binding. The language of the *Critique of Practical Reason* about the use of the Kantian principle as an "acid test" of purity of motive is more guarded.

have to be taken with the caution that they are sometimes more honoured in the breach than in the observance. "Elizabethan" drama would be improved by being more faithful to the precept *ne pueros coram populo*, yet it is clear to my mind that the dead bodies of Agamemnon and Cassandra were exhibited on the Athenian stage itself, and that the effect Aeschylus is aiming at would be impaired without them.[1]

We may seem to have strayed far from the issue which this essay is professedly discussing, but I believe we shall find on consideration that we have been strictly faithful to it. It follows from what we have said that a supreme principle for the direction of conduct is not related to the particulars of the conduct inspired by it as the "laws" of the natural sciences are related to their instances. The scientific law is—if we have succeeded in formulating it correctly—a "universal" which is strictly immanent in the particular instances and in each of them.

The instances themselves may indeed be such as never actually present themselves in concrete facts; there may never be an actual liquid which has the exact composition of chemically pure water, there may be no actual body in the universe which is moving "under the action of no forces." But our propositions in chemistry about the behaviour of pure water, or our "first law of motion" are meant as statements and exactly true statements, about what would be found to be the facts about such a liquid or such a body if they were to be discovered anywhere. The "pure water," for example, again under precisely specified conditions of atmospheric pressure which we may not be able to secure in practice, would vaporize at the precise temperature of 100° C. and the process of vaporization would be precisely in accord with our scientific descriptions of it. Our formulae are only "laws" when we are entitled to say that, in the absence of complicating conditions for which we have not been able to allow, the mere substitution of precise values for the "variables" mentioned in them will yield a precise description of what would happen. But no conceivable formulation of a supreme moral principle for the direction of our willing will, in the same fashion, yield a precise

[1] Cf. the words of John Grote (*Examination of the Utilitarian Philosophy*, 269–70), "Simply *a priori* ethics have no application, and therefore no significance and no value. Simply *a posteriori* ethics . . . do not seem to me to be ethics at all." I should agree wholly with this dictum, provided that it is borne in mind that what can be called "*a priori*" is, in fact, not the whole body of ethics but only the "fundamental principle" (or principles), and that the principle *has* "applications," though the applications are not indicated by the formula which expresses the principle, but have to be found in the concrete situations of human life as we live it. And as regards the "fundamental principle," Grote was right in adding (*op. cit.*, 276) that Mill's moral doctrine is as much *a priori*, and as little "inductive," as Kant's.

description of that which it is proper to do in the particular case in which a man is called upon to act. I do not mean merely that just as the chemist very probably never meets with a sample of perfectly "pure" water, so we never meet with an actual agent whose orientation of willing is morally perfectly "pure," that, for instance, there is no actual friendship which is not vitiated by some secret self-seeking, no actual heroism not tainted by vanity and "exhibitionism." What I mean is that even if you suppose the "pure case" of a wholly disinterested friendship or a heroism contaminated by no trace of "exhibitionism," it is still impossible to deduce from your ideal of friendship or heroism precise conclusions about the conduct which will, in this particular contingency, express perfect friendship or unsullied heroism. Phintias, in the story, shows friendship for Damon in its perfection by returning to die, but there might be situations (it is not hard to inquire some of them) in which Damon might reasonably have felt that *not* to accept his proffered self-sacrifice would have been to fail in friendship. You can safely say "if this is pure water and the circumstances are as stated, it will boil at 100° C., and if it does not, it must be an impure specimen." You cannot say with the same assurance, "if this is a truly good and virtuous man, then, the circumstances being as stated, he will act in just this way, and if he does not, he cannot be the virtuous man we supposed."

And the reason of this greater uncertainty is not simply that the circumstances which have to be taken into account as relevant in deciding how to act in a given case are so numerous and so complicated. This would still be true if the problem of practical living could be reduced, as it cannot, to the mere discovery of means to a determinate end already known in advance. If I knew that my one concern in life is to "die rich, if I can," it would still be hard to know how to go about the business. But since, in fact, it is precisely for the discrimination between different possible "ends" that we most need a supreme directing principle, the principle, if we find it, will prove to be one of a higher order of generality, quite incapable of affording by itself the immediate applicability to the particular case needed in *axiomata media*. It will be some such direction as "Always do right for right's sake," "Seek the true good of mankind," "Do the will of God in all things," "Always be true to your highest self." All of them admirable as precepts for the general orientation of the will, but none capable of answering the question what is here and now the right which should be done for its own sake, the true good which should be promoted for just these men, the thing God wills me to do, the act which will be one of loyalty to my highest self. All are "separate" universals never completely "concreted" or "immanent" in their instances. This explains both why the life of

devotion to good or right can never become an affair of routine repetition of conformity to "the rules," as it might if good or right were an universal "immanent" in its instances and having no being except in them, and again why the supreme principle of any genuinely philosophical doctrine of ethics must be, as Kant rightly maintained, *formal*. Where Kant went wrong, if anywhere, was not in his insistence on this point (which is, indeed, a proof of his insight) but in inconsistently proceeding to write as though the *matter* of our various specific duties could be deduced from the formal principle of dutifulness.[1] But this, as we have already said, is no more possible than it would be to deduce from the general principles of æsthetics a set of rules for the writing of a great tragedy.

There are such general æsthetic principles, and it is the business of a "philosophy of art" to detect them. It is not its business to tell the playwright whether a particular story is capable of being treated with the proper tragic effect, or how it must be reshaped for the purpose; that is just what the artist must divine for himself. He must *see* his subject in a moment of creative imagination, and if he has not this vision, there is nothing which will compensate for its absence. Attention to the directions of a manual of rules like Aristotle's *Poetics* will never of itself result in the production of a masterpiece. Such mere following of rules will at most lead in art as in life to uninspired respectability with its freedom from glaring surface faults. A Racine may produce works which observe all the rules and are also genuine masterpieces. But Racine would equally have produced tragedy of the highest order, though perhaps disfigured by some superficial blemishes, if he had never heard of Aristotle and his rules.

It is just because the great work of art is the offspring of such a direct and original vision that there is so much truth in the observation of Socrates about the inability of the "poets" to explain how their finest effects are achieved.

The great schoolmen in their way put their finger on the point, so far as it concerns morality, in the observation that it is only the *prohibitions* of the moral code which *obligant ad semper*, whereas of the positive commands we can only say that they *semper obligant*. If I am to

[1] Though it may be a question whether Kant really meant what his language has been held to imply. His illustrations may be intended not as deductions of specific rules of duty from the general principle, but merely as evidence that these rules, taken to be already known, will all fall under the principle. Since he is professedly presupposing as the basis of his whole reasoning the "common notion of morality," he may fairly be assumed to have taken it for granted that his reader would not need to learn for the first time from him that a man must not defraud, steal, commit murder or adultery. Has a "metaphysic of morals" to prove these things any more than a "metaphysic of nature" to prove that an unsupported heavy body will fall?

live as I should, there must be *no* moment of my life at which I am committing theft or adultery or blasphemy, but there is no "good thing" which I am called upon to be doing at every moment. I am not at every moment to be engaged in giving alms, or serving the State, or promoting the particular "duties of my vocation." If I am, for example, a teacher in a University, I am certainly to make my teaching as good as I can possibly make it, but not to be teaching every day and every moment of the day and night. John Wesley writes in his *Journal* that in the days when he was a tutor at Oxford he would have thought it dishonest not to lecture to his pupils daily. But even Wesley did not imagine it to be his business to be lecturing all day long, and a more reflective man would have considered that probably his pupils and the college would have got "better value for their money" if his lectures had been fewer than they were. My main point, however, is simply that because it is only prohibitions of which you can say that they *obligant ad semper*, a man may comply all through life with every one of these regulations and yet his life may be morally a failure to be condemned because it has never risen above the level of uninspired respectability. He remains, when all is said, one of those who are further from the kingdom of Heaven than many of the publicans and sinners whose lives, with all their palpable surface faults, have some positive moral achievement to show.

But if all this is true, it follows that the "moral fact" upon which it is the purpose of moral philosophy to pass a verdict of approval or disapproval is never an isolated "event," or even an isolated "act." It is always a standing inner orientation of will. It is true that, since we cannot directly inspect the direction of will in others, or even in ourselves, we have to collect it, as best we can, from the observation of the expression it gets in "acts." but our interest in men's acts, so far as it is strictly philosophical, is throughout dependent on the more primary interest in the "character" they disclose. We pass judgment on the things a man does because we want to reach a judgment on what he is. The "fact" on which the moralist tries to reach a judgment is thus, in the end, never less than the "character" of which a whole life is the expression. Even Professor Reid's contention that the "units" of the moral philosopher are always "concrete *bits* of living" seems to me hardly to do full justice to the situation. It is an admirable reply to those who would make ethics consist in either the study of "acts" in isolation from their intentions and motives, or of motives and intentions in abstraction from the doing apart from which they are no longer real intentions or real motives. But it still misses the point that such understanding of *this* "act" in the light of its intention and motive is impossible so long as we confine ourselves to consideration of what can be

discovered in this "act" apart from its setting in the context of a whole life. For the more completely my life is dominated by a standing "principal motive," the less likely is it that I shall be perpetually conscious of the fact. If a man, for example, really loves his work, he is likely never to tell any one so, nor even often to tell himself so. If he does find it necessary to talk about his love for the work, or even to remind himself that he loves it, his devotion to it is probably beginning to fail. To fall back on a careful distinction drawn by F. H. Bradley, examination of the single act or episode apart from its setting in the whole of the life to which it belongs, will at most disclose what is "before" the mind, not what is "in" it.

I conclude, then, that relevant moral fact is inherently different in character from relevant natural, or physical fact, and that, on this ground, it is idle to look to the procedure of the natural sciences for light on the methods proper to a moral science. Morality can be the subject-matter of "science" only if "science" be understood in the widest sense of the word to mean inquiry into the systematic interconnection of truths. An appropriate method for the prosecution of the inquiry must be one dictated by the distinctive character of *moral* fact; if we substitute for the moral fact of purposeful living inspired by an underlying direction of the will to a goal which cannot be more than dimly known in advance, since it always remains "beyond" after every achievement, the *natural* fact of an event which simply happens as the consequence of a prior event called its intention, our ethics will have been vitiated at the centre. Cranmer, says Macaulay in his spiteful attack on the memory of that unfortunate prelate, was "no more a martyr than Dr. Dodd," since though he was burned, he did not *mean* to be burned; he was burned only because "he could not help it." And it is, of course, true that to be a martyr it is not enough that a man should be burned, he must "*give* his body to be burned." But something more is needed, too. A man may actually intend to sacrifice his life, and yet the intention will profit him morally nothing "if he have not charity"; his death may be intentional, and yet no martyrdom but a display of "exhibitionism."[1] But the subtle distinction of motive which makes the differences between the genuine martyr and the exhibitionist cannot be translated into the terminology of "events." The "ultimate motive"—and it is upon it that our moral judgments have in the end to be passed, cannot be represented as an event which is an antecedent of the event we call the intention or proximate

[1] Is Thomas of Canterbury a genuine martyr in Mr. T. S. Eliot's *Murder in the Cathedral*? He certainly presents himself voluntarily to the murderers —his intention is to lay down his life if they attempt it. But whether the martyrdom is wholly genuine depends on the more subtle question whether he has wholly escaped the insidious suggestions of the "Fourth Tempter."

intention. It is for that reason not representable at all in the terminology of the natural sciences, but lies for ever "on the other side" of them.

This is why what are sometimes called "moral statistics" lend themselves so readily to misinterpretation. These statistical figures have, of course, their value in their proper place. If I learn from them that forgery or arson is uncommon in the society in which I live, I know something which bears on the question whether I need constantly to be on my guard against having a forged cheque presented to me, or what rate of insurance against fire it is reasonable to be prepared to pay. But they tell me little or nothing about the morality of the people around me; if they rarely commit forgery or arson, the reason may be only that in a city with an efficient police bad conduct "does not usually pay." and this is not a genuinely moral reason. The statistics are, in fact, statistics of behaviour, not of morality. Such light as they do throw on morality is mainly of a negative kind. If the statistics, for example, show that the proportion of the funds contributed to "charitable" purposes is steadily low by comparison with the resources of the society, I can safely infer that it does not include many persons of ample means who are also truly benevolent. It would not be so safe to infer that if the proportion is a high one, the well-to-do members of society must be persons of high benevolence, since the motive of the largest donations may have been ostentation or calculating self-advancement.

It has been said that the motto of Kant's first *Critique* might well have been "metaphysics, beware of mathematics!" An equally good motto for the philosophical study of morals would be "ethics, beware of natural science." To quote words which I cannot improve upon: "Is morality simply a positive science of anthropology . . . or is it anything more? . . . A true anthropology cannot be a positive science only, on account of man being a changing, improvable, and educable being; it must involve therefore an idea of 'ought' as well as of fact, of 'should be' as well as of 'is,' and therefore, however, ideas belonging to what we will for a moment call philosophy may yield in other sciences to (supposedly) truer notions of matters of fact, here they will not. . . ."[1] "In one form after another philosophy tries to gain credit with the advancing scientific spirit by denying itself, and ever tries in vain. I have no fear that philosophy will really die, because, however, in obedience to the supposed exigencies of scientific method, people try to make themselves altogether mentally positivist, they cannot do so: our nature in some respects is better to us than our will."[2]

[1] J. Grote, *An Examination of the Utilitarian Philosophy*, 201–2.

[2] *Ibid.*, 277. I speak of the development as a *reductio ad absurdum* because, of course, Mill and the other nineteenth-century writers who

The thesis of our contemporary "logical analysts" considered in the opening page of this essay is, in truth, a vindication of the soundness of this judgment (published in 1870); to declare all assertions which contain ethical predicates strictly in meaning is to present the *reductio ad absurdum* of "positivism." But it does not augur well for the intelligence of our generation that it should find acceptance, even with some who are old enough to know better, as the final word of wisdom, when it is, in reality, no more than the last despairing refuge of the "hard fact men."

plumed themselves upon being "inductive" moralists and supposed themselves to be doing for moral studies what Bacon was fancied to have done for natural science, took it for granted that there is such a thing as moral truth and that devotion to the methods of "observation and experiment" would enable them to get that truth in a scientific form; their positivism or semi-positivism was only important to them as the supposed one method of attaining this truth. But the later more consistent development of "positivist" methodology leads direct to the conclusion that they were deluding themselves, because if the positivist principles are sound, there is nothing in morals to be scientific about.

JUSTICE AND EQUALITY

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My purpose in this paper is to maintain that "justice" represents an objective and impersonal recognition of the nature of moral personality, and as such should retain its identity at all levels of human relationship. It is not, as certain idealist philosophers, and notably Bosanquet, have maintained, inappropriate at the deeper levels, at which it is said to be superseded by love.

I shall also raise Aristotle's question of whether differences in the conception of justice do not arise out of differing conceptions of equality, as applied to human beings, and re-examine the connection of justice with equality. I shall ask whether Aristotle's dictum that the equality which justice should maintain is "proportionate" has not misled subsequent discussion, in so far as justice is the expression of a recognition of moral autonomy.

The use of the word "equality" at once raises the difficulty that it appears to imply a standard of comparison if not of measurement. Yet it would seem that in the ways in which people can be measured and compared, they are unequal; and if they are held to be equal in some ultimate and perhaps metaphorical sense to be examined later, it is sometimes maintained that at this level justice is superseded. If equality be merely a term of measurement, it might be maintained that if there is any sense in which men should be equal, this should be in an equal apportioning of things to which a quantitative standard can be applied. This may indeed serve us with a rough approximation to equality at an elementary, but vital, level of human life. It is possible to estimate quantitatively the number of calories people need to keep in reasonable health, and to say that in this respect certain categories (for instance, adult males, females, growing children) are approximately equal. But when we get beyond the universal requirements of food and the necessary means to maintain physical health, which can be measured with some degree of objective accuracy, we then seem driven to say that distribution must be proportionate to things not strictly quantitative. This is implicit even in the most equalitarian of all social formulae: "From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs." When seeking to weigh "ability" and "need," are we not soon moving among *imponderabilia*?[1] This will be still more

[1] The other day a Church of England clergyman of my acquaintance was asked by a Roman Catholic family in his parish to baptize their baby. When he asked the mother why she did not want to have the baby baptized into

the case if we hold with Aristotle that justice should take into account not only ability and need, but the relative "virtue" of the persons concerned.[1] We seem to be in the dilemma that if justice be simply correlated with equality in this sense, it seems to demand some standard of measurement, but to seek to apply it in material which is not strictly measurable. Is there then force in the old view that justice is a convention, either in the Sophistic sense in which it is a means to power or security, or in the religious sense in which it is held to be superseded by love and mercy; or in the idealist sense, in which it is bound up with an assertion of finite selfhood not ultimately to be taken as real?

Before we go further in asking what the relation of justice to equality may mean, let us look first at different kinds of personal relationship, and notice how justice makes its characteristic appearance. We start from the level of our natural likes and dislikes, of friendships and family ties, based on congeniality and kinship. At this level justice seems at first sight out of place, and we do not normally need to speak of it. But that it is implicitly present is shown by our appealing to it when such "personal" relationships are abused—for instance in possessiveness, favouritism, neglect of children, and the like. "Justice" makes its appearance with the demand[2] of the conscious individual to his recognition as such, in his sense of being distinct from others and having rights against them. Hence it appears, as Bosanquet says, in the world of claims and counter-claims.[3] The other evening I heard this remark in a Tyneside unemployed club: "What yer doin' to-neet, Geordie?" "Demonstratin' for me reets." "What yer mean by yer reets, Geordie?" "Don't knoa, but ah mean to have them." Since the sense of justice typically shows itself in standing up for one's rights, idealist philosophers, and notably Bosanquet, argue that it is a form of the assertion of finite selfhood which must be superseded in the Absolute. In his remarkable chapter on "The World of Claims and Counter-Claims,"[4] Bosanquet says that our "claims" arise from our looking at the world as made up of separate terms in relation, of "units at arm's length." But this world of relational morality,

her own Roman communion, she said, "Your churchwarden's wife was very kind getting me my set of false teeth, so I thought it was only fair that you should have little Jimmie." We have here a nice attempt to weigh the possible destiny of a human soul against a more tangible consideration.

[1] Cf. St. Thomas, *S.T.* ii, 2, qu. 58 a. 11. "The proper function of justice is no other than to render to each person what is his own. But what is said to be each person's own is what is due to him according to an equality of proportion."

[2] The demand may of course be made on his behalf by others, e.g. maltreated children may not be conscious of their rights.

[3] *The Value and Destiny of the Individual,* chap. v.

[4] *Ibid.*

of rights and duties, cannot be ultimately real, for it implies an individualistic assertion of finite selfhood which cannot finally be maintained in an organic system of reality. There is a certain pessimism therefore bound up with the sense of justice,[1] since it demands a proportion between the needs and fortunes of finite man which on a deeper view we shall find will not obtain; and it rivets the finite member of the world to his given empirical self, ignoring his power to transcend that self. Justice has its place as the self-assertion of the finite mind, maintaining some apportionment of externals to individuals. But it is transmuted along with the separateness of the finite mind in the final economy of the Absolute. We shall notice this view of Bosanquet's again later when I shall urge that it is unsatisfying in just the extent to which the idealist view of a merely adjectival relation of finite selves in an organic Absolute falls short of expressing a fully personal relationship. But let us take Bosanquet's point that justice means the self-assertion of the finite individual. He does not bring out the significance of the complementary point, that it also means the assertion of the claims of any individual as such. I may not only stand up for my own rights, but for the rights of someone else as a matter of justice. This suggests that an essential note of justice is the impartial vindication of rights and weighing of claims; that it consists not so much in the application of a rule, but whatever our rule may be, in the impartial and impersonal treatment of persons before it. We see that two questions are involved here: (*a*) the criterion by which we may judge the rule which determines what rights and claims are to be asserted, and (*b*) the impersonal and impartial application of the rule, whatever it be.[2] Of these the latter appears to be more easily recognizable as a universal demand of justice. The distinction between a just and an unjust rule, though of fundamental importance, can be determined with less assurance than the principle that, whatever our rule, its administration should be impartial. The particular rules, that is to say, the content of justice, develop from one age to another through the development in experience of differing estimates of what is a person's "due." And it must be acknowledged that in practice the recognition of claims depends very largely on people's power to press them—hence the plausibility of arguing that justice is the will of the stronger. Hence also the adjustments of "particular justice" can never be more than a certain rough justice. Yet in spite of this we find that when a regulating ideal, as distinct from the mere pressure of claims and

[1] Cf. *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 16.

[2] This does not necessarily mean the rigid application of the rule without regard to circumstances which may make a particular case distinctive and exceptional (as we shall see in considering Equity). It means that the distinguishing circumstances must be relevant and be impartially weighed.

counter-claims, appears in the administration of justice, it appears as the demand that claims be weighed impartially and impersonally. This may help to indicate the other aspect of the universal form of justice—namely, the criterion by which we can determine whether a given rule be just. The demand that, whatever our rule, it should be impartially administered springs from a conviction that everyone's rights count, and should therefore be respected before the law. Hence it would follow that a just law will be one that facilitates the equal enjoyment of rights. The perception of what in fact constitutes "rights" will depend on a growing perception of the conditions necessary for the development of a proper subject of rights, namely, the morally autonomous person. Since at any given time this perception is only partial and limited, the laws to be administered will only be imperfectly just. But they show that they are aiming at securing the conditions for a less imperfect form of justice if the principle of their impartial administration is upheld, since this principle depends on a recognition of the duty to respect moral integrity in any person, whoever he may be.

The distinction between the meaning of justice as universal form and justice as a partially shifting content was of course pointed out by Aristotle in his discussion of Universal and Particular Justice; and indicated perhaps in a rather different sense when he pointed out the ambiguity in the word justice, as meaning both what is prescribed by law, and what is fair or equal and in this sense reasonable. But Aristotle (I think) holds that Universal or Absolute Justice would consist in certain abstract general rules which would commend themselves to the reason as universally binding. This comes out even in the famous passage on Equity.[1] Equity is needed as a corrective of justice because (*a*) the lawgiver must oversimplify, so that his rule will not meet all contingencies, but to re-interpret it in an unusual case will be to fulfil his real intention, and (*b*) the subject-matter of practical life does not admit of being covered completely by universal statements. So the equitable decision, which adapts itself to the peculiarities of the particular case, is still (apparently) distinct from the rational principles of absolute justice, since it is necessitated by the partly irrational material of practical life (1137*b*, 25). But whatever Aristotle's own view, the Law of Nature as it developed from his "Universal Justice" came to be looked on in theory as consisting in certain absolute reasonable principles, binding on all men everywhere. This brings us up against the problem of how absolute reasonable principles are to be applied in the particular complex situations of practical life. So St. Thomas says[2] that the distinctions of private property are not valid according

[1] *E.N.* 1137*b*, 10–1138*a*, 3.

[2] *Summa Theologica* ii, 2, qu. 57 a, 3. Cf. Vinogradoff, *Collected Papers*, II, p. 475.

to the absolute Law of Nature, but the absolute law must be modified to a certain extent in operation on account of the concrete circumstances of time and place. But if we look at the way in which the conception of natural justice has in fact influenced the development of law, we find that its appeal is not primarily to a set of abstract rules so much as to a general sense of "reasonableness" or "fairness," which demands that claims should be judged impartially, all relevant circumstances taken into account, and no wrong go unredressed. Natural Law, in England at any rate, is not looked on as a set of principles, but as a general sense of justice in court which guides it in the decision of doubtful cases. The attempt to construct a system of Natural Law in detail is apt to become either a somewhat transparent justification of existing positive law, or a series of somewhat fantastic deductions. And if we look (in Roman and English Law) at the development of Equity which is held to be in some sense an application of Natural Law, we find that it in fact consists in the growth of a body of law arising out of the correction of concrete anomalies. Thus Roman Equity developed by the help of the Stoic philosophy and the *jus gentium* as an attempt to meet the need of levelling out privileges of civic rights. English Equity has been guided by the Aristotelian principle of reasonable discretion in the interpretation of law, put in a Christianized form in the conception of a court of Conscience. While the maxims of English Equity might appear to be a body of abstract rules, looked at more closely they appear to be specifications of the universal form of justice, namely the impartial weighing of claims, in maintaining that no wrong should be suffered to be without a remedy, and that Equity can only intervene when there is some important circumstance disregarded by the Common Law.

In the use of precedent in Common Law the principle that what has been allowed in one case must be allowed in similar cases is clearly paramount. Precedents are of course used in order to establish a principle. But the principle may be called in question and in course of time revised, whereas equality of treatment before the principle, whatever it may be for the time being, remains. This is so even in code law. The particular provisions of the code are less fundamental than its impartial application. This does not mean, of course, that it does not matter how bad a law is, provided it be applied impartially. But it means that while the distinction between a good law and a bad is something to be hammered out in experience as a result of a growing perception of the needs of human beings in their concrete historical setting, justice demands that whatever your law is, there must be equality of persons before it. In historical practice (in England at any rate), the perception of the content of human rights has grown through the progressive removal of special

privileges and abuses of privileges rather than through the application of any abstract doctrine of natural rights. We come to see that considerations of status and privilege are irrelevant and prejudicial to an objective view of the case.[1] Hence the guiding principle of justice becomes judgment without respect of persons. In this sense justice demands a certain impersonality, an extension of the principle that no man should be judge in his own case, which may well conflict with the personal ties of family and friends. We know the classical examples of such conflicts—the judgment of Brutus in condemning his sons to death for treachery; the problem of the *Euthyphro*, of whether "holiness" demands the prosecution of a wrongdoer, though he be one's father. Probably few of us can sympathize with the rigour of Brutus—the Roman father. Yet the problem remains of how the claim of justice is to be maintained, if we feel that natural family affection ought not to be violated. We should probably say (perhaps hedging) that in fact a man ought to refuse to give judgment himself in a case of this kind, and to turn it over to someone else who is able to take up an impersonal attitude.

Let us now look more closely at what I claim to be the first principle of justice—that whatever the law, people should be held equal before it. This means that the law must aim at the objective assessment of offences and penalties. It must take into account not status, not who you are, but what you have done. Personal status must be taken into account only in so far as it means that one falls into a certain class of judicial person, for instance infants and lunatics. A man's special circumstances and state of mind should only be taken into account in so far as they are relevant to an objective view of the particular case before the court; the case must not be prejudged by taking his character and past record into consideration until *after* trial and conviction, when it then becomes important in assigning an appropriate penalty. Nor should the judge's own predilections, whether political, social, or religious, enter into his judgment of the case, though, judges being human, the complete elimination of all personal factors of this kind is of course an impossible ideal. So Mr. Justice Cardozo writes: "There is in each of us a stream of tendency, whether you choose to call it philosophy or not, which gives coherence and direction to thought and action. Judges cannot escape that current any more than other mortals. All their lives forces which they do not recognize and cannot name have been tugging at them, inherited instincts, tradi-

[1] Although this may be true of the law as between individuals, we must, however, ask whether, as a statement of fact, it does not need to be qualified in consideration of the privileges at present afforded to various group undertakings, such as large limited liability companies.

tional beliefs, acquired convictions, and the resultant is an outlook on life . . . which when reasons are nicely balanced must determine where choice shall fall. In this mental background every problem finds its setting. We may try to see things as objectively as we please. None the less, we never see them with any eyes but our own. To that they are all brought: a form of pleading or an Act of Parliament, the wrongs of paupers or the rights of princes, a village ordinance or a nation's charter."[1]

Corrective justice aims then at the impartial application of the rule of law. (How far its intention is thwarted by inequalities of distributive justice is a point which we shall raise later.) In civil justice, the conception of equality clearly demands in addition, as Aristotle saw, the attempt to restore the balance as it was before the unjust act was committed—"taking away the gain, and adding it to the loss." This is clear in the case of a straight recovery of damages; it is more difficult in cases where moral claims have to be estimated in material terms. But Aristotle's account of corrective justice brings out the point that the aim of legal redress must be to give such compensation, on a basis of complex estimates, as will restore the parties as far as possible to their respective position before the injury.[2] When we turn from civil to criminal justice, Aristotle's principle of corrective justice, that "gain" and "loss" must be so weighed as to restore the original balance, cannot be realistically upheld, even if we were to introduce (as Aristotle does not)[3] a theory of retributive penalties as in some way "making up" for the wrong done. It was surely a merit in Bentham to challenge the conception that punishment, for instance hanging a man for murder, put something on the credit side of the world to balance the debit side, and to raise the plain question why two dead men and two desolate families were not worse than one. But nevertheless, some rough justice of retributive penalties, guided by an "object all sublime" "to make the punishment fit the crime" seems essential, not in order to restore some disturbed equilibrium, but *in order to safeguard the rights of the criminal.* For if punishment be merely deterrent, trivial offences to which there is strong temptation (e.g. stealing food when hungry) may be punished with drastic severity, and the cynical saying that "it is expedient that one man should die for the people" will be defensible. Again, if it be merely reformatory, the door may well be opened for the

[1] *The Nature of the Judicial Process* (quoted by C. W. Muir, *Justice in a Depressed Area*, p. 113).

[2] *E.N.* V, 1132*b*. This respective balance of positions is a form of equality, but Aristotle probably confuses the issue by describing it as a "mean." Cf. Vinogradoff, *Collected Papers* II, chap. 1. "Aristotle on Legal Redress."

[3] Except perhaps in 1132*b*, 29, *ἀλλὰ καὶ κολασθῆναι.*

persecution of the unorthodox by the orthodox for their supposed soul's good. It would be interesting to know how far in Soviet Russia, where it is claimed that the "barbarous" and "vindictive" theory of retributory punishment has been superseded by theories of deterrence and reform, the rights of the criminal are adequately safeguarded. And when the Soviet Public Prosecutor at the Metro-Vic trial says that "Revolutionary justice is a special sort of cudgel with which the proletarian state carries out the task of suppression and compulsion," we wonder whether to make justice the means to the achievement of any further purpose, however desirable, will not be detrimental to its essential principle, namely, the impartial weighing of claims and offences before the law. The element of retribution in criminal justice seems essential to ensure the attempt at some objective judgment of the nature of the act itself, however necessary it may be for other reasons to take into further consideration questions of social consequences, the deterrence of others from like acts, and the reform of the criminal.

But just because justice demands impersonal and detached judgment, it appears to take an external, unsympathetic view. This is because its principle of judgment without respect of persons becomes in practice the necessity of dealing with classes of offenders who have committed classes of offences for which classes of penalties are assigned. Hence the force in Bosanquet's saying that justice belongs to the level of human relationship in which people are treated as "units at arm's length"; whereas in truth (to quote Mr. Walter Lippmann)[1] "we know each of us, in a way too certain for doubting, that, after all the weighing and comparing and judging of us is done, there is something left over which is the heart of the matter. Hence our conviction when we ourselves are judged that mercy is more just than justice. When we know the facts, as we can only know the facts about ourselves, there is something too coarse in all the concepts of the intelligence and something too rough in all the standards of morality." Nevertheless, although the judgments of men fall upon behaviour, and their estimates of deserts and penalties may never reach more than a certain rough justice, we have seen that the very impersonality of justice points to a right of human beings to be respected in their moral autonomy. Here equality is expressed in the principle of the equal right of everyone to have his individual claims weighed impartially before the law. This is neither an abstract arithmetical equality, in the sense of a rule for measuring people as though they were quantitative units, nor is it a "proportionate equality" in the sense of being determined according to the relative value of the persons concerned. Such an estimate of the relative value of one man compared with another is something which

[1] *Men of Destiny*, p. 50.

if it can be judged at all, we certainly hold no law is competent to judge. I would suggest that discussion of the whole question has been misled in so far as Aristotle's principle of equality as proportionate to the value of the persons was applied to it

I do not wish in the space at my disposal to go at any length into the allied question of equality of rights of citizenship, the problem of political justice. I will only state summarily that the principle of equality as here understood would imply, not that all men are equally useful citizens, but that everyone's claim to citizenship must be allowed unless it can be proved that his alleged disabilities are relevant to and necessarily hinder him from the exercise of citizenship (as it may be questioned whether for example those of race or sex do). Moreover, if the principle of "one man, one vote" comes in the last resort from a deep-seated belief that "the poorest he that is in England has a life to live as the richest he,"[1] its importance may be held to consist not in the doubtful proposition that everyone can be got to use his vote wisely, but in its expression of the conviction that everyone in the community counts. I do not say that this conviction is adequately safeguarded by universal suffrage, nor that this must necessarily be its condition in all circumstances, but universal suffrage does seem to give it a certain recognition, and as such has, I should hold, more than a merely utilitarian political significance.

Distributive Justice (which, in itself, is of course not a judicial but a political question) is relevant to all these forms of equality in so far as (*a*) inequalities of wealth make it harder for a poor man to get equal treatment before the law through obtaining the most competent legal assistance,[2] (*b*) inequalities of education make it harder for working-class people in police court trials to do justice to themselves under cross-examination, for instance, by not seeing the implications of the questions they are being asked; (*c*) people are deterred from asserting their full civic rights through fear of victimization, unemployment, and the like; (*d*) inequality of economic security in effect destroys equality of contracts. For a contract to be just, which means of something like equal mutual advantage, it is essential that both parties should be free to make it or refuse it. Inequality on one side through fear for instance of unemployment, must tend towards injustice and exploitation, the essence of which

[1] Colonel Rainboro', in the *Clarke Papers* (Camden Society Publications, 1891).

[2] Cf. C. W. Muir, *Justice in a Distressed Area.* If he is right in alleging that the further you get from London, the harder it is to get a fair trial, because the judges on circuit are hurried, and have imperfect understanding of local industrial conditions, it means that the scales are also weighted against those who cannot afford to appeal and have their case taken up to a London court.

is to take advantage of someone else being in a weak position in order to get something for yourself. To redress inequality of bargaining power to some extent through, for instance, rights of collective bargaining, provision for unemployment insurance, etc., is thus a clear matter of justice.

Distributive justice should therefore provide that equality before the law, equality of civic rights, equality in entering and refusing contracts is some sort of reality. This may not necessarily mean equality of incomes,[1] but it will mean that society be so arranged that (as Mr. Tawney urges)[2] a certain standard having been assured, then the size of a man's income matters less and less in giving him access to the means of health, opportunities for education, and competent legal assistance when necessary.

I should add here another aspect of equality, which is a part of distributive justice—namely the kind of equality which obtains between those who have some significant function to perform in society. Here we are close on to the Platonic Justice "doing one's job" *τὸ ταὐτοῦ πράττειν*.[3] There is a certain equality amongst people who know that they have a real job to do and can do it with reasonable competence, so that they meet on a basis of mutual respect which, in any healthy society, has little to do with difference of income. I am inclined to think that almost the most pernicious inequality in the world as it now is results from many people being unable to have the sense that the job they are doing commands their own or anyone else's respect; or worse still, from their being without a job at all.

But we are still moving on the level of what Bosanquet calls the

[1] I have not discussed the question of justice as proportionate requital for work done, because the problem of the "just price" seems to me incapable of solution in any general terms. Short of a rigidly dictated economy, it seems as though the price of goods and services must be fixed by the interplay between demand and supply (subject of course to the possibility of fixing certain minimum standards of prices and remuneration). Great professional and business competence or the willingness to take heavy responsibility are sufficiently rare to be highly remunerated. But this is still determined by there being a demand for these services which gives them a market value, and by the bargaining power, individual or collective, of those rendering them and not by any requital proportionate to their value as persons, which is something impossible to gauge.

[2] See his *Equality*, *passim*.

[3] One of my students has suggested to me that the puzzling Parable of the Labourers in the Vineyard might be taken as an illustration of Platonic Justice. The early comers who had borne the burden and heat of the day were refusing to mind their own business. The suggestion is an attractive one. But the parable is not surely a lesson on the nature of justice, still less on the principles on which wages should be paid. It teaches that even an eleventh-hour entry into the Kingdom of God is possible, and that membership in that Kingdom is not nicely graded by "deserts."

world of claims and counter-claims, a world of individuals as "units at arm's length," contracting with one another and asserting their rights against each other. This is a sphere in which we meet impersonally as the bearers of rights and obligations. It is true that in all such relations there may also be a "personal touch" which may add much to the pleasantness of life, but it is essential that there be justice. In all such relations a "personal touch" without justice at once becomes patronizing and revolting, because justice stands for the respect of the moral autonomy of the other person.

But the world of claims and counter-claims on which we meet impersonally is a kind of middle distance. On the further horizons of human relationships where we no longer meet as individuals conscious of our rights, the language of justice no longer seems appropriate. Does this mean that justice is superseded? Bosanquet says that it is, for we are getting beyond the limitations of private selfhood to which the notions of rights and obligation are appropriate. But this transmutation of finite selves in the Absolute is possible because Bosanquet thinks of the Absolute in terms of organic instead of fully personal relations. A personal relationship preserves in its wider context the individual integrity of its members, though this need no longer be self-consciously emphasized as a claim to recognition. Correlative to this is the preservation of *obligation*, as an objective demand made upon the individual in each situation, which remains an objective obligation though it be of the most personal and intimate kind, and may no longer be felt as presenting a conflict. Kant found the essential of the categorical imperative to be that we should not make exceptions in our own favour, but should ask what would be demanded of *anyone* standing in the situation in which we now stand. However personal and intimate the situation, we thus still find the first distinguishing mark of justice—a call for objectivity without respect of persons. This objectivity of duty can be described as ethical justice. Equality here appears as equality of all men as responsible before the moral law. This of course goes back behind Kant ultimately to the Stoic conception of the equality of all men before the Law of Nature.

But even the Stoic divided the world into wise men and fools. The conception of all men as standing equally under the Law of Nature led to a distinction between those who lived and those who failed to live according to it. A more penetrating insight into the nature of the demands of an absolute goodness leads to a still more radical perception of human equality—"*all* have sinned," says St. Paul, "all have come short of the glory of God." We have here a glimpse of a perspective in which people's relative distinctions of goodness, ability, and the like become incommensurable. This is not to say that there is not a whole sphere within which such distinctions

are real and relevant. "Judge not that ye be not judged" cannot be an obvious motto, for instance, for a University which is largely concerned with judging people's capacity to do jobs, distinguishing first, second, and third class degrees and the like. But it indicates a further dimension in which instead of standing on one's rights and demanding to be judged justly, inevitably all alike must be driven to seek for mercy. If we believe that there is not only a level on which differences and inequalities are relevant, but also one on which they cease to be relevant because they are related to something infinite, we shall hold that "equality" is not simply a term of measurement, but also asserts a sense in which people are incommensurable. They are incommensurable because their relative powers and relative goodness are set in the perspective of an absolute goodness, and they are incommensurable because each one can count in some unique way in the final economy of things. In this ultimate relationship of persons as incommensurable, where the balancing of claims is inappropriate, have we reached a level at which justice itself must be superseded? Legal justice, in so far as it consists in an external weighing of acts and requital proportionate to "deserts" is clearly insufficient—and if "justification" is sought it is not justification by works. But we have seen that the measurement of "deserts," in so far as this means an attempt to make some sort of quantitative estimate of something in fact not quantitative, though it may play a necessary part in the practical administration of justice, is not the root principle of justice itself. Justice is fundamentally concerned with the respect for moral integrity, and so with upholding conditions within which such integrity may grow. There may be a sphere within which it finds it necessary to calculate rewards and penalties, but this is merely an incidental means to its real purpose. So even at the ultimate level of relationship the essential element of justice may still remain, though in a transmuted form, if there be a love which is no "respecter of persons." Such a love would hold together the personal and impersonal sides of goodness. It would preserve the impersonal universality which is characteristic of obligation, yet it would see each individual uniquely with the intimacy of direct personal insight. So it could hold both the objectivity which is the essential note of obligation, and the personal tenderness of forgiveness. Forgiveness does not do away with the perception of objective duty; it may involve a recognition of a violation of objective duty for what it is; but it restores a personal relationship broken through that violation.

Here we may have passed beyond a weighing of claims and counter-claims in the application of any rule or law. But we still find preserved that objective universality which, I have maintained,

is in the end the inspiration of the principle of equality before the law. Thus we find that justice will be an essential element of all personal relationships at whatever level we can say that the respect for personal integrity and personal freedom should be maintained. For we have seen that the essence of justice is not the application of certain abstract rules, regardless of the concrete uniqueness of individual persons, but a respect for moral personality expressed through the impartial judgment of each individual claim in relation to others, in the light of such general maxims as may be the most equitable we have hitherto distinguished. Such maxims bear a similar relation to justice as do principles of moral conduct to the universal form of duty (which is the obligation to do the best we can in each situation). Such principles are never absolute and self-evident; they emerge from experience and are re-cast in the light of further experience. But the universal form of justice remains; that whatever our guiding principles, we should seek to judge objectively in the light of them without respect of persons. The claim of the equality of persons before the law derives, I believe, in the end from the belief in the ultimate and perhaps indefinable equality of men before the nature of things (however we may describe it). Without some such belief, the principle of equality of rights and of impersonal judgment without respect to status, will be likely to be waived for some standard such as the well-being of the community. And such a standard may be used to justify discrimination and deterrent punishment to almost any extent. The principle of the impartiality of justice is not utilitarian—it appeals in the end to a faith in the value of the individual in the whole scheme of things which it may be difficult or impossible to justify on utilitarian grounds. The principle of equality is thus essential to justice not in any proportionate or quantitative sense, nor even merely in the abstract sense that "each one is to count for one, and no one for more than one," though as a working simplification of the principle this may serve us well enough. But a belief in the objective value of the individual in the final economy of things, in no merely instrumental or adjectival sense, implies a belief that the case of each should be considered as fully and impartially as that of any other. Justice therefore, in a sense the most impersonal of things, is an essential element in a recognition of the supreme importance of personality.

IMAGES IN ART

A. P. USHENKO, M.A.

I

OBJECTIVE communication—the principal aim of languages of any kind—meets with its greatest measure of success in science and art, which can both be precise, and therefore immune to misunderstanding born of vagueness or ambiguity, by giving *specific expression* to ideas. But, paradoxically, in order to reach specificity science and art must be developed along two opposite directions: in the first technical terminology replaces imagery-bearing words, in the second images are cultivated to the utmost. The scientist's procedure is entirely justified. For it is undeniable that words are often misleading because they are clouded with different images in the minds of different people. Nor are the evil consequences of this subjectivity trivial. The whole world agonizes when to some of its leaders the word "war" pictures the victorious march of Roman legions so vividly that another representation, of miserable coolies torn to pieces by exploding bombs, retreats like a shadow into the mental background. In fact, if understanding were as much dependent on imagination as it is usually supposed to be, it would be surprising that things go as well as they do or that social organization can prevail over disorder. Should the use of such an ordinary word as "dog" require an image, I might think of a great dane, but then I could not follow even a simple statement like "The dog jumped on his master's lap." Without going into a discussion of the meaning of words it is sufficient to observe that one can claim to have mastered a language when one knows how to use its words correctly, i.e. when to apply them and how to combine them into sentences, even if these are unaccompanied by mental illustrations. A scientist, then, in using his technical "imageless" vocabulary, is not an innovator; he is merely consistent where a layman would now and then relapse into a survey of mental pictures. Of course, even a scientist may occasionally need the aid of a figure or a diagram or a model. But he needs it mostly for pedagogical purposes, in any case at an introductory stage. Advanced science takes the form of a string of mathematical equations, which often—as in multi-dimensional non-euclidean geometry—could not have, even if it were desirable, a graphic representation.

But the short-cut to objective communication made by science is

a closed road in art. For it is its hold on imagination which keeps a work of art alive, however important its capacity to generate delight of sensation or intimate philosophical ideas may be. The striking thing about art is that in face of this dependence on imagery it can claim objectivity. Even some of the artists have misgivings on this score. Anatole France said somewhere about one of his books that it consists of as many novels as there are readers which it can find, since their response varies from one person to another. The remark is certainly false; it merely expresses the writer's greed for all kinds of favourable criticism and would not be made if the mass of foolish comments could also reach him. By disowning the judgment of the unqualified, the artist, no matter what he says, betrays his belief in the existence of a proper interpretation and therefore in the existence of *the* work of art. And if such is the artist's opinion, it would seem that no one else has the right to question it, assuming, of course, that the artist has succeeded in expressing what he wanted to express in his work. The existence of inferior or abortive productions must not deter one from making this assumption, for when it comes to the question of what *can* be done in art, anything short of a masterpiece should be disregarded. Since, furthermore, to deny the existence of masterpieces is sheer impertinence, the inevitable conclusion is that to receptive and suitably trained critics art is objective regardless of how much at variance these critics find themselves in being thrilled or displeased by the same works of art. But the fact of objective art is nevertheless a philosophical problem, since it remains to explain why images, of which art cannot be deprived, do not infect it with subjectivity. The general line which such an explanation must take is clear: if the images of ordinary language are impediments, whereas the images of art are implements, to objective communication, the former images must differ in kind from the latter. More particularly, as contrasted with ordinary representations, art-images are thoroughly specific. This means that a piece of literary craftsmanship must not offer an indefinite or ragged description to be patched up from the resources of the readers' imagination. As a consequence of its independence of the idiosyncrasy of imagination a portrayal of art does not vary with the variation of aesthetic appreciation, which is a negative way of saying that it is an objective expression.

The main difficulty in this explanation is its assertion that art increases the specificity of experience. This is contrary to the common belief in the specific nature of ordinary sense-images. But this common belief is seldom, if ever, accompanied by a clear understanding of what it means for a datum to be specific. In its widest sense, which as it will appear later is quite precise, "specific" signifies whatever is *closed* to further discrimination. When "specific" is so

understood, one must realize that as a general rule our sense-data and percepts are not specific. In the first place, nature as perceived usually lacks definiteness in the arrangement of its objects; it is a medley which stimulates incessant investigations; a *perpetuum mobile* of things, animals, and people. And even when, as in a perspective of distant hills, nature seems to be at rest and closed to developments, one is always aware of the possibility of making the view clearer and more determinate by walking towards the hills. But as the contours come into prominence in a clear-cut outline of the main configuration, the approach brings for discrimination details of the scenery which were previously hidden, a visual emergence which is practically endless. Also a perspective, although a mere cross-section through nature, is never given as a whole at a single glance, but is an outcome of reconstruction in which the present sensory data are correlated with the memory-images of preceding impressions. More technically, perception is an outcome of interaction between sensation and apperception, a mosaic of which the fragments must be uneven in vividness, colour, and definiteness of their outline. Nor is it necessarily the case that perceptual indeterminacy is caused by "blurred" apperceptions which succeed in dominating the otherwise specific sensations. Under the influence of the Cambridge School many philosophers have assumed that sense-data are always specific. This is a sheer dogma. It might appear to be plausible when you are told, for example, that if you take a book in your hand and look attentively at its cover, you will find that you have a visual sense-datum of a specific shade of colour. Perhaps you have. But such a highly simplified and therefore artificial experiment with perception is certainly not a typical illustration of how pure sensation normally functions. On the other hand, a more complex instance would allow for different interpretations, and although it is customary to interpret it in favour of the existence of specific sense-data, an adverse interpretation is not only feasible but, if anything, is more convincing. Thus in the often quoted illustration of the success of memory in retrieving the number of the clock's strokes which were not consciously registered as they were struck, there is no evidence for supposing that behind the listless perception a specific sense-datum (of the number of strokes) must have lingered in order to enable memory to fall back upon it. A much simpler explanation would be given if one assumes a correspondence between sensations and feelings. In an effort to recall one represents imaginatively the successive strokes of the clock, until one comes to a number which "feels" like the feeling left as the sole residue of the original auditory sensation. And then this likeness of feelings prompts one to identify the reproduction in imagination with the past experience. To take another example,

the difficulty of noticing misprints while reading fast. This might be explained as an outcome of interference of memory-images of standard patterns of words with their actual specific prints. But such an explanation would mean the existence of friction between images, something which we certainly do not observe in our minds. If we want to remain within the field of observation, we should deny that in reading we begin with specific sensations of letters. At a first glance we have a general impression only, but it is capable of arousing a specific feeling which favours a representation of standard shapes of words taken as if they were actually read off the printed page.

This alternative account of such examples is given here without an intention to imply that ordinary experience has no specific sensory content. The suggestion is that specific sense-data are much more rare than they are believed to be. To deny their existence altogether would be overlooking the roots which art images must have in ordinary perception. But what is a general rule of aesthetic experience is an exception in perceptual practice.

II

When a percept is blurred or indistinct, its "focusing" requires its isolation from the background of change. An object for discernment must be rescued from the obliterating rush of events. The idealization of this truth gives the principle of the art of painting—a picture must be a *static* representation. It is no accident that pictures are framed; a frame breaks up continuity with the moving world. Thus encased and stabilized, the canvas can wait on the wall indefinitely for a spectator to take it in completely from an appropriate distance and angle of vision. But the immobility of the canvas is only one condition for a static perception; even more important is the size of the picture, which must be small enough to be grasped at a single glance. Of course, it usually takes some time for the eye to travel from one figure or colour on the canvas to another until the composition can become, both as a whole and in detail, entirely familiar and specific. But this visual transition in exploring the picture is unified, and therefore stabilized, by the original impression, which is never lost sight of throughout the experience. Besides the restriction upon change by the unifying impression of the whole there is the further restriction imposed on the spectator's capacity of discernment by the simplification of the artist's treatment of his subject. Such simplification expresses the basic convention of the art of painting which in effect rules out simple imitation of nature, which would be a reproduction of its wealth of detail. Even an

"interior" of some Dutch master, crowded as it is with minutiae of appointment or decoration, cannot compare with the inexhaustible supply of items which can be detected even in a meagrely furnished real room. A static picture is thus essentially restrictive of the possibility of perceptual discrimination.

A very common error, disastrous to the understanding of the relations among the arts, would identify the nature of a static picture with that of an image created by the art of writing. The identification implies that the effect in words can be reproduced on a canvas, and that a picture can be reported through a description. If this were true, either painting or writing, as existing side by side, would be a superfluous luxury. Also the fact that words can add unexpected vigour and vitality to a visual presentation—as when one blushes at the description of an act which in performance slipped by nearly without notice—would then remain a mystery. The truth is that description has an original power, and gives an experience untranslatable into painting, because it arouses images which are different in kind from static pictures. By contrast let them be called *dynamic*. For whereas concentration of the faculty of discrimination on the canvas enhances the specific vividness of a picture, an attempt to "arrest" a fugitive image of discourse defeats itself. Torn out of the context of other images, under the scrutiny of the mind the image would melt away like a dream upon awakening:

"Already this dream was beginning to fade away. In attempting to recall it in order to portray it I made it fade all the faster."[1]

An image, however, is called here dynamic not so much because of the negative property of "paling" at an interruption of the flow of discourse, but rather because it is a function of the piece of writing as a whole. I mean that an image within the context emerges empowered with the inertia of all the images which have preceded it and vitalized with anticipation of the images to follow. A line in a poem might leave one breathless as it comes in the order of the verse and yet fall flat if read in isolation. To take one example only, the somewhat awkward statement "The sunbeam strikes along the world" becomes within the verse a touch of descriptive perfection:

> The forest crack'd, the waters curl'd,
> The cattle huddled on the lea;
> And wildly dash'd on tower and tree,
> The sunbeam strikes along the world. . . .

The dependence of an image on the context is more than the "shine" which in a picture a figure gains against its background. In description there is no clear-cut distinction between a figure and a background, because images are not segregated by such boundaries

[1] Marcel Proust, *The Captive*, p. 162.

as the contours of a drawing. The clarity of an image grows with the support which it receives from other images; their interpenetration does not erase their individuality, which surges out wave-like from the common flow of the narrative. But this interpenetration means a mysterious presence of each and every image throughout the recitation, even when the waves of imagery have not yet reached their crests. There is no particular word or phrase at which an image is born, for its predecessors make up a development of its expectation; there is likewise no phrase, unless it be the end of the description, at which the image ceases, for it is the driving spirit of its successors in which it finds completion of realization. Thus an image hovers, as it were, over the whole discourse—a dynamic immanence which is a condition of specificity of an entirely different order from the determinacy as an effect of painting.

An analogy with music is obvious. There also specificity comes through the relationships among the elements. A specific tune is so slightly conditioned by its constituent pitches that transcription into a different key does not change the melody as such. But the contextual organization of images is even more binding than the co-ordination of tones within a composition. For while a sound in isolation is stripped of its brilliance, it is nevertheless recognizable as an effect of a definite pitch, timbre, and intensity. The specificity of auditory sensations is therefore an indispensable factor in the final specificity of a piece of music. On the contrary, an image out of the context is simply nothing. Hence its specificity is entirely conditioned by its gregarious or dynamic complexion. It would seem that, with regard to specificity, music occupies an intermediate position between the extremes of painting and discourse. The specificity of a picture is a specificity of a visual pattern of sensations. When sensations are, as in music, auditory, they are in a state of flux which would produce a blurring effect of confusion if not counteracted by the specificity of the dynamic order of composition. In the art of writing specificity of images is even less bound up with sensation; it is by compensation more dependent upon dynamic order.

But a specific order, unless it be merely a system of logical postulates, requires some concrete material for manifestation. And if sensations are not the stuff out of which images in literature are made, the question as to the nature of the substance of their composition remains to be answered. Here again a comparison with music is helpful. The invariance of a melody under transposition from one key to another shows that auditory sensations are not sufficient to account for the substance of music either. And since tones, their relationships, and the feelings (or emotions) which a composition embodies seem to be exhaustive of the make-up of a piece of music,

it is likely that *feeling* is the dynamic substance of music. This conclusion is also plausible by reason of the intrinsic connection between feeling and action or expectation of action. An isolated sound would leave one utterly cold, except for anticipation of sounds to follow; as they actually emerge a specific emotion is born. Of course, the dynamic character of tones is so different from either biological or social processes of transaction, that it is preposterous to think, although aestheticians have always believed it, that the feelings expressed by music are the practical feelings of sorrow or joy or love or anguish or some other labelled variety. That there is a faint similarity between the effects of art and emotions in life is undeniable, but even the use of the same word to characterize manifestations of both kinds need not keep one from seeing that their specific difference is much more significant. "Sad music," for instance, is an effect utterly incommensurable with depression of actual grief. A practical emotion, as Dewey has observed, is an urge for self-discharge in a succession of acts or attitudes which, I should add, allow for a wide range of determination. An emotion in music is an urge of self-preservation in a specific succession of auditory sensations. This digression on emotion in practice and in music is relevant to the comparison of music with description, because I wish to make the point that the specificity of images, like the specificity of a melody, must ultimately reside in the unique individuality of feeling which would be impossible if art were to give expression to the generic feelings of practice. On the other hand, it is not necessary to leave the ground of common experience in order to show that emotion is a condition of specificity. Only one must turn away from the socially registered feelings towards the host of unique and exclusive moods which are disregarded in practical transactions to the extent of being left unnamed. The part played by these feelings without labels in contributing to specificity can be best shown by taking the very common experience of recognition. The mental image which enables the recognition of a close friend or relative must be specific enough to detect an impostor however skilfully disguised, or to sort pictures, in the absence of the original, into good and bad likenesses. But this mental standard is not itself a picture with definite contours, for as a general rule it cannot be reproduced as a drawing, quite irrespective of one's technical skill for reproduction. If then the specificity of the image which is sufficient for recognition is not pictorial determinacy, it can still be accounted for by the uniqueness or exclusiveness of the associated feeling. All that is required for unmistakable identification is an intuitive awareness that the reappearance of the original *feels* just like its expectation in a mental representation. Identification of feelings is thus enough for recognition and identification of their

respective objects. Furthermore, the specificity which it implies is not to be slighted as merely relative to a practical purpose. For in case of an unerring identification the object must be recognized as this particular individual. And it would seem clear that awareness of a trait which excludes duplication gives the utmost attainable if not absolute specificity in experience. It is precisely because specificity in identification of feelings gives the maximum of specificity that not only may it dispense with the visualizing of clear-cut contours, but it can even persist through a change in pictorial configurations, as happens in dreams when the same agent is recognized through a display of most fantastic transformations, or in reality when after years of separation the matured countenance of a friend does not conceal the youth that we knew.

"A miraculous identity may be felt emotionally even when the two descriptions of the identical thing differ in *every* sensible term, as happens in metaphors, in myths, in myself as body and mind, in idolatry, or in the doctrine—which expresses a mystical experience —of transubstantiation."[1]

III

If representations of ordinary experience can be specific without being pictorially complete merely because *nothing else feels the same way*, this state is a necessity for images in the art of description. For a complete picture vizualized and fixed in the mind would interfere with the dynamic development which the image undergoes in the process of reading. Hence the inevitable disappointment at the illustrated editions of one's favourite author. The reader is disappointed not because he has a ready-made mental picture to match against the illustration, but because he resents the immobilized representation stifling the dynamics of his imagination. At the same time, even though an image grows, it gives no licence to imaginative excesses which might generate wrong or irrelevant ideas. It must not be forgotten that an image does not belong to any particular phase of the description, but carries on the momentum of the whole work, which must be powerful enough to suppress any false suggestion. Let the line "Or gazing on the new soft fallen mask" materialize into the appearance of a silk black mask at one's feet—a rather strained supposition since the image would be incongruous with the adjective "new"—the fugitive image will be immediately chased away without leaving a damaging trace of emotion as the reading of the poem proceeds:

> Or gazing on the new soft fallen mask
> Of snow upon the mountains and the moors. . . .

[1] Santayana, *Scepticism and Animal Faith*, p. 153. Scribner's, N.Y.

The elimination of the wrong image, perhaps, depends here on the poet's happy diction. But more is needed for the suppression of other, more subtle distortions. The choice of words must go hand-in-hand with the peculiarities of rhythm and rhyme, with the mobilization of metaphors, in a word, with the whole array of literary devices for creating an emotional medium in which there is no place for uncongenial figures. This is the contribution of the whole poem to the exclusive determination of its imagery.

The emphasis given to the negative office of elimination of inappropriate images is dictated by the consideration that specificity has essentially a negative significance. A manifestation is specific when it is so explicit as to *exclude potentiality for further specification.* How to perform this exclusion is a question for various arts to decide and they offer different solutions. In the art of description the performance consists in a full exploitation of the potentialities aroused at any stage of the writing by an image. The writer must take care of the realization of these potentialities in order not to have them at the mercy of the reader's imaginative resources. For unless the writer can impose his own view of things upon his audience, he would capitulate before their variable responses, which is another way of saying that his art would generate imagery which is defective in the sense of being indefinite and incapable of objective communication. Such indefiniteness, however, is the very opposite of the negative function of a specific image. A negative function which is as basic as the exclusion of potentiality must inevitably have a positive effect upon experience. For by the exhaustive division of reality into actuality and potentiality the exclusion of the latter is equivalent to the positing of the former. And certainly there is nothing more positive in experience than contact with actuality. This conclusion holds even though our interpretation of actuality as specificity requires a re-examination of the relationship between actuality and potentiality. Let it be granted that the two are not co-exclusive, that there are degrees of actuality since there are degrees of specificity. Also that actuality branches out into intensification of sensation as in painting and intensification of emotion as in writing. This complexity means that the sense of reality can be heightened by altering the quantitative relations between potentiality and the actual in favour of the latter—new evidence that art is more real than nature.

THE STATUS OF PHYSICAL CONCEPTS.[1]

JOHN C. BEGG, F.R.A.S.

CONTEMPLATING certain residual mists, the net proceeds of a material world exploded and disintegrated by the relentless penetration of scientific intellect, the more advanced physicist has been led in recent times to co-operate with the philosopher on a common plane. Not so long ago, and not always without reason, the philosopher was regarded somewhat askance. It is the old antithesis between the practical man and the theorist, the scientific man himself having been regarded for long as a dreamer. All depends upon the level of action. Operating in the wilds the black tracker has nothing to gain by pausing for the slow, if sure, dictum of the scientist; and if a Mercator projection of the world, or a sextant, were offered to a primitive navigator of well-known home waters, these important aids to the sailor of longer voyages would probably be thrown in a corner, if not overboard. The launching forth on to wide oceans created the occasion for, and proved the value of, such products of exact thought. Thus, in his highest abstractions, the physicist must perforce become a philosopher. At the very least, the need of review and evaluation from a more general standpoint will be conceded.

Physical concepts have to do with Nature considered as objective; and, in the more simple form, they comprise the ordinary naïve view of the world (sticks, stones, etc.), a view which will continue to possess its value and importance. Logic and inductive science, however, seek an interpretation less beset with anomalies and inadequacies; although the cynic might plausibly question the present success of this quest! However, the naïve picture of a world

[1] This essay (with but slight variation) was read at the Auckland meeting of the Australian and New Zealand Association for the Advancement of Science, in January 1937. It outlines and illustrates a doctrine that leaves unprejudiced a place for the "real" as transcendent, metaphysical, or mystical. The "real" of ordinary or scientific discourse, however, bears a relative significance, and is subject to degrees, the fluctuating boundaries of its denotation depending upon subjective organization, both sensory and intellectual, and being affected by instinct and purpose. This does not by any means negate objectivity, but affords an analysis of its conditioning circumstances.

It is worthy of note that, at the same meeting, Dr. S. Moore, of Dunedin, propounded a psycho-analytic theory of knowledge in which similar conclusions emerged. He substitutes "mass feeling" for Freud's "unconscious" as the source which, guided by purpose, articulates varying fields of objectivity.—J. C. B.

of objects disposed here and there throughout space, each with its detached quasi-personality (probably derived from primitive animism) received a severe set-back with the advent of "field" theories.

It was Ernst Mach, a German physicist of last century, and regarded by his contemporaries as somewhat erratic, who met the difficulty of transmission of influence through empty space, such as the gravitational pull of the sun upon the earth, by denying the presence of any real difficulty. How can a thing act where it is not? But, said Mach, "it is WHERE IT ACTS." That is, a so-called individual object may pervade the environment, or, indeed, the Universe. Along this line also came the work of Faraday and Clerk-Maxwell, and later that of Einstein. Mach showed further that ideas used in ordinary explanation are just as inexplicable ultimately as recognized mysteries. That the sun should move the earth by gravitational action across the great gulf of empty space is no whit more wonderful than contact phenomena, as when one ball pushes another; for contact is not coincidence, nor yet separation, but something wholly indefinite. This mystery has grown familiar, and our minds, said Mach, are satisfied if we can somehow reduce uncommon unintelligibilities to common unintelligibilities. In the last analysis physics must simply accept the fact, and not search for the metaphysical "why."

An important question for philosophy arises when we ask whether Nature, as we look out upon it, is a detached, independent realm, or, on the other hand, a reflexion in some measure of the observing mind. The history of thought has exhibited an oscillation of opinion concerning the objective and the subjective. Indeed, this matter has been deemed so vital that a philosopher is largely characterized, by his views upon it. In this rapid survey we may set out with an assertion that is little more than a truism; namely, that all intellectual life, both of common sense and of the scientific order, develops in individual experience. If we could think of the pure experience of a single person at one time and one place, the objective world would merge in the subjective, but they would not be quite coincident, because will and emotion both contain a phase which defies objectification. Pure static experience is however an ideal. As soon as time intrudes (as is inevitable), and we move about, there commences a panorama which composes our minds. It comprises, not merely orthodox perceptions, but illusions, dream images, pleasure, and pain. We have here the primary, individual world.

If, leaving the single personal standpoint, we step out among our fellows and live in the common domain of Nature, we are compelled to shed off a great deal of this primary train of experience, because there is so much that is evanescent and irrelevant to anybody but ourselves. To the things that assert themselves obtru-

sively and consistently in the common domain of Nature we assign the abode of a single space and time system in which our bodies move. A rather more abstract Nature now emerges—the world of common sense.

Still, a great deal that in ordinary life we find objective and common property, although IN space and time, are not OF them—colours, odours, and, perhaps more ambiguously, tastes, etc. While we include all these in the common-sense world, physical science, which does not shy at a further step away from actual experience, finds many such things unsuited to be inhabitants of its more purified realm, and has, in fact, progressively endeavoured to confine its objectivity to space and time themselves, eked out by a content the mode of which tends to become merely formal, approaching pure number. So emerges in the third phase still another Nature, with radical departures from the two previously described worlds.

Sir Arthur Eddington, in developing his physical philosophy, has made much use of a sharp distinction between the familiar world of common objects—tables, etc.—and the scientific world of electric particles, waves, and mathematical functions. This twofold division, while doubtless serving Eddington's purposes in exposition, would seem to suffer from omitting the very important distinctions which differentiate the individual world from the familiar common world. A headache, for example, is an unquestionable citizen of the former, but, to say the least, is not fully naturalized in the latter. Again, setting the familiar and scientific worlds in sharp contrast is apt to obscure the continuity of ideas which unites them, diverse as they undoubtedly are. The threefold division here suggested is not intended to imply definite boundaries or complete diversity in the world as apprehended from different standpoints. On the contrary, similar notions are to be found in all three worlds, with, however, radically changing emphasis, as will be further illustrated presently. Meantime, it may be asserted that the individual world of an impossible paragon of knowledge, who would require also to be ubiquitous, would include both the familiar common-sense world and that of science. On the other hand, neither of the latter could contain the world of the individual in all its fullness.

Before proceeding farther along this train of thought, a few reflexions must be devoted to meeting an inevitable question. Which of these differing worlds is the real one? First, it is necessary to point out that the term "real" is commonly used in a transcendental or metaphysical sense to which we cannot assign any empirical meaning. Something is postulated within the veil, not only in abstruse metaphysics or theology, but also by materialism. It appears as unobservable "substratum" in Locke's philosophy,

and as "thing-in-itself" in Kant. It may probably be true that the power of the metaphysical 'real' to invade popular thought is based upon the supposition of a vague potentiality of manifestation somewhere or somewhen. Although physics has endeavoured to abandon transcendental notions, which have often played the role of stop-gaps, it must be remembered that such notions play a necessary part in ordinary life. When Laplace told Napoleon that his science had no need of the God hypothesis, he might have added truthfully that it had no need of the fellow-man hypothesis, the beauty hypothesis, the goodness hypothesis, the free-will hypothesis; and now we could add even the time hypothesis as formerly understood, for modern scientific interpretations of Nature have robbed time of its stability and character, substituting something variable and purely symbolic, in which past, present, and future have no absolute significance. But the human mind cannot easily place these things entirely to one side even in scientific activities. Mathematical physics indeed can scarcely escape entirely from metaphysics. Philosophical physicists emphasize over and over again that we cannot express "things in themselves," but knowledge or, at least, explicit knowledge, must be confined to relations. Nevertheless, the symbols by which the terms of these relations are expressed must mean something, or, as Bertrand Russell has said, they would be only marks on paper. The idea of entity is not easily exorcised.

It seems doubtful if the line separating physics from metaphysics can ever be clearly drawn, leaving no margin of overlap; but a valid distinction remains. In regard to the concept "real," it must, if used by physics, have some empirical import—perhaps not so crude as that indicated by Dr. Johnson when he refuted the idealism of Berkeley by thumping his stick against the ground, but based essentially on that principle. It would be a comparative term, like "tall," the degree varying with the importance and consistency (rather than the violence) of the appearance under consideration. The thump of Dr. Johnson's stick may carry a very significant tale: possibly the hammer of activity meeting the anvil of resistance generates the sparks (to speak metaphorically) which shape themselves into the objective world. However, this present discourse must not desert the cognitive level.

We have spoken of the similarities and disparities which characterize the three worlds in which each of us may, in a measure, hold our discourse, namely, the individual world, the common-sense world, and the scientific world. Taking these admittedly overlapping domains in the order named, we shall find that in moving out from intimate individual perceptions, and the cruder concepts which accompany them, and considering the series as it leads to the abstract universe depicted by mathematical physics, we encounter

regions progressively poorer in intrinsic content. The Nature of common sense no longer contains the myriad images, emotions, and fantasies that parade in and constitute the individual world. Yet it contains colours, sounds, etc., the significance of which, in the consensus of the generality of mankind, is sufficiently unambiguous to bestow upon them an unquestioned objective status. This is so despite the fact that there are blind and deaf people who cannot in themselves apprehend such objectivity. Physical science, considering colours and sounds in their actual character as subjective, will have nothing to do, except by structural function, with the red glow of the sunset or the feel of the velvet (to use Whitehead's illustrations), or any of those aesthetic experiences which we encounter in daily life. All such things are discarded in favour of a spatio-temporal or mathematical domain. Multi-phased Nature, as it throbs in harmony with the senses and inner responses of the spirit, becomes but a boisterous scene of electrons, protons, positrons, neutrons—a field of wave functions, or a chart of world-lines!

Why this slaughter? It simply means that the pursuit of science involves a temporary abstraction from that aspect of Nature which holds the ordinary amenities. It does not destroy the validity of these amenities. But our present inquiry concerns the principles of procedure. Let it be said again that science does not come in like a foreign dictator and impose entirely new principles, but it selects from, emphasizes, and makes consistent certain concrete elements and elements of procedure that are implicit in, and necessary to, all objectivizing, even in our individual world. Science is certainly thorough and drastic. A dominant principle employed is generality. The degree of objectivity is always dependent upon the number of viewpoints that are concerned with, and cohere in, the object in question. Thus, as was pointed out, differentiation of subjectivity from objectivity commences when a single mind moves away from a single point of outlook. It is then that a succession of aspects are consolidated in the notion of an external object. The greater the number of consistently sustained aspects, the surer and more steadfast the object becomes. For example, bodily pains have an undoubted measure of objectivity to the individual, but they are deemed subjective because their occurrences and recurrences are not consistently related to the more insistent environment of the perceptive domain: they are occasional intruders rather than members of a stable system.

There are thus degrees of objectivity, and borderland cases occur. The rainbow is barely rescued from being an illusion by the fact that a contiguous crowd of people agree more or less as to its position, but the man who seeks the pot of gold at its terminal point is apt to explode the objective theory. A constellation, like

the Southern Cross, has a much better status, for it is there for inspection by all mankind when the view is unobstructed by the solid earth, clouds, or competitive glares. Yet to inhabitants of a distant star system it would be non-existent as a cross even if the individual stars could be seen. These uncertainties are not dependent upon mere ambiguities of speech. The same principle applies all through the world of objectivity. From the viewpoint of an electron a brick, with its galaxy of atoms floating in space, would be much of the same character as a constellation to us: inversely, to a being of cosmic proportions, our Milky Way might be a very definite concretion. Again, to a blind or colour-blind population, what would become of the red glow of the sunset? We see then that while objectivity in some form is inherent in all worlds, the form it assumes is contingent upon viewpoint and instruments of perception.

Another principle, which is yet but an extension of the striving towards generality, is that of conservation or invariance. To show that this conception is related to the larger one of generality it is necessary to bring in the analogy between space and time, which has exercised so much the minds of modern physicists. An object is constituted by the generality of its appearances; that is to say, if all observers are agreed upon the occurrence of a certain appearance, universal testimony will insist on its objectivity, and such verdict is difficult to assail. Science requires a generality in *time* standpoint as well as a generality in *space* standpoint, and objects which dissolve away have not fundamental relevance. A block of ice in the ordinary interpretation is undoubtedly an object, with spatial boundaries sharply defined for all observers at the given time. But, as it melts away along the time line, there is a very fuzzy termination to its existence. So in greater or less degree with all material objects that we see or handle. Not only a block of ice but a block of wood, a piece of glass, the pyramids, the earth, the sun, our galaxy of stars itself, would appear to a group of observers strung along the time dimension as variable indeterminate objects, fading away in the extremities to non-entities. Science, therefore, must find a set of objects which better withstand the test of time. It has sought such in the atom, but scarcely found it.

Clerk-Maxwell, in a famous passage which reads strangely in the light of modern knowledge, wrote concerning the atom:

> Natural causes, we know, are at work, which tend to modify, if they do not at length destroy, all the arrangements and dimensions of the earth and the whole solar system. But though in the course of ages catastrophes have occurred and may yet occur in the heavens, though ancient systems may be dissolved and new systems evolved out of their ruins, the molecules out of which these systems are built—the foundation stones of the material universe —remain unbroken and unworn.

Hence arose the law of the conservation of matter and later the conservation of energy. Can such laws be called empirical, or are they man-imposed? Bertrand Russell has said that the great generalities of physics are much of the character of the "great law" that there are three feet in every yard! Conservation is a notion, essential to science and therefore it is sure to appear in a scientific scheme. Why? Because it serves the primal purpose and charter of science, namely, power of prediction, with control as a corollary. In ordinary life, no doubt, prediction and control are likewise essential, and therefore also some form of conservation. You simply cannot predict without some constant link between the present and the future. If the fact of the future were absolutely different from that of the present, prediction would have no terms in which to express itself.

The conservation in the individual and common-sense world is, however, limited, because prediction, although very important, is not the exclusive, or even the paramount, consideration. We live in the present, and, moreover, the present derives its interest and vitality, *not* from conservation, but from novelty. A universal conservation would be a universal death. Thus we find that the world of our individual experience is a perpetual excursion into novelty while, as objectification becomes more definite in the passage to the common-sense world and onward to the world of science, so does the ambit of conservation expand and that of novelty diminish. The conservation in the primary worlds is not necessarily of the same kind as that in the scientific world. For instance, we ordinarily consider a river to remain identical, although to science the enduring molecules which constitute its waters pass away out to sea. And so with other things.

Something has already been said about the radical variations in the world that can arise from varying viewpoints, and also from diverse organs and instruments of perception. The atomic and cosmic viewpoints were mentioned, and the assumed non-existence of atomic or cosmic observers does not vitiate these illustrations, for physics in its widest aims, is at liberty to embrace all viewpoints, whether occupied by conscious beings or not. Development of this thought must be preceded by enunciation of a thesis which is central to this discussion. It is, that neither the world of common sense nor the varying world of a progressive science is delivered directly to sensory experience. This may seem a rather startling statement to any who may not have given the subject critical thought; for is it not the glory of science that it is founded upon observation and experiment? Yet who has ever experienced an object as it is considered to exist in Nature? Our impressions really form a succession of aspects. I see the outside of a house to-day, and

to-morrow I may go in and view the interior. Thus the unitary and steadfast house of the spatial world turns out to be "given" as a moving panorama, the components of which are separated in time and diluted with an indefinite amount of intermediate experience. And this always is, and must be, the case, even if we set ourselves to concentrate on a single thing, whether it be a lump of wood, an electron, an ether wave, or anything else. It follows, then, that Nature considered as objective is a structure of our selective and abstractive faculties. This point must be examined more closely, because if it is not fully realized, or if it is misunderstood, the remarks that are to follow will be only so many empty words.

It may mitigate the somewhat abstract character of the subject if we imagine a man with eyes like a cinema camera, with sound-recording ears, and with the other senses likewise provided with analogous instruments. As he passed through life, moving hither and thither, his whole sensory experience would be recorded in a series of film elements. It is plain that any one of these single film pictures would not contain an object in its full character, but only a casual aspect of it. Nor would the whole film composed of the separate elements have significance until projected and synthesized by a spectator. This is exactly the case with the chain of our sensory impressions: it has no significance apart from the constructive interpretations of the mind. These impressions are in themselves absolutely separate with no principle by which one can participate with the other in a common life. The Italian philosopher Gentile, in an article published recently under the title "Time in History," shows how history and physical Nature are together involved in this predicament of being disjointed movements save under the synthesis of some covering and unifying principle of interpretation supplied by the mind. Speaking of the common notion of a world of objects complete in themselves, with mind simply standing over against them, he says: "Common sense to escape being driven at the mercy of unbridled imagination over the boundless region of abstract thought puts its trust blindly in a hypothetical world of objects, but such a trust is destined to lure it helpless into a labyrinthine series of facts and objects without logical connection or kinship of the spirit which strives to catalogue them. For facts have no order or connection, even in a mechanical order, which is not derived from the system in which the synthesis of consciousness represents them. . . . The belief in facts becomes an atomistic theory which is essentially the negation of any order or system. . . . As facts pile up before the anxious gaze of the researcher there creeps over him a sense of helpless mystery."[1] Something of the same sort may have been envisaged by Goethe when he wrote:

[1] *Essays Presented to Ernst Cassirer*. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1936.

> And all that flows unfixed and undefined
> In glimmering phantasy before the mind,
> Bid thought's enduring chain for ever bind.
> (*Faust*—Tr. ANSTER).

Upon the cinema illustration hinge certain inquiries and perhaps reservations; for, in addition to sense perception, the mind has an inward eye of memory, so that every member of the whole train of preceding film elements projects its contents upon each new momentary record, the mingled aggregate being thus personal and unique, and not solely dependent upon the immediate sensory situation. In the case of the mind, moreover, all accretions of imagination and impulse may be carried forward in perpetuity under conditions studied by psychology. Physics has to do with the spatio-temporal deliverance of the senses.

Keeping the main thesis in view, however, it will be noted that we have the raw material of the individual pictures on the one hand, and the elaboration by selective abstraction and construction on the other, resulting in Nature as we know it by common sense or science—for an analogy in method holds for all interpretations. A question will obtrude itself here: Have we then unlimited free options as to the character of the Nature which shall emerge as we vary our constructional policy or methods? The extreme cases would be illustrated by regarding Nature as presented to us, on the one hand like the jumbled elements of a jig-saw puzzle bound to one predetermined solution, and, on the other, like a heap of bricks out of which any chosen edifice could be built. Before hazarding a decision on this issue it will be well to examine further the sources of variation in our constructional results. Let us continue, however, along our line of thought by applying this contingent characteristic which we have found in human perceptions to the cinema illustration. The individual pictures themselves, which were figuring as the raw material for the mind architect, turn out on closer examination to be full of subjective elements, and by no means simple or unique. The form of them is contingent upon our physiological organization and instinctive nature, which mould and transform the primitive impressions. In the film picture, although in the visual part a pretty close resemblance holds between the tiny element in the projector and its counterpart on the screen, it is not so in the sound record. This appears on the film as a manifold of shaded components which issue in articulate speech only after projection on a photo-electric cell, the graded impulses from which actuate the sound apparatus. It may be that in similar manner our apparently simple perceptions, as they appear on the screen of the mind, bear only a very remote functional relation to the primitive sense impressions—as is, indeed, suggested by vision, where, for example, *two* minute

retinal images of a house upside-down appear in perception as *one upright* structure, totally disparate in its large dimensions. It is difficult to analyse back to elemental sensations, and indeed to do so philosophy must set out from the level of definite perceptions.

For our present discussion perhaps the most important factor of variation in our emergent world picture arises from intellectual constructive imagination. Here is to be found the principal agent of physical science both in its systematizing work and in its formulation of the questions put to Nature in observation and experiment. Nature must be articulated into such patterns as best provide the keys for understanding and, in a measure, controlling it. The ordinary configurations which dominate everyday life are in science considered of minor importance, and the world is resolved into more significant, if less tangible, elements. Options in the principles of construction not only exist here, but, in contrast with the uniformity of instinctive urge in the sensory world, by which we mostly agree as to the objects which surround us, a wide divergence of systems has arisen in the realm of physics. Let me offer a few geometrical analogies to the progressive simplifications and multiple interpretations of physics. An uninstructed man might be imagined to use very unwieldy methods in surveying a field. Take a parallelogram with unequal angles. Our novice might isolate the four triangles contained in the figure when the diagonals are drawn, laboriously compute their areas, and add them together, arriving at the correct total area. If he dealt with many such fields on the same lines he might easily acquire the habit of referring to the four sections of the parallelogram by symbols as if they were separate entities. One day he discovers that against such a parallelogram can be placed a rectangle which may easily be shown to equal it in area. He, therefore, in subsequent cases of the kind, simply multiplies the base by the altitude and dismisses the triangle entities from his system of thought. As a somewhat different example,[1] a set of dots may be given in apparently promiscuous distribution. Investigation may then show that all the dots can, by a certain grouping, be absorbed as angular points in right-angled triangles. Of course any other grouping by threes would produce triangles, but probably they would not have an important uniform characteristic. These right-angled triangles, if repeatedly found in fields of dots, would soon acquire a claim to the status of definite entities in the vocabulary of a geometrician dealing with them. Things implicit, although not actually embodied in concrete form, can thus be made manifest by mind, and read into the situation. As a non-geometrical example of the same thing one could imagine a picture like Leonardo's "Last

[1] Professor C. D. Broad has used a similar illustration in a somewhat different context.

Supper" with the central figure omitted. The mind of the spectator would be almost compelled to supply the want, so meaningless and puzzling would the picture otherwise be. In this sense the figure might be said to be actually depicted.

In our perceptive experience we find a bewildering profusion of presentations with which we must deal, not only in the interests of speculation, but in the struggle for daily existence. The necessity for a classification and arrangement which will serve our purposes of economy of thought and action is forced upon us and instinctive urge sets us at the task from birth onwards. Our investigations may, and often do, stop at a point where we have become sufficiently expert to avoid accidents, gain sustenance, communicate with our fellows, and prosecute daily life. It is presumed, however, that such resolution of the elements of experience is still very crude indeed, and scientific investigation proceeds to simpler and more general formulae by which the survey of the presented field moves on towards perfection. Diamonds and charcoal are very different things in the common view, but science unifies them in the atom. So came the resolution of the whole physical world to electromagnetic elements.

This is no prejudice to sciences with special subject-matter, like chemistry, and particularly biology, which are fully entitled to their special concepts and methods as long as they need them. But whatever special concepts and methods may be employed by biology, the physical components of organisms must be subject to physical laws. Physics will never tolerate the exclusion of anything within the space-time domain from its jurisdiction. If within organisms behaviour inconsistent with known laws takes place, then these laws must be altered to accommodate the new phenomena even if not fully to account for them; just as within a state of a confederation federal laws must be obeyed although supplementary local laws may be imposed.

In the light of the position now arrived at it is possible to reflect upon the issue involved as between objectivism and subjectivism. Nature appears to be fairly rigid and self-willed, by no means clay in the hands of the mental potter, and it seems absurd to think that we could, e.g., bark our shins against a constructional ideal or a mathematical principle! I think we must always recognize the actual—the fact of things being what they are and not something else, no matter by what route such actuality has arrived on the arena of experience. I do not think that it matters very much for physics to what transcendental agency we ascribe the arrival, or whether we postulate transcendental agency at all. That is appropriate to another sphere, although it is true that even physics cannot be purely empirical. In any case it may be convenient to recognize

two contrasted moments in the composition of systems—the consciously imposed forms being mental and the basic elements worked upon being physical. Probably there is nothing ultimately determinate in this distinction, particularly if we impose upon physics the heavy task of recognizing all possible viewpoints and all possible organs of perception, as well as complete freedom in intellectual construction. But we are human beings, and, willy nilly, find our external world moulded for us in large measure, and such moulding, according to genetic explanation, is attributed to the organization of our bodies and minds. Some philosophical physicists, Eddington, for example, claim the widest constructional field for the mind. He says[1]: "There is often a tendency to divide our assertions about the physical world into 'hard facts' and 'theoretical conjectures.' There is no such separation." And again[2]: "We have found that where science has progressed the farthest, the mind has but regained from Nature that which the mind has put into Nature. . . . We have found a strange footprint on the shores of the unknown. We have devised profound theories, one after the other, to account for its origin. At last we have succeeded in reconstructing the creature that made the footprint. And lo! it is our own!"

I suggested that perhaps it was not of any concern to physics to assign transcendental agency in explaining the world as we find it; but there is a sense in which it is possible to mark off the subjective from the objective components. For physics *that* becomes objective which is inescapable in any particular system of world constructs. There seem to be many such things, because human cognitive nature is common to all of us, and our physiological and psychological organizations are canalized in their operations, and limited by the senses and categories of the mind. It is not significant for physics whether the concretions which are associated with these canalized forms are attributed to a transcedental personality or to a transcendental material. The realm in which such a difference applies is essentially mystic, and in it we are beyond the application of mundane standards and boundaries. A mystic in an absorbing vision may spasmodically point his hands outwards, and whatever they chance to point to may serve as a symbol for the inexplicable. Appropriate symbols are important, no doubt, for metaphysics and religion, but they have no relevance for physics. Objectivity will vary in degree according to the proportion of automatic agency deemed operative in the task of delineating the scientific world. Co-relative with this, and supplementary, is an extensive margin under the play of optional thought, and within this margin is supplied the subjective element.

[1] *Philosophy*, January 1933. [2] *Space, Time and Gravitation.*

The distinction between objective and subjective, although variable in differing contexts, is thus given an intelligible foundation. The metaphysical reality is ignored because it has no relevance. This must not be considered an agnostic or defeatist attitude, any more than would be the case if a mathematician were to decline to describe the taste of a triangle. Nor is there any justification for discussing *probabilities* regarding the pure metaphysical real within the context of the empirical: for probability means nothing if no test to determine presence or absence can be applied. If a test be established, then, *ipso facto*, the metaphysical loses its character and the entity itself may come within the domain of physical or other empirical science.

The illustration of the dots and triangles as previously presented may help in a further critical consideration of this immediate question. The dots themselves may be taken to represent the "given," and therefore in that context they are undoubtedly objective. The constructed triangles may be thought to inhere in the relative position of the dots; but that is scarcely a definitive character, for many alternative constructions are possible, e.g., the circumscribed circles might be more significant in some contexts. Therefore these optional constructions may be regarded as subjective. This distinction, however, is not absolute, because one may imagine the dots to have been produced, for example, by an engraving process, revealing themselves on close inspection as a multiplicity of minute lines. These lines could in turn become the objective elements, and the dots would then appear as constructs. The aggregation into dots, although natural to our sensory habits, would not be inevitable in itself. Aside from our sensory bias, there is involved (rather more subtly) that intellectual assumption of the special coherence attaching to *contiguous* elements, which reason could scarcely substantiate if the matter were brought in question. In this manner the subjective realm can invade the objective, and the frontier is not absolute, but dependent upon the sensory and intellectual system dominant in any particular occasion.

That variable anthropomorphic considerations enter into a determination of reality is thought by some philosophers to be derogatory to the sublime detachment of a higher sphere; but it is difficult to imagine any significance for us attaching to anything totally unconnected with our nature. Moreover, what has been said does not imply that one assignment of objectivity is as good as another. A useful analogy with a pair of similarly variable terms may be given. It is certainly not a meaningless distinction that is made between coastal districts and interior districts in a continent. A crab would probably draw the line of distinction at a few yards from the edge of the water, while a seagull might consider as coastal a strip ex

tending a score or so of miles inland. From time to time these limits would doubtless be transcended, but a reasonable norm as between coastal and interior could be established, based upon the constitution and habits of the respective creatures. So with man: the norm of objectivity is determined by the more or less fixed character of the senses while, as regards the critical intellect, this norm can be varied and indefinite according to the universe of discourse.

It might be possible to imagine a being who could vary his sense reception over a wide range, as indeed we do to some extent with instrumental aids such as the microscope and telescope. In such cases the subjective domain would be indefinitely extended and the objective diminished. On the other hand, if the intellect were more inflexibly fixed and canalized, like our sense organs, Nature would become definitely objective, thought being more or less a sinecure without range of selectivity. Hudibras, the prodigy of Samuel Butler's satire, had a mind something of this sort:

> His notions fitted things so well
> That which were which he could not tell,
> And oftentimes mistook the one
> For th'other, as great clerks have done.

Could such perfection be counted as a blessing? It would merge with instinct or intuition, which dispense with laborious mechanism of thought, although at the sacrifice of that turmoil of speculation and striving which seem to constitute the essence of our life.

Law, object, and cause are important and related concepts in physics. Law is essential, not incidental, to Nature. To bring forth the heavens and earth out of chaos is virtually to create them; for chaos, although imperfectly conceived as a tumbling jumble of elements, must in the fullness of its meaning cancel all entity, which necessarily implies some trace of system and order. It is easy to see how a complete system of natural law would determine the correlated objects, because it would prescribe the orbits of all particles, and consequently their aggregations. No doubt very many laws, particularly minor ones, are objective and inherent in Nature in a dominant degree. Others, the great mathematical laws like those of universal conservation, are subjective or man-imposed. Thus the variability in the objective versions of Nature as a whole, assigned by science from time to time, is accounted for. Nor need there be any finality in this direction.

Cause has usually been regarded as having reference to succession, the cause preceding the effect, but the idea could be generalized and extended to the co-existent in space—to say nothing of the future causing the present or the past. The nature of a curve, for example,

could be cited as the cause of a generated figure. In a penetrating article written for Swiss publication in 1934,[1] Professor Lauwerys developed this thought in a most interesting manner. He does not, however, use the word cause in a general sense such as I have indicated. The general principle is the Uniformity of Nature which is applied as *geometry* in *spatial* relations, and as *causation* in *temporal* successions. Now, in a mechanical problem, such as the trajectory of a bullet, it is usual to compress time as it were, so that the whole course of the bullet is shown as a simultaneity in a curve. Actually, of course, the bullet is only in one place at a time; but the continuous representation in a curve enables the flight to be dealt with analytically. This ruse, however, is not practicable in more complex physical phenomena such as an application of a light and a consequent explosion. It is necessary in such cases to invoke causation proper, which, Lauwerys points out, always involves the atomization of phenomena, for a cause must be individualized. This introduces two diverse and incompatible methods of dealing with Nature, and the result is the dilemma expressed in the Heisenberg Principle of Uncertainty, which asserts that it is impossible to know at once both the position and the momentum of an electron. You can *choose* which you wish to know, but once the choice is made there is a complete and systematic uncertainty as to the other element. This appears to be simply the result of applying simultaneously two not perfectly compatible systems of thought.

Owing to the option always offered in constructing Nature as viewed by science, it is apt to happen (often most subtly and elusively) that two systems are employed in a single argument, and hence we have many paradoxes comparable with those of Zeno the Greek, who held that motion is an illusion, because a body, in occupying all the intermediate positions, infinite in number, between two points, and spending any time whatever at each, would require an eternity to attain its destination. Similar confusion in a more obvious way was exhibited by the student who, in answer to an examination question as to whether he could give an example of an effect preceding the cause, instanced a man pushing a barrow. Or that other famous answer, that a circle has two sides, the inside and the outside. An illustration, certainly imperfect, of the Heisenberg dilemma might be found in the two diverse methods of indicating a geographical position, (*a*) by longitude and latitude, and (*b*) by pricking a mark on a map. The mark would of necessity be of a finite size, and so it would be to that extent indefinite for statement by precise numerals—and vice versa.

Much of what has been said may seem formal and likely to be barren in practical science, but it is highly important that clear

[1] *Annales Guébhard-Séverine.*

ideas of scientific method and its relation to metaphysical ideas should be formulated. Confusion has reigned in high places. For example, the Heisenberg Principle has raised violent controversies regarding the validity of the principle of causation. Now, if it be definitely and consciously realized that a double system of thought is applied to a problem no harm is likely to accrue. Indeed, multiple systems have often proved useful and supplementary, and perhaps they may be ultimately essential to science. But it is a different matter to assign as an indefeasible character of Nature what is merely the result of a particular chosen method of analysis.

Failure to distinguish between the individual world and the common domain of science has, it would seem, been responsible for the attempts of Sir A. Eddington to impose free will on Nature. Free will has to do with the individual world, and should never be argued (as such) on the plane of the very different world of physics, which excludes by its very procedure not only free will, but the whole vital colour of life. The knowledge of free will is in no way dependent upon undetermined electrons. It is an immediate intuition, of a higher truth status than the derivative realm of physics. In any case Eddington's freedom does not amount to much. The writer had an opportunity of asking him a question at a philosophical Congress in Cambridge. Premising that physical laws with suitable transformation can be applied backwards, as when ancient eclipses are determined, it was suggested that on his showing the past must be indetermined in a similar manner to the future. He replied in effect "*Yes*, except in so far as the past is actually known from experience." Now, what an infinitesimal part of the past has entered into actual experience, and most of that is long forgotten! The most unbending determinist would surely be satisfied to believe that the future is as definite as the unknown past.

We cannot live backwards (Eddington elsewhere emphasizes): but physical laws can be interpreted either backwards or forwards. However, he finds an exceptional anomaly in the second law of thermodynamics. Energy, although always the same in amount in a closed system, must perpetually degenerate in form. To take a figurative illustration, a viscous column of, say, bitumen, could retain its constant weight although gradually collapsing from tall and thin to short and stout, and eventually spreading like a pancake on the ground. Eddington suggested that the constant degeneration of energy creates the inviolable onward flow of time. But surely this would involve a wholly anomalous backward flow of time *in restricted regions* where, as of course is admitted, energy can, by drawing upon neighbouring sources be boosted for the time being in an upward direction.

But the whole conception ignores the fact that the adventure of

mind in time is a matter of the individual world, in which context time is not space-like at all (as Bergson's philosophy has emphatically proclaimed). It is, therefore, not directional in the spatial sense, unless, indeed, it be a genetic prototype of the spatial concept. Certainly it is not as a citizen in the space world. Would we expect distinction between "here" and "there" in the universe of science? Yet these concepts are vital to the individual.

The abstractive domain of physical Nature is like a map or index. It is not accounted as a blemish in a chart that it does not show pictures of individual ships, or that it can show the way on to the rocks as well as the way to avoid them. The index is not identical with the contents of a book!

Doubtless it will have been noticed that I have followed in a general sense the Kantian interpretation of Nature. But modern physics has gone beyond Kant, who held that space and time in their native character were unassailable foundations of thought. If so, they have shared the fate of the sensory qualities of the common-sense world; or have at best been admitted to the world of physics in a mutilated condition. The relativity theory and other theories have brought these background entities out into the arena of manipulative calculation along with the matter which occupies them. Indeed, the ideal is to whittle away content and express the Universe as a general configuration upon a spatio-temporal domain, in which mathematical character overrides intuitive simplicity.[1]

Einstein has set the ball rolling, and there is no end in recent cosmic theories to the liberties being taken with the space and time concepts. De Sitter, the eminent Dutch mathematical astronomer, suggested the necessity of different time systems for the occupied and unoccupied regions of space respectively.

Later still, E. A. Milne, who for some years past has been a prominent figure among English cosmologists, goes much further than Einstein. He alludes to the fact that owing to the abolition of absolute time evolution has lost its meaning, but concerns himself mainly with devising a character for a universe capable of fitting modern theory, particularly as to conflicting elements of time. The famous second law of thermodynamics, which implies the doom of the Universe by the running down of effective energy, is itself nugatory unless a specification be given of the particular time system to be applied. Many cosmologists now regard the Universe as expanding in such sort that a commencement to the expansive process seems to point to original creation. Milne embodies this conception, and his Universe comes out as one in which a leading thought is a diverse time system for each constitutent world in the Universe, so that each, while growing old and running down in

[1] Cf. Cassirer's *Substance and Function.*

energy level, may look back to a real creation epoch. Not only that, but the inhabitants of any ageing world will always be able to envisage within the Universe other equally real worlds in whose time system creation is an affair of yesterday. This, in the opinion of Milne, can reconcile creation, degradation of energy, and eternal duration.

One more aspect of time in Nature. Time systems are ultimately derived from physical law, but physical law aims at being itself timeless or permanent. Is this a modern version of the Parmenidean quest, endemic in the human breast, to reach out of the flux which is the mother of Time to pure Being which is one and for ever stable.

It is not possible on this occasion to discuss Nature as the bridge between mind and mind, but it may be suggested that the bridge having become so wobbly, the validity of the communication between spirit and spirit seems to come in question—a far-reaching thought. In conclusion it may be hoped that one practical deduction can be drawn from this review of the status of physical concepts. The Nature of physics is a purposive abstraction from experience, intensely meaningful, but not an epitome, let alone an embodiment, of all reality. Things with which we have immediate contact in experience cannot be cancelled or contradicted by an elaboration of theory. The world of physics may hold the keys to the mansion, but the keys are not the mansion; nor is a map of the world, however useful, identical with the great globe itself.

PHILOSOPHICAL SURVEY

PHILOSOPHY IN GERMANY

THEORY OF VALUE

In our last surveys we collected some new books concerning philosophy of nature and philosophy of history. To-day we concentrate on Philosophy of Value, taking under review some books more or less closely connected with it. Here again we meet a different situation. German philosophy of history was in closest connection with its own history (with the "rise of the historical consciousness" at the end of the eighteenth century) and with the moral sciences analysing historical objects. It wished to give these sciences the rank possessed already by natural science, and to build up history with their help. German philosophy of nature, on the other hand, was concerned with natural science; it was theory of science, epistemology applied to this specific field, trying to overcome the difficulties of former theories and those inherent in modern science itself, especially in physics. The position in the sphere of the theory of value is different, and still more difficult because no clear-cut series of sciences corresponds to its problems. Moreover, the theory of value itself is new, originating at the end of the nineteenth century as a generalization of former ethical, aesthetical, and economic theories. Unfortunately the theory (debatable in itself) arose at a moment when the values on which European civilization of the last two thousand years was based were already in a stage of dissolution. Consequently the philosopher is in the unfortunate position either of facing the task of establishing a new order of values or of overlooking this very dissolution which confronts him.

Moreover, the position in Germany differs from that in England, because the dissolution of the bourgeois society is far more advanced there than here. Helmut Plessner's very able analysis, *The Fate of German Thought at the End of its Bourgeois Epoch*,[1] makes it clear enough. This book traces the dissolution of the old order of values, the replacement step by step of religious values by those of the Mind, by economical and sociological ones, and finally by those of the blood. Its leading idea is that simultaneously with the bourgeois society its superstructure, especially its theology and philosophy, has been broken up as mere ideology. Regarding philosophy the author is very pessimistic; it has lost, in his opinion, any influence on life and on the conduct of human affairs; it is eliminated, and only one genuine task is left to it, namely, to develop a theory of man. Though I strongly disagree with this conclusion, and though I think that there are still fruitful beginnings where he sees destruction only, and that the collective philosophies of our time deserve attention in certain respects, the dissolution of the old order of values cannot be denied.

It is astonishing to see that the most important new book on our question, a fruit of a lifetime devoted to it, Oskar Kraus' *The Theories of Value, History and Critique*,[2] does not take any account of this situation. It is a

[1] *Das Schicksal Deutschen Geistes im Ausgang seiner bürgerlichen Epoche.* Max Niehans Verlag, Zürich und Leipzig, 1935.

[2] *Die Wertheorien, Geschichte und Kritik.* Verlag Rudolf M. Rohrer, Brünn, Wien, Leipzig, 1937.

very scholarly work, in the good and in the bad sense of the word. Everybody must be grateful to Kraus, for he gives the first comprehensive history of the theory of value, from Heraclitus to the most recent writers, including English thinkers like Hobbes, Hume, Smith, Bentham, Martineau, Sidgwick, Moore, psychologists, economists, and modern theorists of law. This vast material is ordered by being seen and criticized from Brentano's latest standpoint, the so-called "reism." Everybody in accord with him gets a good mark, everybody disagreeing a bad one (therefore we must be prepared, I am afraid, to get a very bad one). This "reism" (*Reismus*) is based on the dubious presupposition that the unity of the concept of consciousness (not the unity of consciousness itself) demands the unity of its object, and this unity Brentano calls "thing," or "essence" or "real." The meaning of this theory may perhaps best be understood from Brentano's criticism of Plato. He rejected Plato's ideas not only as hypostasized universals, but as hypostasized fictions. Plato supposed concepts to have meanings of their own which are only syncategorematical or which have the mere function of adding to the meaning of the whole speech. But by his saying that not all substantives are concepts Brentano does not arrive at a pure nominalism. He, the follower of Aristotle, agreed with Plato that there must be a highest genus under which we may subsume every thing which we represent, judge, or evaluate. This he called *res* (*ὄν*).

I think this theory provides a very interesting demonstration that an antiquated scholastic theory which is in disagreement with present logic may nevertheless be of critical value. For this "reism" is the basis of a very interesting linguistic analysis of moral judgments. It criticizes the speech of "the realm of values," of "the hierarchy of values," etc., and demands its translation into propositions about things, reality or *res*. Criticism of language is regarded by this school as the presupposition of the critique of reason, and I draw the attention of the reader especially to Georg Katkov's *Researches regarding the Theory of Value and Theodicy*,[1] in particular to his first chapter containing linguistic analysis and his appendix on W. D. Ross, *The Right and the Good*.

If this linguistic criticism gives the negative basis to the research, the positive basis is supplied by the thesis that the man who judges rightly (*einsichtig*) is the measure of all things, of those that are, that they are, and of those that are not, that they are not; and that a person evaluating in right evaluation is the measure of all things, of those which are good, that they are good, of those which are bad, that they are bad. Thus the author believes himself to have solved the old Sophistic Platonic controversy about relativity or absoluteness of values. The objectivity of values, their realm and hierarchy are destroyed, but, nevertheless, relativism is rejected, for the "rectitudo" of the subject gives a measure for evaluating. For to speak about evaluating in "right" evaluation and of "right" emotions, and to say that "right" evaluations and emotions are more elementary than ethical judgments, means the reduction of truth (*verum*) and goodness (*bonum*) to the "rectitudo" of the acts which are related to them. Truth and goodness are not a quality of objects but of the acts of the human mind.

The tendency to transfer the problem from the objective to the subjective sphere is interesting, and possibly a way to its solution. If Westermarck objects "to speak, as Brentano does, of 'right' and 'wrong' emotions, springing from self-evident intuitions and having the same validity as truth and error, is only another futile attempt to objectivize our moral judgments" (*Ethical Relativity*, 1932, p. 61), his criticism is too easy. For if Westermarck believes

[1] *Untersuchungen zur Wertheorie und Theodizee*. Rudolf M. Rohrer, Brünn, 1937.

himself to have proved the relativity of moral judgments by reducing them to "moral" emotions that is quite as much a "circulus in probando," because emotions are in themselves neither good nor bad, but become such only because we judge them to be so. Brentano's theory contains considerable difficulties, because to speak of "right" emotions, of "right" love, of evaluating in a justifiable manner, etc., is merely to borrow the terminology of logic; nevertheless, it has the great advantage of being an earnest attempt to solve the problem. Therefore we hope the book will find in this country the attention it deserves. The abundant richness of its historical analyses, in which there is no room to enter in this survey, will make it indispensable to any student of the subject. Anybody, however, who is interested in the fate of European civilization, which, challenged from more than one side, has entered its period of catastrophes, cannot fail to notice that the two pages devoted to Nietzsche (compared with Heinrich Maier's nine pages) are wholly inadequate. This fact would not be so important if Nietzsche were not the most representative expression of the basic situation of our time (which is completely ignored by the Professor's book), namely, the dissolution of the system of values dominant in Europe for two thousand years and the inescapable problem of revaluation or, as Nietzsche said, *"Umwertung aller Werte."* This problem reappears in Brentano's language; for how shall we make people love in the "right" manner or even understand what "right" love means if they have lost the faculty of loving altogether?

In this most distressing situation it seems not impossible that the general theory of value may profit from its applications just as philosophy of nature profited from natural science and philosophy of history from moral science. I have in mind the science of law. Perhaps a new book of William Ebenstein, giving an account of the Vienna School's treatment of the pure theory of law, may be useful.[1] It is the school of Hans Kelsen, to which belong Adolf Merkl, Alfred Verdross, Felix Kaufmann, Fritz Schreier, Frantisek Weyr and his Czech school. The book, which is to appear in English also, seems to me to contain an able and thorough account of Kelsen's ideas. This school introduces Kantian and Neo-Kantian ideas into the sphere of Law. Thence the speech of "Pure" Science of Law, of "Pure" Theory of Law. It demands that the science of law be purged of all elements foreign to it, of all elements of nature, of biology, psychology, sociology, and also of morals, grammar, and the so-called Law of Nature. It is not concerned with the matter of law, but, following Kant's transcendental method, it starts from the fact of existing law and analyses the conditions of its possibility. Kelsen himself is chiefly influenced by the Neo-Kantian Marburg School of Hermann Cohen, others, like Kaufmann and Schreier, by Husserl.

Now the interesting point of this school is that the claim of law to absolute validity (as upheld in the Law of Nature (*Naturrecht*) and in the Law of Reason (*Vernunftrecht*)) is dismissed and replaced by the hypothetical validity of positive law. The underlying principle on which the theory of law is based is an hypothetical proposition, "If A is, then B ought to be." It explains what is to follow in a juridical manner, if a certain state of affairs is given. The "ought" expresses the specific connection between condition and consequence. Thus juridical values lose their absoluteness, their validity is hypothetical (even derived from their logical character of being the hypothesis of the facts which they have to explain). They are relative; yet their relativity is restricted even by the necessity that they have to provide a basis for empirical facts. I do not suggest that this solution is satisfactory,

[1] *Die Rechtsphilosophische Schule der reinen Rechtslehre.* Taussig u. Taussig, Prag, 1938.

but it may be that the study of empirical law may teach us more about the nature of values than a precipitate return to so-called material values.

Not without relation to our theme is the new volume of Fichte's posthumous works,[1] with two unpublished though not unknown lectures, both taken from pupils' notes, the one "On Logic and Metaphysics, as a Popular Introduction to Philosophy, following Platner's Aphorisms," the second one on "Theory of Science," the first unimportant, but the other interesting. In it Fichte, criticizing Kant, tries to find the unity of theoretical and practical philosophy; he treats philosophy as a whole, disregarding the differences between theoretical and practical problems. To Kant's treatment of both as different domains with independent laws, Fichte objects that Kant does not even reach a consistent theoretical philosophy. Kant formulates laws of our thoughts in relation to objects. Fichte asks, Why do we suppose that an object corresponds to our representation? To answer this question, he says, we must go back to the unity of our action, for our ideal action is not independent of our real action. We are conscious of our representations and of objects only because we are acting beings. "An action must be directed towards an object, an object which we call in our language *'Gegenstand,'* because this object is that which resists our action." "In itself the thing-in-itself is nothing, it is something only in relation to our action." Only by this action do we become conscious of reality. Fichte sees the new point of view of his theory of science in the fact that it starts neither from the object like materialism, nor from the subject like idealism, but from the inter-relation of both. If Fichte were right that in a basic sense theoretical and practical problems are united, it would be of great importance to our problem (probably he is right, and his problem is still important; some of Professor Macmurray's remarks after his lecture at the last meeting of the Aristotelian Society pointed in this direction). Expressed in the language of logical analysis, Fichte's thesis would mean that the meaning of terms is not simply a matter of linguistic convenience. It may be that the meaning of a term in one sphere (e.g. of "reality" in the sphere of theoretical knowledge) cannot be cleared up in this sphere itself, but that we have to go to a more basic and more comprehensive sphere in order to understand it. (The lectures are identical with those treated in S. Berger's able dissertation, *On an Unpublished Theory of Science of J. G. Fichte,* Marburg, 1918.)

David Baumgardt's original and stimulating book[2] may be regarded as a preliminary to a new ethics and to a history of ethics. His elaborate and thorough treatment of Kant's rationalistic ethics, and of Herder's, Hemsterhuis', and Jacobi's irrational ethics, anticipate his systematic point of view that ethics ought to give a universal law and to consider the material element of moral life as well. Unfortunately, the small space at our disposal does not allow a detailed analysis; the interested reader will find it in Professor Liebert's *Philosophia,* vol. ii, p. 316.

Klaus Dockhorn's book on *The Political Philosophy of the English Idealistic School, its Theory and Influence,*[3] may find interest in this country because in treating of T. H. Green, F. H. Bradley, B. Bosanquet, he pursues researches started by Professor Muirhead. This paper is based on his master's, Professor H. Schöffler's, dynamic interpretation of English literature, which supposes the nation to be in a constant interchange with the surrounding

[1] Johann Gottlieb Fichte, *Nachgelassene Schriften.* Bd. 2. (*Schriften aus den Jahren 1790–1800.*) Herausgegeben von Hans Jacob. Tunker und Duennhaupt, Berlin, 1937.

[2] *Der Kampf um den Lebenssinn unter den Vorläufern der modernen Ethik.* Meiner, Leipzig, 1933.

[3] *Die Staatsphilosophie des englischen Idealismus, ihre Lehre und Wirkung.* H. Pöppinghaus, Bochum-Langendreer, 1937.

forces and impressions, and thus to change its form and organization. This notion, adequate to a nation without tradition like Germany, is not quite true applied to a nation with tradition like England. Consequently this book, which is rich in material and quotations, is in danger of Germanizing English thought (e.g. if somebody speaks of "community," of understanding it as corporate life).

In a looser manner H. Glockner's book, *The Adventure of the Mind*,[1] is connected with the theme of this survey. It owes its origin to the meeting of the German Philosophical Society at Berlin in 1936 on "Soul and Body." The author, expecting a clear word worthy of the great historical moment, was deceived, and wrote this book, with which, however, he himself does not seem quite satisfied: "I am fairly well acquainted with the history of philosophy and know that few of my thoughts are really new." Strikingly new, in any case, is the translation of "index" by "*Begriff-Zeiger*." His thesis that the traditional distinction of the theoretical and practical sphere is wrong reminds us of Fichte's thought.

Thus, in the sphere of the Theory of Value, even more than in that of Philosophy of Nature and Philosophy of History, everything is in a state of flux, including the problems themselves.

F. H. Heinemann.

[1] *Das Abenteuer des Geistes*. Fr. Frommann, Stuttgart, 1938.

NEW BOOKS

A Hundred Years of British Philosophy. By Dr. Rudolf Metz. Translated by Professor J. W. Harvey, M.A., Professor T. E. Jessop, M.A. and Henry Sturt, M.A. Edited by J. H. Muirhead, LL.D., F.B.A. Library of Philosophy (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1938. Pp. 828. Price 25s. net.)

To translate into English a German book such as that of Dr. Metz calls for special qualities. The translator must not merely find good English equivalents for the German words and phrases; he must get back to the actual terminology used by the English writers whose doctrines are being expounded. I imagine myself, confronted with such a task, spending hours ferreting into the books and articles of Green and Bradley, Bosanquet and Hobhouse, Alexander and Stout and Moore, and the rest, to discover just which particular chapters were being laid under contribution, which sentences had been incorporated into the German exposition; and laying down the pen time after time with utter weariness. The three translators in the present case have done their work remarkably well. They and the Editor are to be congratulated on the successful termination of a formidable task. Dr. Metz's book is prodigious for its industry and its completeness. He has made his volume a kind of Baedeker of the English philosophers of the last sixty years, preceded by a general introduction covering in a less thorough way the philosophic movements from the beginning of the nineteenth century. He was, of course, helped, and helped very greatly, by the two volumes of Contemporary British Philosophy edited by Professor Muirhead. But he has made it his aim to come into personal contact as far as possible with the actual philosophers of whom he was to treat; and his judgments on their work are expressed with a candour which an English colleague would not permit himself, at least not in print. He was of course addressing his German colleagues: the translation enables us to overhear his talk. For many readers this volume will have all the interest of the volumes about Britain and the British character written by friendly observers abroad. We like to see ourselves as our neighbours see us, even though we may think them mistaken here and there.

On the whole Dr. Metz has succeeded in maintaining an admirable perspective. His orders of merit are distributed in a way with which there will be pretty general agreement, though of course there will be disagreements in particular cases. His highest praise is given to those philosophers who have built up complete systems of philosophy in books specially written for the purpose. He is less happy about thinkers who have devoted themselves to detailed studies in regard to particular problems. And he does not like thinkers who do not produce definite solutions. Thus Moore's work is "that of clarifying problems rather than of solving them," and in consequence "may evoke admiration but cannot satisfy thought" (541). "The intensity of the clarifying process not merely fails to help us to a solution," he says of one of Moore's papers, "but even debars us from it" (549). In the work of Broad, he complains, "in the end most questions are left undecided, unless we choose to call a decision the somewhat higher coefficient of probability with which one theory is invested in preference to another." His work "moves by preference in the shallows of probability, without ever reaching or wishing to reach the firm ground of certainty" (668).

Sorley once complained that "English writers . . . [on philosophy] have suffered much . . . at the hands of erudite German historians on the look-out for system rather than for thought."[1] Dr. Metz is on the whole saved from this complaint by his general plan of considering individual thinkers on their own merits rather than as exemplifications of this or that "ism." His Baedeker permits travellers to arrange their own tours. And this is as it should be. Admirable as his backgrounds are, however, I am not altogether happy about his actual expositions of the thought of particular philosophers. Many of them are illuminating; but many of them give merely a summary of conclusions arrived at by a thinker without any account of the method by which they have been reached, and without any reconstruction on Dr. Metz's own part. Perhaps more than this could hardly be expected; but the practice has its disadvantages. The reader who is trying to understand is left baffled, and in many cases is liable to be actually misled. Backgrounds seem to me to be his strong point. In spite of this, however, Dr. Metz's book is a memorable achievement, and its translation opens to English readers a mine of information about British philosophic thought.

The index is merely one of names, and does not include reference to names in the footnotes. In it Samuel Butler and the Bishop coalesce into one. All the references to pages 121–183 are inaccurate, through an unfortunate transposition of pages at the indexing stage. The numbers in the index from 121–154 should read from 150–183; those from 154–183 should read from 121–150. 154 is thus ambiguous. But this is a matter of minor importance; the rest of the index is accurate, so far as I have tested it.

I have no space for a discussion of particular details of Dr. Metz's treatment of individual thinkers. I must confine myself to noting a few general points. He regards British Idealism as constituting a renaissance of philosophic speculation in this country, and puts it down to the influence of Hegel, brushing aside as without evidence the view of Professor Muirhead[2] that there was at work also a genuine English tradition, derived from Plato. He claims Green as a Hegelian, though he admits that there is little explicit evidence for this in Green's writings; and he considers Green's political philosophy as of minor importance for the curious reason that "it has come down to us in the form of lectures edited by another hand from his remains" (283). Verily, publication is a great God! He prefers Bosanquet's account of the State, because it is more genuinely Hegelian. Green "fell back into the typical individualism of the English": "not fully liberated from the fetters of the native tradition, he shrank from such radical consequences as Hegel had drawn" (283). Hobhouse's political theory also he regards as less valuable than the rest of Hobhouse's work. For it "does not spring from the scientific objective study which characterizes the rest of his work, but from the hate-impregnated and envenomed atmosphere of the World War, to which even a thinker of so steady and objective a judgment fell a victim." It represents "a typical form of bourgeois Liberalism, defending itself against the omnipotence of the State because it feels its freedom threatened thereby" (168).

The other main characteristic Dr. Metz sees in modern British philosophy is its closeness to the trend of thought of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, where it is not influenced by Hegel; and many of the thinkers he regards as not succeeding in getting far beyond Hume. The influence of Reid, with his appeal to common sense, does not seem to him to bode well for British philosophy; wherever he finds it, he mentions it as something to be deplored. He regards Dean Inge as introducing to present-day English philosophy "a noteworthy

[1] *History of English Philosophy*, p. 300.
[2] *The Platonic Tradition in Anglo-Saxon Philosophy.*

widening of its cultural horizon, the sharpening of its vision for far views over space and time, a training in genuine thought about and insight into history and the philosophy of civilization" (788)—which the English might have received from Hegel but did not, and which Dean Inge owes to Troeltsch. And he thinks (777) that too many British philosophers have shown an uncritical interest in Psychical Research.

L. J. Russell.

Studies in the Philosophy of Religion. By A. A. Bowman, M.A., Litt.D. Edited, with a Memorial Introduction, by Prof. Kemp Smith. (London: Macmillan & Co. 1938. Pp. Vol. I, xlviii + 423; Vol. II, xiii + 438. Price 30s. the two vols.).

I believe this to be one of those rare works which at once take their due place in the front rank of British Philosophy. It is a masterly presentation of original principles that must indelibly impress the thought of to-day. And this not only so far as its main themes are concerned, but equally as regards others which, despite the detailed discussion accorded to them, are skilfully subordinated to the Philosophy of Religion itself. Logic and Epistemology, Realism and Idealism, Science and History, Ethics and Psychology are all brought within one comprehensive viewpoint, and surveyed with a penetrative vision that never loses sight of the far-reaching forest owing to the innumerable trees. The subtlety of the argument, indeed, sometimes verges upon paradox, as in the question: "Is it possible to experience what it is to be unconscious?" But however involved the analysis may become, it is inevitably refocused upon Religion.

The Ontology, in the first place, is unambiguously realistic: "to exist as an appearance is to be the function of an independent Real; every experience of an appearance is an experience of the object itself; the independent Real is a *real* object of *experience.*" Needless to add that appearance in all its modes, and experience at every level, are conditioned, but always in such a way that despite the profound contrasts between the conscious self and its objects, direct and unbroken contact is sustained between them, however diversified or distorted it may be. Even if the problem of the Real and its Appearances is not finally solved, this discussion is of the highest value.

The mere statement of the issues in these terms, however, may seem to assign a relative unreality to the subject; but this suggestion is categorically rejected. For while experience necessarily implies having an object, it is far more significant in that it involves being a subject. Not, of course, that these two principles can be severed; rather is it a matter of emphasis, and even of value; to be a subject has its own intrinsic character and far outweighs the implications, important though these also are, of having an object; and with this Realism is inseparably associated Permanence, in and of subject and object alike. However baffling, or even inscrutable, such Permanence may be, the arguments on its behalf are of the weightiest order; and while the contentions of current Phenomenalism, Neo-Positivism, and Psychological Atomism are clearly recognized and evaluated, they are countered by a criticism so effective as to confront their advocates with extremely formidable difficulties.

The term "self" and "selfhood" are, however, employed in an unusually comprehensive, though perfectly legitimate, sense. All selves, without exception, are "highly integrated, self-identical wholes," never to be fully understood simply in terms of their physical conditions. Thus far, then, "inanimate

nature, the actually existing world, is a system of selves," only "not of experience-bearing selves"; the first type possesses an inner, or intrinsic, character of its own which must be rigorously distinguished from all relations, while it also enjoys some degree of the permanence already insisted upon. Incidentally, this principle seems to be very slowly forcing itself upon modern scientific theory, and even, though against the author's own contention, into Physics. But however this may be, the second mode—"selfhood-experience" —involves (to repeat) "a permanent subject," an "identity of selfhood, actually experienced in the sense that every experience comes to us as an experience of the self. We feel ourselves to be the universal and uniform subject of every object and event." Thus all variants of Subjectivism are categorically rejected. The inclusive use of "self" to denote "the complex existent" as such, however, appears to me to confuse the further distinction between this "selfhood in general" on the one hand, and personality on the other. But this is after all a quite minor point; the essential principle is that "we learn to think of ourselves as inviolably self-identical in the unique concept of personality." A "person," in short, is "an experience-bearing self," and personality implies not merely "what it is to *have* an object," but (once more) "what it is to *be* a subject," while it is on the contrary "impossible to attribute modes of experience to the permanently unconscious." How, then, do these conclusions bear upon Religion? To begin with, "a personalist interpretation of nature" is one outstanding characteristic of primitive religion; but still more fundamental is the principle that "the notion of personality (is) the pivot on which everything turns," since it constitutes the differentia between the specifically religious, and the scientific-secular, attitude to the Universe, and also creates "the issue that confronts religion itself in one of the most serious crises of its development." But this is no antiquated anthropomorphism. Quite the contrary; the demarcation of the essentially personal aspects of Religion from the impersonal, the secular and the scientific forms one of the most original and valuable features of the entire argument.

In the first place, primitive Animism and its derivatives themselves provoke the familiar and powerful "drift towards the impersonal," substantiated as this seems to be by every advance in knowledge beyond early and crude superstition, and culminating in Pantheism and the most prominent types of Mysticism. But however emotionally attractive and logically consistent these may appear to be, they fail, in the end, to meet the conditions of man's existence and to satisfy the demands of his being. Usually, I believe, this collapse is averted by the impossibility of any genuinely coherent formulation of such systems; and if, on the other hand, they pursued their principles to the bitter end, they would prove (to resume the author's own weighty contention) that Religion is absolutely inseparable from the instinctive and ineradicable desire for existence which, no matter how refined and elevated it may become, must ever retain its inherent finitude, simply because man is a finite being. "Religion," therefore, "is a phenomenon of finitude, and to remove the finite factor is to cancel our concept of religion altogether." This formulation of the Hegelian principle of Negativity, of course, neither questions the incalculable value of Mysticism nor imposes any narrow limits on finitude, as such; this, to employ a scientific illustration, may expand like the Lemaitre Universe, which nevertheless remains finite! From the purely religious standpoint, then, thoroughgoing Mysticism is self-destructive: "to be completely lost in God is to lose God completely. To become *one* with the One that knows no other is to cease to be His worshipper. Brahmanism is the nemesis of oriental religion; Buddhism is the nemesis of

Brahmanism. As a solution of the religious problem of existence, mysticism breaks down."[1]

In the opposite direction, similarly, "a universe which is all God is as incompatible with religion as a universe in which a god is altogether wanting" —the Universe, in other terms, of thoroughly consistent secularism and impersonalist Science. This Universe and these cultures must, nevertheless, be assigned their due rôle in human life; and this is achieved by Religion itself, as it steadily develops, creating the domain of the secular as the sole method of transcending "its own animistic beginnings." "For the purposes of religion," then, "man must be thought of as man"—the essence of sane secularism—"just as nature must be thought of as nature," as pure Science quite logically insists. In other words, recalling what has already been argued about Mysticism, "it is a necessity of religion that the human agent should not lose himself in continual preoccupation with God; he must perforce differentiate his attitude towards the things of this world in such a way that religion itself prescribes." Thus (to repeat) Religion conserves its essence and ensures its advance; for it continues to pivot on personality, and neither secularism nor scientific impersonalism can deprive even the scientist of his humanity. The apparent "retreat of the religious attitude in face of the secularist," therefore, must be viewed in its true light as being "one with the movement whereby religion becomes clearly and consistently theistic, and theism definitely spiritual."

Once it has shed its animistic and crudely anthropomorphic swaddling-clothes, then, Theism involves "a stupendous dualism, a fundamental duality in the nature of things, which is at the basis of all religion." Man himself shares this duality, even while he observes and investigates it; and in realizing himself to be "a finite personality," he must conceive God as "the correlate of a completed personality in man." Not at all, however, in any abstract, arbitrary or artificial manner, but naturally and intrinsically: "the existence of a personal God is the necessary implicate of all personal experience . . . man's practical belief in his personality implies the existence of a personal God"; on the other hand, "the discovery of order in the world does not necessarily imply the existence of an omnipresent Intelligence." This should suffice to show that the arguments advanced are original as well as weighty. "The supreme reality is personal in character"; "God must be a person" in the sense that He is "the Being to whom we cannot relate our personalities in any other way (than) in their synthetic completeness"—a criterion that is unmistakably pragmatic, though by no means easy; while at the opposite pole "the concept of nature serves to stereotype the impersonal interpretation of the world" on which all Science is based.

It is, however, impossible, within the limits of a Review, to do justice to the application of these principles to other fundamentally important aspects of human experience—to Ethics, marked by a devastating criticism of naturalistic moral theory; to genuine creativeness within even man's activities, and attaining its perfection in the divine; to the proper functions of History and Art. But in conclusion I should like to remove any suspicion that the author ever yielded to the besetting temptation of the philosopher —over-intellectualization. On the contrary: "Philosophy can never hope to take the place of experience. . . . Religion is not truly religion until it has incorporated the moral life. . . . Religion goes behind all intimacies of experience to the universal groundwork of reality. . . . Effectual belief in

[1] This finds a remarkable confirmation in *The Bhagavadgītā*: "When one sees Me everywhere, and sees everything in Me, I am never lost to him, nor is he lost to Me." *The Song of the Lord* (E. J. Thomas). VI. 30. This Mysticism, in other words, is by no means absolute.

the personality of God means more than a theoretical belief that God *is* a person. . . . No religion can live on its ideals alone." Inadequate though this must be, it should ensure the keenest interest in the forthcoming sequel, *A Sacramental Universe.*

J. E. TURNER.

From Morality to Religion. By W. G. DE BURGH, F.B.A. (Macdonald & Evans. 1938. Crown 8vo. Pp. xxi + 374. Price 12s. 6d. net.)

In these Gifford Lectures Professor de Burgh continues his defence of Reason in its wider interpretation to cover intuitive as well as discursive thinking. Reason thus interpreted is a function of man's whole nature, and includes the activities of the mind in moral, aesthetic, and religious thinking, as well as in science and philosophy; it is "integrated with the will and the emotions in the living growth of personality." This conception of Reason is supported by accounts of its functioning in ethical and religious experience. Referring to these Professor de Burgh writes: "My purpose is twofold. I want first to show how moral experience presents a problem which philosophy is unable to solve, and which points to religion for its solution. The problem is that of the dualism of ethical principles, according as conduct is motivated by the thought of obligation or by desire for a rational good. Secondly, I shall consider the larger issue of the relationship by way of action and reaction, of morality to religion and of religion to morality." Professor de Burgh is aware that by his analysis and description of rational activity in these two important spheres he is attempting only a limited contribution towards the solution of his major problem. "A complete solution," he tells us, "calls for collaboration of many thinkers working forward, each from his chosen angle, to the unification of the fruits of rational inquiry in science, art, morals, and metaphysics, and with the knowledge revealed in religious experience"; but no one who follows his weighty arguments can doubt the importance of the contribution he has made.

Professor de Burgh's examination of ethical experience leads him to distinguish what he regards as two independent types of ethical activity: action for duty's sake, and action *sub ratione boni.* The key lies in the distinction between *theoria* and *praxis,* the former being pure *praxis* and the latter *praxis* governed by *theoria.* While endeavouring to do justice to the claims of both ideals, Professor de Burgh is mainly concerned to establish the independence and autonomy of each. "We should be shutting our eyes to the facts," he holds, "if we ignored or minimized a fissure that cuts deep into the structure of man's ethical nature."

In the main Professor de Burgh accepts Kant's conception of moral obligation, but he departs from Kant by insisting upon the existence and importance of another type of ethical experience. Kant fell into error, he holds, when failing to recognize the worth of action *sub ratione boni.* The discussion of these two forms raises for Professor de Burgh the central question: Can the concept of obligation be derived from that of good? His reply is decisive, for he is convinced that this can't be established by any philosophical argument. He is led to this conclusion by a comparison of what appear to him radically conflicting characters in these two kinds of experience. These may be summarized as follows: (1) Moral obligation or duty is purely formal, unconditional, and absolute. It is universal, and is apprehended intuitively as such in every particular moral act. Duty can't be justified by anything other than morality; and there is no answer to the question:

Why ought I to act thus? save, because it is my duty! Action *sub ratione boni*, on the other hand, implies the thought of an end, and can be justified by the character of the end to be achieved—an end which is immanent within the process of achievement. Further, the good pursued in particular actions is imperfect; and, since it is not yet realized, is hypothetical. It follows then that the absolute, unconditional, and universal moral obligation can't be derived from the hypothetical and imperfect good. (2) Moral obligation is negative, being characterized by restraint, compulsion, and discipline. It implies desire, but only the stern desire to obey the constraining authority. Such desire is *sui generis*, being derivative from the thought of obligation. As against this action *sub ratione boni* knows nothing of restriction and obligation; but is characterized by spontaneity, aspiration, and harmonious self-expression. In so far therefore as any action is *sub ratione boni* it ceases—we are told—to be moral, since it is performed spontaneously and without any conflict. (3) A similar distinction is expressed when it is stated that in moral obligation *praxis* is for *praxis* sake, whereas in action *sub ratione boni theoria* is primary over *praxis*—the vision of the ideal over the process of its actualization. (4) This leads to a further distinction regarding the kind of freedom expressed respectively in these two types of action. In moral obligation freedom is the freedom of choice; whereas in the other mode of ethical experience freedom is a necessitation which is also spontaneity, since it arises from theoretic vision. (5) Finally, duty or obligation attaches to man-doing, and not to any act viewed in isolation from the acting subject; but good is a character predicable of the object judged good, and the implication of the valuing consciousness compresent with the object does not affect the goodness.

Since, in regard to the relation between goodness and obligation, I hold the view which Professor de Burgh maintains cannot be established by any philosophical argument, I feel bound to indicate my attitude to the problem here, although I hope no reader will form any judgment on the matter without considering the powerful arguments with which Professor de Burgh supports his conclusions. My divergence can perhaps be presented most clearly as a difference in the conception of the manner in which Reason is autonomous. Professor de Burgh is concerned to establish the autonomy of Reason in its various modes; I, on the other hand, hold that Reason is one, and that it can't be entirely autonomous and independent in any of its modes. I am, of course, aware that Professor de Burgh also accepts the oneness of Reason, but as against him I am convinced that such acceptance is not compatible with any claim for the absolute autonomy of Reason within its distinguishable spheres of activity, if these are regarded as independent. In respect to the relation we are considering our conflicting views appear in Professor de Burgh's denial of the possibility of any necessary relation between the good and obligation, and my claim that this relation is necessary and synthetic. I should endeavour to support my view by examination and analysis of the relevant kinds of moral experience. Whether an argument so founded would be philosophic I must leave Professor de Burgh to consider. In making this claim I am not denying the validity or the importance of the distinction Professor de Burgh has expressed nor the accuracy of much of his description of the two types of ethical experience, but I reject his view of the relation between these. (1) Professor de Burgh maintains that unconditional and absolute obligation can't depend on hypothetical and imperfect good. This may be true, but it is not a necessary assumption. The authority of duty is derived from Reason acting under guidance from such apprehension of the good in the relevant situation as

is possible for the rational being concerned. (2) Professor de Burgh further maintains that duty implies conflict, whereas action *sub ratione boni* is spontaneous; and this difficulty is further illustrated by the distinction in the different types of freedom implied. In this connection he points out that as soon as any action is inspired by vision of the good it becomes spontaneous and therefore not moral—conflict having been eliminated. Although admitting the general accuracy of much of this description, it still seems to me clear that in cases of moral obligation conflict may remain while at the same time the actions are performed under guidance by apprehension of the good. As Professor de Burgh himself insists, goodness is a character of an object judged good; it can't therefore always be identified with my good, and surely it is a fact that there is frequently conflict between personal inclination and the acceptance of rational guidance from such apprehension of the good as is possible. (3) Further, I am prepared to admit that frequently when acting from moral obligation, there is no conscious apprehension of the good to be achieved. In such case it may appear that no ground can be given for action save the sense of duty or obligation. But is this not due to the fact that, as rational beings, we are members of communities; and that when required to act in many situations, we do not depend for guidance upon personal apprehension of the good sought? Inherited convictions and beliefs are deeply embedded in our personalities, and in situations of certain kinds we accept—whether consciously or unconsciously—guidance from these, without inquiring again whether by such action we shall achieve the good. In cases of this kind the necessary connection between good and obligation is shown by the fact that, whenever we become convinced that actions springing from such convictions or beliefs lead to human suffering rather than to the good which we anticipate, they immediately cease to induce any sense of obligation. (4) Lastly, when examining my own experience I invariably find that the obligation to act in any situation remains inoperative so long as I am genuinely perplexed in regard to the good to be achieved, but that the command becomes imperative immediately my apprehension of the good becomes clear. For reasons such as these I hold the connection between the good and duty to be necessary; and any other kind of relation would appear strange in view of the fact that Reason is one, whatever the mode in which it may be operating.[1]

Referring to his account of religious experience Professor de Burgh writes: "I have tried to show on grounds comformable to intellect, that religion is able not only to resolve the dualism inherent in ethical experience and to liberate ethical principles from formalism and ideality, but to raise morality to a higher plane of goodness through the motive of love to God." Professor de Burgh approaches religion by way of the paradoxes of ethical experience. That all actions performed under obligation should be valueless save in so far as they bring about moral goodness in the agent is, he says, a paradox "which moral consciousness shrinks from but can't dispel." Further, he holds that perfect fulfilment of the moral law by man is not possible in his present condition, for man is helpless and hopeless before the austere injunctions of the law. But there is another and independent form of ethical experience, and a step in the solution of the paradox is made by establishing the primacy of the good. At the same time the actualization of ideal good in temporal experience is ever defective, and it follows that the tension between the ideal and the actual can't be resolved under the conditions of actual experience. Thus only in religious experience are the radical con-

[1] My view is probably nearer to those of Mr. Joseph and Professor Laird in opposition to which Professor de Burgh develops his conception.

tradictions of ethical experience overcome. To religious faith God is revealed as the ground alike of goodness and of the moral law, and the "unanswered problems of ethical experience find their solution in religion." In supporting this position Professor de Burgh makes use of the moral argument for God's existence as the ground for moral worth; an argument which rests on the truth that essences or ideals, so far as they are abstract, can't have value, since value is only value when actualized. Nevertheless, though the moral law be grounded in God's nature, he is not subject to the moral law; and further, the goodness of God is of a higher order than moral goodness. Therefore, neither the moral argument nor any other based on non-religious sources suffices to justify the assurance, or to give any "positive knowledge of God's nature. "The issue," writes Professor de Burgh, "is of tremendous importance, since it concerns the possibility of any rational knowledge of God by man." His solution of the difficulty is of the greatest interest, although here it can only be mentioned. Professor de Burgh maintains that there is one type of religious experience in which man possesses direct and veritable knowledge of God. In the experience of man's love of God which is evoked by grace in response to God's love of man, the love of God experienced by man is in its quality homogeneous with God's love. It follows therefore that in regard to this kind of religious experience, the term love can be applied univocally to man and to God; and not analogically as must be the case when the value predicates which characterize man's ethical experience are ascribed to God. This argument, Professor de Burgh holds, is confirmed by the experience of religious mystics who insist, with one accord, that the love of God participated in through grace gives knowledge. He further contends that the knowledge acquired through this experience of love carries man beyond "the limitations of propositional statement." Professor de Burgh carries his argument further in his account of *virtus infusa* where he explains how, in religious experience, the contradictions of ethical experience are transcended through the operation of the religious motive of love for God, which imparts a new form of life, affecting it in almost every detail; and implies a transformation of ethical values which is radical and all pervasive.

There can be no doubt in regard to the importance or value of this account of religious experience; yet I feel that the difference in our interpretations of the autonomy of Reason leads also to divergence in our attitude towards the value as truth of religious experience. I agree with Professor de Burgh that Reason is for life, and is not exclusively an instrument for logical analysis and inference. The pursuit of truth demands reflection upon *data* presented in all kinds of intuitive experience—whether in sense, or in aesthetic, ethical, or religious experience. It is clear that such *data* can't be completely explained in propositional statement, but this seems to be true of the *data* presented in sense as well as of the *data* presented in other modes of experience. It is clear also that, since Reason is for life, there must be tests for truth other than that of the clarity and logical coherence of its propositional statements. At the same time I am convinced that, in the search for truth, no privileged position can be given to religious experience, save that which it has in virtue of the richness and fullness of its content. It seems to me that Professor de Burgh claims for religion some such privilege when he argues that "Religion gives knowledge of the truth." Does he mean by this that religious *data*, unlike those presented in other modes of experience, should be exempted from critical examination by logical and discursive thinking? Surely this is one of the functions of universal Reason. It may be I am wrong in this assumption, for Professor de Burgh himself points out that any spiritual revelation is "*ex parte hominis* of necessity fallible, calling for criticism and

interpretation by the God-given faculty Reason"; but the acceptance of this view appears to me to exclude any claim that religious experience gives truth, and to necessitate a conception of progressive approach to truth through inquiry and co-operation in all fields of experience.

I have not been able to mention Professor de Burgh's discussion of problems of the present age, which is not only of the greatest interest, but is also integral to the development of his conception of Reason; but must express the indebtedness which those perplexed by the deeper problems of life, whether they be speculative or practical, owe to Professor de Burgh for this important contribution to modern thought.

G. H. Langley.

An Introduction to Spinoza's Ethic. By Alexander Shanks. (London: Macmillan & Co., 1938. Pp. vi, 104. Price 4s. 6d. net.)

Mr. Shanks disarms criticism by the very modest account that he gives of his intentions in preparing this book for the press: his treatment is divided into three sections, the first two of which (on *Definitions* and *Restatement of Spinoza's Argument*) are "intended merely to enable the student to come to grips with Spinoza's argument before forming an opinion as to its merits or demerits"; and the third (containing *Notes* and *Conclusion*) is "intended to indicate some of the problems which arise and, occasionally, to offer interpretations which seem to make for a constructive view of Spinoza's philosophy as a whole." Many of these interpretations, moreover, he warns the reader, "are such as are not generally accepted, and (he) should not treat this book as a substitute either for Spinoza or for the standard criticisms of his philosophy. It is intended merely to supply him with the tools with which to work on both of these more valuable mines of information." In spite of these limitations and warnings very rightly emphasized by the author, there is a very real place for such an introductory discussion as this slight (and very well printed and produced) volume offers. Whether it would not have been better done by a more accomplished student of Spinoza than Mr. Shanks claims to be is a question that need not be answered since no such person has attempted to do it. The text of Spinoza is not very easy reading for the contemporary mind, and there is little doubt that discussions round about the central concepts may well prove illuminating for a beginner, even when the guidance is inaccurate, frequently superficial, and occasionally heterodox. That the earlier epithets do apply to almost every page of Mr. Shanks's book I think the author himself would not deny; and this renders detailed criticism out of the question in a short review.

Let me restrict myself therefore to noting a few of the more outstanding features of Mr. Shanks's exposition and interpretation. The first section, on *Definitions*, occupies only about nine pages and deals with about a score of key-conceptions—giving thus only about half a page to each. This would be very cavalier treatment of such important notions as Substance, Attribute, Causality, Essence, Imagination, and so forth, were it not for the somewhat fuller treatment of them in the third section; but in any case some of the explanations do not seem to me very effective even as preliminary indications. Terms like "substance" and "attribute", for example, are among the most ambiguous in the philosophical vocabulary, and it is of prime importance in any exposition of Spinoza, however modest or utilitarian, from the very outset to distinguish the special use of them by Spinoza from those of philosophers like Locke or Kant, and even to attempt to make clear their positive significance and importance. It is not enough to say that Spinoza does not

make clear "which side he favours" in the (later) disputes of those who side with Locke and Kant on the one hand and the "out-and-out Idealists" on the other, or again that "Substance is the ultimate reality of whatever we experience either in a spatial or psychical context." Spinoza does not himself define Substance as "ultimate reality", but as self-created and self-explanatory being; and that is the definition that should have been made the basis of the explanation and distinction. It would then have been clear how far Spinoza is from Locke: as far, it seems, as the purely intelligible is from the absolutely unknowable. A further step in the argument would then have been to indicate that Spinoza's idea of the intelligible was plainly different from that of Locke, and perhaps nearer to that of Kant. It is, of course, difficult to plunge into such questions right on the threshold of an introductory volume, but at least it is essential to preserve right from the start the correct impression of so fundamental a conception as that of Substance. Mr. Shanks was perhaps well-advised not to attempt in this section the difficult question of the relation of Substance and Attributes, though his way of avoiding it, by use of the analogy of the dimensions of space and time is rather unhappy. As Mr. Shanks returns to this analogy in his *Notes* perhaps a reviewer may be allowed to say that this vulgarly attractive comparison, for the use of which there is better authority than there ought to be, when it is anything more than intellectual "dope", must be positively misleading. If one could provide a spatio-temporal analogy in which one dimension was visual, another auditory, and a third tactual, the beginnings of a useful illustration might be perceived; but the four dimensions of space-time, with the qualitative distinction of space and time abstracted by the reduction of time to a sort of space, miss the very point of the desiderated analogy.

On the subject of Causality I think Mr. Shanks is confused—he is certainly confusing. Again and again in the course of the volume he speaks as if Spinoza was thinking of causes operating in time *a tergo*, after the manner of what are sometimes called "natural causes" (though nothing could be more unnatural), so that the finite modes are arranged in an endless temporally successive series to which each is related to the next as cause to effect or as effect to cause. I do not think that Spinoza held such a view of even the "common order of nature", and certainly not of the "order of the intellect": he is thinking always of "genetic" causes, whether considered as they truly are for *Ratio*, or as they are imagined in the first kind of knowledge. This is what is really meant by those who wrongly affirm that for "cause" Spinoza substituted "ground". This confusion is probably responsible for at least some of the difficulties discussed in the third section under the heads of "Modes" and "Regress".

Another term that the author has either not himself cleared up, or has failed to make clear to his readers, is "objective", but as this is probably traceable to his views about the relation of Substance and Attributes, I will not spend time in discussing it. A good deal of modern philosophy is permeated with ambiguity by the curious fallacy that the objective is the real.

In the second section Mr. Shanks undertakes a rapid restatement of the argument of the *Ethics*, Part by Part, with marginal references to the pertinent Propositions. As the whole occupies only about a score of pages the treatment, in order to be intelligible, is compelled to be superficial. Some of the points already noted naturally tend to obscure the exposition here and there: for example, Mr. Shanks's views about causality, which reciprocate with his views of the finite modes as spatio-temporal *sections* of Nature, determine the form of the difficulties that he finds in the deduction of the finite from the infinite modes.

In connexion with the account of Part II of the *Ethics* (and also his remarks on Thought and Extension in the third section—especially on p. 69) I should like to draw Mr. Shanks's attention to the contradiction between his statement in the last paragraph of page 27 and Spinoza's own assertion that "the idea of the mind and the mind itself are one and the same thing considered under one and the same attribute" (*Eth.*, II, xxi, Sch.), i.e. are *absolutely* identical. I can hardly blame the author for this serious error since it is shared by that essential Spinozist, the late and much lamented, Professor Samuel Alexander (cf. *Space, Time and Deity*, 2nd impression, p. xvi).

Next, I wish I could understand in greater detail what Mr. Shanks means when he says that "an idea in God's intellect . . . must be true, since it then *is*, in a sense, its own correlate" (p. 28). It is connected doubtless with the suggestion, on which I shall presently comment, that Extension is not an attribute of Substance in the same sense as Thought, but only from the point of view of inadequate ideas. With this is evidently connected the notion of the divine intellect creating its objects within itself. I am not suggesting that this is not Spinoza's view (he even tells us that God's intellect is *toto coelo* different from that of a man)—but suddenly thrown out in the middle of a discussion of Truth and Falsity it will be bound to strike the young reader as paradoxical. But perhaps, after all, that is no great harm.

The only other thing that I should like to say about this section of the book is that the author seems to me to underestimate the importance of the second half of Part V of the *Ethics*. He has nothing to say about the eternity of the mind except for a few references to "individual immortality in some sense", and he devotes only a page and a half to the synopsis of *Ethics*, V, xxi–xlii, which contain some of the crucial propositions of the system.

Section Three consists mainly of notes on important conceptions, and is probably the most valuable and original part of the discussion. It is also the longest, occupying about half of the book. Once more I restrict myself to comment on outstanding subjects.

In his note on *Substance* Mr. Shanks again fails to distinguish the uses of this term by philosophers so far apart (or so it is commonly believed) as Spinoza and Locke (whom he explicitly names). Of course he may be of the opinion (which I should respect) that they are not so remote as has usually been held; but if so I think the matter should have been made a subject of distinct comment. This could not but have been very illuminating to a young student.

The notes on *Attribute* reproduce the current confusion about subjective and objective in relation to the real: "Attribute is defined as being 'what the intellect perceives of Substance as if constituting its essence.' This seems to indicate that the attributes are subjective." But surely what it *indicates* is that since they are objects-of intellect they are essentially *objective*; nor do I see how it can even *imply* that they are subjective in the other sense of the term, viz. creations of intellect: it leaves that question entirely indeterminate; at least so it seems to me—though Mr. Shanks has his own views about the natures and relations of the Attributes and Substance, and, as I have already said, goes so far as to suggest that not only is Thought pre-eminent (as others have held, and as is the natural suggestion of a *theoretical* account of reality), but that "God has the attribute of Extension in so far as he is revealed through the system of inadequate ideas, and the attribute of Thought in so far as he is revealed in the system of adequate ideas"—Extension being thus reduced to "mere appearance". This is a somewhat novel suggestion in this connexion, but one towards which I personally entertain feelings of toleration and the speculative interest that arises from the movement of my own mind

in recent years; though I fancy it will be difficult to fasten it upon Spinoza.

On the *Infinite Modes* Mr. Shanks is not very helpful or sound: he gives the idea of them as abstractions, types, or forms—a mistake that may partly be due to his confining them to the *immediate* infinite modes. But for Spinoza, as I understand him, all these modes are individuals, "fixed and eternal things", whether we refer to Motion and Rest (not mobility), Infinite Intellect (not intelligibility), "the face of the whole universe", or "the infinite idea of God". Mr. Shanks's argument, too, suggests that the production of these in their hierarchical order is a real production out of the conceptions of extension and thought—though he realizes that it is not temporal production. But perhaps what is given is rather the stages in the progressively detailed objectification of the essence of Substance.

It is for the reader to decide whether my criticisms of Mr. Shanks's book imply that I do not think him yet qualified to write an introduction to Spinoza's *Ethics*. Even if it were so, that would not involve serious disparagement of his obvious philosophical powers. Elementary textbooks are notoriously more difficult to write than textbooks of Elements. The fact is that he advances and discusses views about Spinoza far indeed from the customary interpretations, but well worth careful consideration, and capable perhaps of revolutionizing our views of the philosopher. I need only instance his views on Extension and otherness already referred to, and hints such as are to be found on page 60 and on pages 70–1. Mr. Shanks has at least thought for himself to some purpose, and it may well be that he will make other students think for themselves—no small thing in a world increasingly prone to habitual cerebration.

One last word, Mr. Shanks is a Scot, but he should try not to irritate the English reader with constant insistence upon such ungraceful and not specially *juste* Scotticisms as "outwith" and "independently on".

H. F. Hallett.

La Morale Antique. By Léon Robin. (Paris: Felix Alcan. 1938. Pp. 180. Price Fr. 15.)

Every new book from the pen of Professor Robin will be welcome to the serious student of Ancient Philosophy. For not only is he the recognized authority in France on Platonic philosophy—he has edited the *Phaedo*, the *Symposium*, and the *Phaedrus* in the *Collection des Universités de France* (*Collection Budé*), and has written three highly valuable books on problems connected with Platonism, *Etudes sur la signification et sur la place de la Physique dans la philosophie de Platon*, *La théorie platonicienne de l'Amour*, and *La théorie platonicienne des Idées et des Nombres, d'après Aristote*. The last by itself would be important enough to establish his name as one of the greatest scholars of our time in the field of Classical Philosophy. He has also given us recently an account of Plato's philosophy as a whole in a monograph belonging to the series *Les grands philosophes* which contains a very accurate description of the various stages and development of his Theory of Ideas; and in his *Pensée grecque et les origines de l'esprit scientific* (in the collection called *L'Evolution de l'humanité*) proved himself to be a master far beyond his special subject, and even beyond philosophy itself when taken in its narrower sense as a particular branch of our University curriculum.

It is, therefore, with high expectations that we turn to his latest book, *La Morale Antique*, which has appeared as Vol. XVII of *La Nouvelle Ency-*

clopédie Philosophique. And, indeed, in this expectation we are not disappointed. It is really astonishing and impressive what a wealth of learning and how many valuable suggestions he has been able to pack into its mere 180 even rather small pages.

The book does not proceed along an unbroken historical line like its forerunner, *La Pensée grecque*. In it Professor Robin rather proposes to deal separately with three main ethical topics, viz. with the question as to what is the ultimate moral good, the question of happiness and virtue, and the problems connected with the psychological conditions of a moral act, showing what the several great thinkers and schools of thought have said about them. This method has the advantage of bringing into stronger relief the important and sometimes fundamental divergencies which existed among these ancient thinkers about one and the same issue. It might be feared that this method would lead to some repetitions, but Professor Robin has been remarkably successful in avoiding this danger.

Another attractive feature of the book is that it begins Greek philosophy, not with Thales, as is usually done, but goes further back (like Bréhier's *Histoire de la Philosophie*) to Homer, Hesiod, Theognis, the seven Wise Men, and the Mystery Religions. Especially striking seemed to me a remark of Professor Robin's on page 32 on the irony of Socrates, where he pleads that this irony consists not only in his feigning to know nothing in order to deliver his pupil from ignorance, but also in feigning to love him sensually in order to free him from his self-love and too great attachment to himself. Noteworthy also is the contention (on p. 41) that Plato's ethics, when all is said, should be regarded as something like a philosophy of mysticism—in which he apparently agrees with Dr. Inge (see his *Philosophy of Plotinus*, II, p. 51). Lastly, of great interest is the suggestion on page 51 that the "mixed life," while it was for Plato only a second best which borrows, as it were, its goodness, as far as it goes, from a strictly transcendent "Good," becomes with Aristotle the highest good itself and to such a degree an immanent quality of this world that it can be described as the peculiarly human good. The Stoics are on the whole severely handled, almost as in Plutarch's *De repugnantibus Stoicis*, but, as far as I can see, fairly and justly. Epicurus, on the other hand, finds more favour with Professor Robin. The importance of Neoplatonism is perhaps a little underrated. Christianity, finally, is hinted at as the religion which for subsequent times has profoundly transformed all ethical thought, although this transformation is not described in great detail.

There is one point about which I venture to disagree with Professor Robin. It is this. I do not believe that it is permissible to deal with the problem of free-will under the head of "Les conditions psychologiques de l'acte moral," as is done in Part III. For moral acts, as Professor A. E. Taylor aptly remarks (see his "Freedom of Man" in *Contemporary British Philosophy*, ed. Muirhead, vol. ii, pp. 270–304, especially p. 292), do indeed occur in time and so far are psychological events. But it may well be that they are far more than mere events, so that formulae which have been devised to describe mere events may become useless when applied to them. Accordingly it would seem to me that the solution which Plato offers as an explanation of the Socratic paradox that *οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν ἁμαρτάνει* in the Ninth Book of the Laws has not been duly appreciated by Professor Robin, and that his insistence on the Myth of Er at the close of the *Republic* with its necessarily highly symbolical language does not fully make amends for that omission. But it would be unjust to conclude this review with a criticism. Let me therefore add that at the end of the book there is a list of references (pp. 177–180)

which is extremely helpful for anyone who wishes to penetrate further into its subject-matter, and which once more shows how solidly Professor Robin's statements are based on first-hand knowledge of the texts and of the best expositors of them.

H. Gauss.

The Philosophy of the Act. By G. H. Mead. Edited, with introduction, by C. W. Morris in collaboration with J. M. Brewster, A. M. Dunham, and D. L. Miller. (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press; London: Cambridge Univ. Press. 1938. Pp. lxxxiv + 696. Price $5; 22s. 6d.)

Mead (1863–1931), of the University of Chicago, owed almost all his reputation to his oral teaching. He published very little. The above is a third volume of his collected papers. It was intended to be the conclusion of a series, but may be followed by one supplementary volume of reprinted articles. All the material in the present volume is here published for the first time. It is doubtful whether the editors have done a service to the memory of their teacher by carrying so much private material into print. Their remark that "the discerning reader would prefer in the main to make his own selection" is tantamount to an abdication of the function of editorship. In consequence they have given us a very bulky book whose mere bulk makes a heavy demand on the reader's pocket and his time, and without any commensurate return, for the pages are crammed with repetitions due both to overlapping chapters and to a most tedious repetitiousness within each chapter.

The general impression one gets is that Mead's philosophy was pragmatism made difficult. It is expressed in a language like that of Whitehead at his worst, which is particularly unsuited to a theory that lays all the emphasis on practice. The editors in their introduction speak the same language. Perhaps I should confess that I do not understand it, for where I do get any meaning from it the meaning can be put easily into the *lingua franca* of philosophical students. What I have to say may therefore give an unfair idea of the writer's attitude and achievement. Mead reaffirms the general position of pragmatism, that the process, results, and significance of thinking lie wholly within the ambit of practice. Thinking is what arises when a biological impulse meets with an obstacle to its smooth expression and fulfilment. According to the editors, Mead's distinctive contribution to pragmatism consisted in a wealth of detailed analysis exhibiting and vindicating the pragmatist thesis in a variety of fields. There certainly is a good deal of analysis and a good deal of detail, even when the repetitions are discounted, but it is markedly unsystematic, and the relevance of much of it is not clear. The Mead of this book displays a strongly associative mind, the wandering quality of the essayist rather than the selective and progressive mind of a reasoner; but we must remember that we are peeping into his private papers, not reading finished statements prepared for the severe test of print.

The main preoccupation is to show that everything about which a philosopher can speak is a phase, function, or relation of a biological act, the general stages of which are asserted to be impulse, perception, manipulation, and consummation. The position is very interesting because it brings out very plainly, I think, the instability of any attempt to unite the biological approach with anything resembling radical empiricism. For the former there is a real environment, faithfully described in biology and the related sciences; for the latter, anything beyond the percipient or the perceiving act is highly dubitable. It appears to be one of the chief claims made by and for Mead that

he reconciled these two approaches. I can find nothing but an oscillation between them. On the one hand he speaks repeatedly and emphatically of the things that "are just there"; on the other hand, he interprets the material world, or all that we know it as, as a social creation. A view for which the material is only a world of common meanings can only be reached from a radically empiricist position, and is therefore not entitled to take advantage of the notion of the social. If "the analysis of perception does not take us to a reality which lies outside an actual or possible perception" (p. 23), everything except my own actual perceptions cannot be anything but a possible perception.

The problem of perception, especially the relation of perceptual objects to the objects of physics, occupies the greater part of the book. Pragmatistically Mead says that "the reality of what we see is what we can handle" (p. 105), but this does not turn out to be a statement of the meaning of "reality." He is against the view that there is a material reality consisting wholly of primary qualities over against a mind in which secondary qualities reside. The separation, he declares, is a device of reflection, and is based on the claim, which he endorses, that primary qualities are the same for all of us. Yet it would be much too simple to say that for Mead things really have both sorts of quality. I cannot gather what for him the nature of the perceived world, or of the environment to which we react, really is. All perception of it is said to give but an individual perspective of it, and all reflection upon it to proceed by the co-ordination of these private but socially communicable perspectives: the "distance experiences" lead us to form hypotheses which predict determinate "contact experiences," and are verified if these ensue. I suppose that if the world as we conceive it is a construct of a merely pragmatic intelligence, there is no point in asking what it *really* is. Yet Mead uses metaphysical language, speaking of emergence as against mechanism, and of mind as an ordinary natural fact. What he seems to me to say is that the world we construct and pragmatically verify, though even as verified only a world of socially common meanings, is the world in which we really live. This paradox comes out most clearly in what he says of space: "A permanent space is not only not independent of the percipient events or individuals that inhabit them [? it], but . . . exists only in relation to them—yet it does not exist within them. On the contrary, they exist within it" (p. 180). The space we exist in is surely more than a social construct. A statement on the next page that "reflection is a fact in nature and not simply in mind" is not surprising when what is meant by nature is left so unclear. Mead is trying to found an objective naturalism by means of a subjectivist epistemology.

The remainder of the book is occupied by some very incomplete notes on value, and by fragments on a variety of topics. Values are neither absolute nor merely individual preferences, but are social. Religion can no more transcend the social reference than anything else can; it is part of the effort to achieve more satisfying social values, but falsely projects these upon a purely imaginary ultimate.

T. E. Jessop.

The Clandestine Organization and Diffusion of Philosophic Ideas in France from 1700 to 1750. By Ira O. Wade. (Princeton, U.S.A.: Princeton University Press; London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford. 1938. Pp. xi + 329. Price 18s.)

This fascinating book, richly documented and embodying heavy and (despite the author's much too modest disclaimer) pioneer research, is an

outstanding contribution to the study of the cradle-period of a momentous age, and therefore demands a place in every university library and on the shelves of every student of French literature and philosophy.

The emergence in France about the middle of the eighteenth century of a vigorous group of freethinkers—the Encyclopaedists and others—is one of the apparent jumps that set problems to the historian. It has usually been solved by reference to England—the Enlightenment crossed the Channel with returning visitors like Montesquieu and Voltaire. True, Bayle's *Dictionary* (1695–97) is bold and big enough to be adduced as a native stimulus and pointer to freethinking, but the difficulty has been to understand the gap between its appearance and the outburst of the new thought, and since the latter was led by writers who explicitly acknowledged a debt to England, this country has been given almost all the praise or blame for being the source of the French Enlightenment. The virtual absence of liberal or radical publications in France during the first forty years or so of the century is, however, sufficiently explained by the rigour of the censorship. The problem has therefore been whether during that period there was any verifiable and not merely supposed radicalism of thought propagated secretly and gathering force and courage until at last it burst into the open and challenged the civil and religious censors. Before freethinking could make itself irresistible, as it did, it must have developed widely underground.

The problem was solved in 1912, when G. Lanson, in an article in the *Revue d'histoire littéraire*, drew attention to a number of liberal treatises in manuscript in the libraries of Paris. He was able to give evidence that some of them had been copied and recopied and circulated clandestinely. Professor Wade's book is a continuation of Lanson's work. The author has sifted not only the Parisian but also the provincial libraries and has brought to light ample material which adds corroboration and detail to Lanson's discovery. He lists and examines 102 different treatises in manuscript which handle the topics of politics, morality, and religion in an unorthodox manner. Nearly half of them eventually found their way into print, mostly after 1750, and ostensibly in London (though I would regard a "Londres" imprint in such cases with considerable suspicion). Of some of them he has traced ten to thirty copies in widely removed places, and shows from the records of the Bastille that copying and distributing became a trade. The greater part of the book is devoted to a summary of the treatises taken severally and to an investigation of their authorship.

A book so closely packed with what is largely new material requires an essay to welcome it and show its worth. A brief notice can do little with it. Not the least valuable aspect of it is that it sets the stage for further research, for a fuller investigation of the origins of the clandestine doctrines and of the extent to which they passed effectively into the minds of the Encyclopaedists. On these points Professor Wade, dealing at length with prior questions, is perforce brief and himself demands that they be pursued further. I may note two points of interests to philosophical students in his conclusions. Firstly, the English influence is smaller than one would have expected (though nine of the treatises are translations or adaptations of English writings), and there is less of Locke than of Hobbes, Mandeville, Toland, and Collins. Secondly, the dominating influence appears to come from Spinoza, especially from his *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*; a translation of part of this, a few essays in Spinozistic metaphysics, and Lucas's *Life* of Spinoza figure in the author's lists.

T. E. Jessop.

Kant's Pre-Critical Ethics. By Paul Arthur Schilpp. (Evanston and Chicago, North-Western University Studies in the Humanities, No. 2. 1938. Pp. xvi + 185. Price $2.50.)

The development of Kant's ethical views prior to the *Fundamental Principles* has been almost completely neglected by English writers, despite the inherent interest of the subject and the great wealth of material to illustrate it. Besides the published writings, which, even when not primarily ethical, contain many indications of his ethical views, there are the letters, the scattered notes collected in the Berlin edition as "Reflections on Ethics," the Fragment from about 1775, and the recently published *Lectures on Ethics.* Mr. Schilpp discusses these chronologically in considerable detail. This is at times wearisome and the main argument difficult to follow; but he introduces several summaries which help one to "see the wood." It is one of the merits of the book that it quotes all the most important passages in English translation.

The generally accepted view, and that maintained by Paul Menzer in his standard essay on Kant's ethical development,[1] is that for a number of years Kant passed completely under the sway of Rousseau and the British "moral sense" school, and then, about the time he was roused from his dogmatic slumber, suddenly veered round to the (allegedly) entirely opposite position found in the *Fundamental Principles.* Against this Mr. Schilpp forcibly argues that, though Kant was certainly much influenced by these writers, he never accepted their views uncritically and in their entirety; if he spoke of "moralisches Gefühl" he did not mean quite the same thing as a "moral sense." It follows that the *Dissertation* of 1770 does not indicate a sharp break with Kant's previous views, and that instead of discontinuity we have "the slow and painful explication of ideas present in his ethical thinking from the very first" (p. 171). While these points are well argued, it would have been better if some account had been given of the philosophic background, and in particular of the views of Wolff, to help one to understand how the problems first presented themselves to Kant; and the apparent discontinuity is hardly satisfactorily dealt with.

The main theme of the book, however, is that the accepted views of Kant's mature ethical theory have greatly distorted it. Mr. Schilpp would say that the solution of the ethical problem towards which Kant was moving was a "methodological formalism." This seems to imply—though it could have been more clearly stated—that "the solution of the moral problem" is not to be found in terms of norms and rules, but in a "formal and creative procedure" (p. 96–7). The "moral objective" is regarded as "a new creative construction" (p. 97); morality is "dynamic" not "static," and is "the method of rational reflection, construction and transition from old accepted to novel untried objectives" (p. 163); it is freedom limited by the need for self-consistency (p. 119). (It would have been helpful if a brief account had been given of Mr. Schilpp's own ethical position instead of references to articles merely.)

There is much in this view to stimulate thought—though it could bear considerable elucidation—and it may help to correct the one-sidedness of many views of Kant's ethics. But the "one side" which existing views emphasize does seem to be the important one. Without Duty and the Categorical Imperative Kant would lose most of his importance as a moralist. Mr. Schilpp's view, if it is to win general acceptance, would have to show much greater appreciation of this aspect of "unconditional obligation." On the

[1] *Kant-Studien*, 1898–9.

surface it is impossible to think that the discoverer of categorical imperatives could have believed that morality is "the construction of fresh objectives."

Mr. Schilpp promises a further volume applying his views to the main ethical works; and it seems unfortunate that he did not publish this first. His aim is a fresh interpretation of Kant's ethical theory, and that can only be given on the basis of the major writings. Otherwise the critic may argue that whatever incongruous teaching is found in the earlier works was rejected as Kant achieved maturer insight. Because of this mistake in strategy Mr. Schilpp fails to convince on his main point, though there is much of interest and value in the book.

W. M. Watt.

Time, Cause and Eternity. By J. L. Stocks. (London: Macmillan & Co. 1938. Pp. xii + 163. Price 6s.)

The late Dr. Stocks's posthumously published Forwood lectures are a further proof, if such were needed, of the loss which philosophy, as well as university administration, sustained in his lamented and untimely death. Few books published in recent years contain more matter in such small compass, and certainly few show such a combination of keenness and clarity in their mode of expression.

The modesty of the author's avowed programme does something less than justice to the importance and value of his argument. He is concerned with the conflict or opposition between the claim characteristic of religious philosophy down the ages that the temporal order is wholly dependent upon a timeless eternal, and the point of view, natural to modern science and to the modern mind in general, that temporal categories are supreme. But he sets himself to treat this opposition from one specific approach, by discussing the bearing upon it of the notion of cause and of the interpretation given at different times to causal explanation.

He begins with a short account of the typical Greek view, as exemplified in Plato and Aristotle, especially in the latter's doctrine of the Four Causes, but the Greek "subordination of Time and Change" is illustrated also interestingly from other features in the Aristotelian philosophy, e.g. his political theory, in which the constitution and laws are conceived of as in principle unchanging, the supreme body in the state being first and foremost a deliberative rather than a law-making body. We then pass to the modern view of Time and Cause. Here Stocks selects "two features of the modern period as decisive for our point of view," namely, the dominant influence of physical science and the more recent emergence of the historical outlook and attitude. Under the former formative influence Causation has come to be interpreted wholly in terms of "efficient causes," and "efficient cause" as the event in a mechanically conceived system which makes possible or necessary a subsequent event. (This idea of necessity is, of course, rather an expression of uncritical nineteenth-century "Science" than of a more circumspect standpoint that has taken into account the sceptical analysis of Hume.) "This scheme presents us with an ideal of human knowledge, reducing it fundamentally to the composition of two factors, which may be called respectively *physics* and *geography*. 'Physics' is required to give us an ordered list of the various elements at work in the world and of the laws of their combination. 'Geography' is required to tell us of their actual distribution at a given time." The result of this is, he urges later, inevitably Materialism, in the sense of explaining wholes in terms of their component parts variously arranged and moved about.

The more naïve presentation of nineteenth-century materialism has, of course, come under revision and suspicion in the light of recent physical discoveries and the impasses which they have suggested. But we are here warned (and surely justly) against attaching too much importance to alleged idealistic tendencies in contemporary physics. In part these are simply based upon assertions of ignorance and of the unpredictability of certain physical ultra-microscopic facts, and "it is certain that ignorance explains nothing but other ignorance, even if the claim is warranted that this ignorance is necessary and irremovable." On the other hand, if the present-day "scepticism as to the value of the causal category" means (as it does, e.g. for Planck) the admission that Science must surrender its "fundamental assumption that the course of a process can be represented by means of an analysis of it into its spatial and temporal elements" and must apply the concept of wholeness in the field even of purely physical inquiry, then that signifies a return to something like the Aristotelian doctrine of the Form as a causal factor.

Before arguing the case for such a return, however, Stocks turns to consider the second formative influence upon the modern mind, the idea of history. The impact of the historical point of view on the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is briefly described. The idea of Progress is "the first hasty *a priori* form of the historical attitude, which the fuller comprehension of the nineteenth century superseded and corrected." Later, History attempts to become scientific, just as Science, under Darwinian influences, is infused with something of the spirit of history. But the attempts (such as that of Bury) to interpret history completely as a science fail (it is suggested) because they do not and cannot do justice to the ineradicable element of individuality, which (whether the individuality be that of persons, societies, or civilizations) must always be the principle of explanation for the historian. The scientific and historical attitudes are naturally opposed, at best complementary, at the worst in open conflict: neither can ignore or usurp the place of the other.

That this is so is seen when we turn to consider the attempts made to base a metaphysic either exclusively upon science and its findings or exclusively upon "history." The former fail because "science" is essentially preoccupied with the "material cause" only. As an example of the latter Stocks takes the philosophy of Bergson, in which Time comes so definitely into its own as an ultimate real. Bergson's is an effective protest against the exclusion of the element of novelty and variety in nature, characteristic of the outlook of a certain type of scientist with his concentration upon uniformity, correlation, and law. But Bergson's *élan vital* is, when examined, seen to reintroduce "not merely Purpose and the Final Cause, but with it in addition all the other three causes which Aristotle used," yet in a way that does less than justice to the point of view of physical science (as Aristotle's own metaphysic also failed to do). Final causes here ignore too much the claim of the material cause.

The reconciliation which it must be the task of Philosophy to attempt between "the Materialism of Science and the Individualism of History" cannot be stated in the old terms, belitting the significance of Time and tending accordingly to merge both Final and Efficient cause in the Formal cause. It is suggested that Alexander's phrase that "Time is the mind of Space and Space the body of Time" is helpful here. It intimates that in attempting a combination of the two points of view "a certain priority must be granted to" that of Science. Body must be there before it can become the vehicle of mind, as letters and words must be before they can be used. But this does not in the least deprive history, the story of life, of significance; rather it saves temporal processes from being "a somewhat awkward and unwelcome

intruder" upon the world as science sees it. Yet this is not enough, for we seem to demand a conspectus more satisfying than can be found in an infinitely extended temporal process, however rich this may be in accumulated meaning. What is needed is a postulated eternal order, a general plan or idea not itself temporal in which all the significances of the temporal order may be comprehended.

Is there any empirical evidence of such an eternal order? This question might be answered by an examination of the claims of religious experience, but this is excluded as beyond the scope of the book. The author is content to remind us that the very consciousness of succession proves that the experient is in some sense other than temporally successive, and to point to the evidence of wisdom down the ages that for the effective mastery of the life of action (in time) detachment from the flow of temporal interests and desires is a necessary condition. Mind is disclosed as actively operative upon temporal processes, and therefore as itself more than temporal, "a member of a higher order from which it draws its power and its freedom," and which stands in relation to the lower order as controlling form to determined matter. The eternal then is "formally definable in general terms as that higher level of being for the realization of which time and the time-process provide the means and the necessary vehicle, as that by which they are justified, that in which they are perfected."

Being in very close agreement with the author's main argument and conclusions, there is little that I have to offer by way of criticism. I will touch on only two points. The first is the selection of Bergson's philosophy as an example of a metaphysic based upon "History" rather than upon "Science." Stocks realizes that Bergson is not a very satisfactory example, and has some pertinent criticisms of his views in this respect. But they hardly go far enough: I do not think the Bergsonian interpretation of Time squares with an historically oriented metaphysic at all. What the historical point of view demands is not only the "reality" of Time and the relevancy of Final Causes but the distinctness and uniqueness of occasions, and I do not find this in Bergson's "durée reelle." At its core Bergson's philosophy is more mystical than historical. If it is difficult to substitute a more satisfactory example, the reason may be that a philosophical bias in favour of the historical point of view has never been able to ignore or disparage Science, the occupant already in possession of such large and well-developed estates of human experience, to the same extent as Science has been able to ignore the late arrival History.

We are asked to find in the Greek ideal of "leisure" (σχολή) an expression of a recognition of the place in life of an absolute good implying a higher order than the temporal. This is implied, it is said, in the Platonic-Aristotelian ethics of detachment from worldly interests. This is no doubt true in a sense. The study of the Platonic Forms or of the Aristotelian First Being is the study of the timeless. Yet as an ethical doctrine the ideal of is σχολή surely not one of detachment from temporal interests so much as selection and re-attachment to certain opportunities afforded in life as temporally conditioned. Contemplation (the word so often used to translate Aristotle's Theoria) misrepresents the intensely activist character of that way of life. It stands in strong contrast, for instance, to such an ideal as that put forward by Schopenhauer, in which deliverance from the everlasting dissatisfaction of temporal experience is to be in some sort achieved by a passive aesthetic experience freed from all elements of desire.

The revised statement of the principle of the Formal Cause seems to me in its logical aspect to contain most of the value of the old Idealist conception of the Concrete Universal. It is deeply to be regretted that the author did

not live to work out much more fully the logical and metaphysical implications of his thesis, or to expand his discussion of many points upon which he has confessedly touched but lightly. None the less, the reader will attach to these lectures a value out of all proportion to the number of pages they occupy.

The book is prefaced by a foreword in which the Archbishop of York pays a moving tribute to his friend.

J. W. Harvey.

A History of Chinese Philosophy. The Period of the Philosophers. By Fung Yu-Lan, Ph.D. Translated by Derk Bodde. (Peiping: Henri Vetch; London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1937. Pp. xx + 454. Price in England 25s. net.)

This is a translation of the first volume of the two volumes entitled, *A History of Chinese Philosophy*, by Dr. Fung Yu-Lan, Professor of Philosophy at the National Tsing Hua University, Peiping. On the wrapper mention is made of a projected translation of the second volume next year. The few alterations made by the translator are carefully noted (p. xii), and the division between the present volume and its successor is natural and not artificial. The four centuries from Confucius to about 100 B.C., when Confucianism achieved official orthodoxy, are properly called "The Period of the Philosophers," the later philosophy being called "The Period of Classical Study." It has continued to the present day, although now, according to our author, Chinese thought "has for the first time suffered revolution" and is "assuming a new aspect." The book contains an extensive bibliography of translated and of untranslated books and articles.

Since I have no acquaintance with the language and little with the philosophy or with the literature of China, I had some compunctions in allowing the editor of *Philosophy* to persuade me to undertake this review. Dr. Yu-Lan's book has every indication of being a standard work, but I cannot vouch for its adequacy or for its accuracy. This gives its author and his translator a legitimate grouse. Indeed, I am rather perturbed to note that according to certain eminent Chinese philosophers of old time, punishment was due both to those who exceeded and to those who fell short of the thing they had undertaken to perform. In this delicate situation I shall attempt only to indicate the sort of impression that the book has made upon me.

The author has written the book in his own language, but he has been trained in Occidental philosophy, and his recent anthology called *The Importance of Living* has recently been included in our Sunday Press as one of the books that should be packed for Bank Holiday reading. It is therefore fair to assume that he hoped to address a Western public, and it seems plain that he himself has a Western as well as his own cultural attitude towards his theme. I am unable to conjecture how far the Western and the modern features of his outlook are an advantage to a book like this.

The tone of the book is rather detached. Its expositions (I should judge) are clear, and there are extensive quotations, but, as it seems to me, rather little that is quoted is very striking or even very quaint. One wonders whether the author's selections, or the literature itself, is the cause of this result. Although the author is a clear expositor, he has the habit, excusable if not inevitable in a lecturer or in a coach, but less excusable on the printed page, of repeating his points in close recurrence, not from delight in a phrase or in a thought, but, so to say, as a matter of routine.

The discussion of ethics predominates, and this, we are told, was charac-

teristic of Chinese thought in the relevant period. Nevertheless, the discussions of cosmology, logic, dialectic, and epistemology that are to be found in certain parts of the book are of much interest, and seem frequently to describe a philosophy that attained a high level. (It was written, of course, very long ago.) I should gladly have read more about these ancient discussions and should judge that the author has relatively little interest in them. In that, however, I may be grossly mistaken, and I have no means of judging whether he gave them, proportionately, sufficient attention.

What, then, about Chinese ethics?

As I have said, we are dealing with a period remote by two millennia. Nevertheless, ethical ideas do not age so rapidly as, say, the ideas of experimental science. On the other hand, clear ethical notions and ethical systems are among the later products of most civilizations. Our author gives us very little guidance regarding the extent to which Chinese thought was influenced by ideas that were developed outside China; but we should rate the ancient ethics of China very high if either its analysis of moral ideas, or its orderly presentation of them in a connected system were worthy of respect and of commendation.

In these respects Dr. Yu-Lan (even if he has been trying to see the affair with Western eyes) seems to me to have shown, very successfully indeed, that Chinese ethics had attained a high pitch of development.

The Confucian conception of *jen* (translated "human-heartedness") seems to have been conceived with care and insight and to have been a proper foundation for an ethics of character. In this, and in his doctrine of the "rectification of names," our author's comparison of Confucius with Socrates seems to be not unjust. The doctrine of Mencius, in a sense his follower, seems to have been a genuine development of the same set of ideas, particularly in its discussion of the relations of *jen* to shame, modesty and the sense of right and wrong, and in its explicit opposition to utilitarianism. Take, again, the Confucianism of Hsün Tzû. In it there are highly developed conceptions of nature, desire, and the place of artifice in morality. Among the Confucians of the Ch'in and Han dynasties the relation of *jen* to *li* (righteousness), and of harmony (or music) to form, are discussed in a way that is penetrating and un-antiquable. Again the doctrine of the mean, or of the "timely mean," was very fully discussed; and many other elaborate and difficult moral conceptions.

Although Confucianism ultimately triumphed in ancient China, other philosophical moralisms were also elaborated skilfully. Early Mohism, it is true (i.e. the philosophy of Mo Tsû, who died a little later than 400 B.C.), seems to have had gaping lacunae and great internal difficulties. It attempted to combine frugality, universal love, and pacifism on a utilitarian basis, and its odd combination of a doctrine of renunciation with the said utilitarianism, does not seem, in the account given in these pages, to have been excogitated very profoundly. But the later Mohists made amends, giving a strict exposition of hedonistic utilitarianism that may reasonably be compared with Bentham's in its apparent clarity. (I think, however, that its pacifism is oddly allied with its attempted justification of capital punishment, and the argument that to kill a robber is not, properly speaking, to kill a man, seems to belong to the baser sort of sophistry.)

If Confucius may properly be compared with Socrates, Lao Tzû may appropriately be compared with Spinoza, with the important difference that quiescence rather than acquiescence was his goal. "All things, howsoever they flourish, returned to their root. This return to their root is called quiescence, which is called submission to fate. Submission to fate is called the invariable.

To know this invariable is called enlightenment." In the later Taoism of Chuang Tzû, a monism of emptiness seems sometimes to have been preached; but a richer form of wisdom was also present. "Heaven and earth have their constants. The sun and the moon have their brightness. The stars have their groupings. Trees and shrubs have their life and growth. You, sir, first liberate your instincts and follow Tao." "Comprehension of the qualities of Heaven and Earth; this is called the great root and the great foundation. It is to be in harmony with Nature. To be in harmony with Nature is the happiness of Nature."

There is much freshness in these ancient treasures.

JOHN LAIRD.

Consent, Freedom and Political Obligation. By J. P. PLAMENATZ. (London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford. 1938. Pp. xii + 163. Price 7s. 6d.)

"Philosophy," Mr. C. K. Ogden has remarked in cynical mood, "is 99 per cent. the unconscious misunderstanding or the unjustifiable exploitation of the elliptical, the metaphorical, and the fictional." Mr. Plamenatz has written a treatise which may be said to be almost entirely the other 1 per cent. His purpose, in his own words, is "to provide definitions of a number of words generally used by political thinkers, and to discover whether the duty of the governed to obey their governments is, on the whole, greater in proportion to the extent to which the latter act with the consent of the former." With this twofold purpose in view, he examines the concepts of "consent," "rights," and "freedom," and, incidentally, the ideas of "general will," "common good," and "political obligation."

The author contends that the idea of consent has two facets. It involves the expression of a wish that another or others should perform or abstain from a certain action or actions. It also means that the right of one man to act in a certain way is conditional upon another man's having expressed the wish that he should act in that way. "Consent" is distinguished from "approval": consent to a man's action is quite distinct from approval of its effects, for the giving of consent is essentially the granting of permission. Moreover, "consent" can be given, strictly speaking, only to the actions of others, and never to one's own. It is shown that under both pure and representative democracy there is no such thing as government by the consent of all the persons supposed to owe obedience to the government. Therefore consent may be one basis of political obligation, but cannot be taken to be the only basis. "Locke and Rousseau were perfectly right when they insisted that protection by the law creates an obligation to obey the law, but they were wrong in maintaining that the acceptance of protection by the law implies consent to its enforcement."

The same distinctions are applied to the theories of the Idealist philosophers, and in particular to their conception of a "general will." Idealist theory is the most complete attempt yet made to base political obligation entirely upon consent. The notion that law gives effect to a social will which is, at the same time, the "real will" of the governed, is used by Hegelian philosophers to prove that we must obey government because it is really doing nothing other than enforcing our own will. We are always consenting parties to its actions, even if we are not conscious of being so. The enforcement of the law against our own actual will at any moment is only an appeal from Philip drunk to Philip sober, and we can—in Rousseau's famous phrase—be "forced to be free." Mr. Plamenatz shrewdly attacks the basis of the whole theory when

he contends that "there is simply no argument from the existence of a good common to several people to a will which is also common to them." Moreover "will," in Idealist theory, is sometimes regarded as simply individual volition, sometimes as an immanent, moral "goodwill." It is this double ambiguity which alone makes possible the paradoxes of Idealist theory.

The hinge, then, upon which the whole ultimately turns is the conception of freedom. Mr. Plamenatz contrives to avoid entanglement in the old controversy between free-will and determinism by defining freedom, in its primary meaning, as "action from a motive from which a man desires to act, or, at least, does not desire not to act": in its secondary meanings ("freedom from restraint" and "freedom from coercion") as "action from a motive other than an undesired motive." Thus, to "act against one's will" means to act from a motive which one wishes did not exist in one's mind. The discussion of the idea of freedom is as illuminating as it is brilliant; but one is left wondering whether a distinction between "impulses" and "motives" might not have still further advanced the discussion.

The ultimate case for the largest possible element of consent in government is briefly this: co-operation should be undertaken under such conditions that the greatest possible number of the actions which it involves are the effects of desired—or at least of neutral—motives. In order to minimize restraint and coercion, the consent of those who co-operate must be obtained as extensively as possible. This is the almost platitudinous conclusion at which the author quite unashamedly arrives. Its truth could, of course, be elaborated indefinitely by practical illustration (the Prohibition Laws of America, for instance, which have proved as great a godsend to the political scientist as they proved to the gangster). But this is a work not of political science but of political philosophy. And Mr. Plamenatz has made a valuable contribution to the theoretical discussion of those ultimate political values which are so apt to be perverted, defiled, or even forgotten in modern politics.

DAVID THOMSON.

The Problem of the Individual. University of California Publications in Philosophy. Vol. 20. (Berkeley: University of California Press. London: Cambridge University Press. 1937. Pp. 206. Price $2.00; 9s. net.)

This book consists of eight essays by different authors, each of considerable importance and merit, but varying so much in their view and argument that the only unity which they possess and characterizes the book as a book lies in the fact that they are all concerned with the *individual*. About the latter, however, there is no common thesis.

Neither singleness (indivisibility) nor uniqueness, according to Professor Loewenberg, who criticizes empiricism and subjects the processes of distinction and separation to examination, can serviceably define individuality, for there is no demonstrable knowledge of what is in itself single or unique; and both catalysis and synopsis lead to insoluble difficulties such as Kant emphasized in his Second Antimony. Professor Pepper, considering the *Individuality of a Work of Art*, analyses the latter into physical object and aesthetic object and agrees with Professor Loewenberg that the individuality of both is remote. In Physics Professor Lenzen traces developments from the classical to quantum theory; and discussing the questions as to what is the concept of physical individuality and what is the ontological status of the ultimate physical individuals finally answers that the atomic individual "becomes a correlation of series of possible numerical measures" and that

the pictorial image of a corpuscular individual "serves merely as a mental support for the abstract concept of an ordered set of numbers." Professor Dennes contends that uniqueness, indivisibility, complexity, or simplicity are each irrelevant to individuality, develops his argument by defining the individual as an instance of a type, and emphasizes—a point relevant to theories such as those of Plato, Aristotle, and Bosanquet—that a view of this kind can prescribe no limits as to what is or is not ontologically individual, any assertion that some things are more truly or genuinely individual than others being merely the expression of a *preference* for some things as against others. Professor Adams, on the other hand, working on the basis of a conception of continuity, argues that "far from being an instance of type individuality is always that which is more and other than an instance of type"; it is relevancy to context, its contrast being the "abstract universal" which is indifference to context; but both of these have to be regarded not so much as being mutually exclusive as ideal limits between which there exists a sliding scale. Professor Strong deals with the question as to how an individual is to be specified, identified, or described relevantly to the problem of human rights, and distinguishing though not separating three aspects of individualization has some interesting things to say on topical social and political issues.

This hunt for the individual can be no doubt exciting; but there seems to be a certain degree of confusion which is probably traceable to the initial absence of agreement about the meaning of individuality. It shows itself in the obscurity of Professor Lowenberg's phrase "the remoteness of the individual"—a phrase accepted and repeated by several of the others; it leaves one in doubt whether the individual is reached by a laborious dialectical inquiry, or whether the individual cannot be known even by this means, or whether anything answering to the term individual exists at all. There is a lack of clearness concerning the three terms—definition, existence, and knowability of the individual. According to one interpretation of Plato's theory, the individual is relegated to a level of unreality and consequently is not an object of knowledge; but Professor Mackay, dealing with the problem of individuality as he seees it in Plato's philosophy, comes to the conclusion that "far from denying the substantial existence of particular individuals, Plato takes them to be the ultimate basis of his dialectic." Professor Marhenke deals with the problem as it is treated by Hume in his discussion of Identity, and, while he brings out the difficulties inherent in that treatment, he would have brought his essay more into line with the main discussion of the book if he had made it clear whether Hume, in saying that personal identity is a fiction, was saying that the individual is not *known* or is not an ontological fact, whether in saying so he was right or at least in line with things said by other writers in this book, though his argument for this conclusion was bad, or whether he was wrong both in his argument and for what he argued.

B. M. Laing.

An Abstract of A Treatise of Human Nature, 1740. By David Hume. Reprinted in type facsimile. With an introduction by J. M. Keynes and P. Sraffa. (Cambridge at the University Press. 1938. Pp. xxxii + 32. Price 3s. 6d. net.)

In a letter dated March 4, 1740, to Francis Hutcheson, Hume refers to an "Abstract" which he had succeeded in getting printed in London and to a "Mr. Smith" who evidently had a copy of this Abstract or who was acquainted with it. Hitherto this Abstract has remained unknown, and doubts have been

expressed regarding its ever being discovered; in the absence of further details Hume's biographers have identified "Mr. Smith" with the famous Adam Smith and connected him with the authorship of the Abstract—a concise précis of the lately published *Treatise*. The interpretation constituted a charming story, expressive of the esteem in which Adam Smith was held, but lacking any cogent evidence and not very consistent with Hume's own statements in the letter. Now the public is presented with that Abstract; and the editors deserve the thanks for their discovery and publication which includes a valuable introduction.

Three main points arise. First, who was "Mr. Smith"? Second, who composed the Abstract? Third, if Hume is the author, has the fact any importance? The answer given to the first question by the editors is that "Mr. Smith" was John Smith, a Dublin publisher, with whom Hume, dissatisfied with the result of the publication of the *Treatise*, hoped to effect an Irish edition of the latter work. This is admittedly conjectural, nevertheless it provides a motive on the part of Hume for making an Abstract and securing its publication in some form. The editors answer the second question to the effect that the Abstract was made by Hume himself: a careful correlation of passages in the Abstract with passages in the Appendix to Volume III of the *Treatise*, guided by consideration of the chronology involved, convinces the editors that no one but Hume could have written it; it must be granted at least that it could not have been written without Hume's collaboration. The third question is not touched upon by the editors. Yet a short and concise Abstract might be expected to reveal something of the author's main purpose and argument. One gets the impression, for instance, that the Abstract in structure and in phraseology is largely an anticipation of the *Enquiry* of which it is a miniature. Other features worthy of notice are that it stresses the need of supplementing prevalent logic by a theory of probability and evidence, that it selects causation not because of any special importance it possesses or of any special interest which Hume personally has in it but because it serves the purpose of illustrating the argument in one detailed instance, that in discussing the nature of mind (as of body) Hume was attacking directly the philosophical notion of mind as a simple, identical substance, and that in regard to necessity constant union and *inference* are the data from which the idea of necessity is obtained.

B. M. Laing.

Humanism and Naturalism: A Comparative Study of Ernest Seillière, Irving Babbitt and Paul Elmer More. By Folke Leander. (Göteborg: Wettergren and Kerbers Förlag. 1937. Pp. vi + 227. Price Kr. 8.)

This comparative study of three authors, one French and two American, who are little read in Great Britain is of considerable interest and value. As the writer remarks in his first sentence, "Terms like 'humanism' and 'naturalism' may mean almost anything nowadays. . . ." Hence the title throws little light upon the contents. It is a work of, in the wide German sense, "anthropology."

Seillière and Babbitt (and to a less extent More) have spent much strength in tracking down and lopping off the hydra-heads of Rousseauism which, under the name of "naturism" or "naturalism," seems to them the arch enemy of Western culture. Mr. Leander's outline of their analyses and interpretations in this matter is lucid and, I think, convincing.

While the three agree in their historical interpretation, Babbitt and More diverge from Seillière in their psychology and their ethics. As to the former,

indeed, with reason; since Seillière's elaborate doctrine of "imperialism" (an odd, and, I think, a misleading term) comes at bottom to Hobbes's egoism *sans phrase*, and was therefore finally refuted by Butler by mere process of accurate description. To this Seillière adds fresh difficulties by his singular pseudo-divinization of "reason-experience" or "synthesized experience of mankind" by which he would have man's native egoism controlled. Indeed, the vast bulk of this author's lucubration would hardly seem warrant for too serious treatment of it as philosophy.

Babbitt and More, however, are in different case. The former's *Rousseau and Romanticism* alone gives him a right, in his field, to respectful attention. Yet even these, in their "humanism" seem to lack philosophical *Grundlichkeit*. It is, to risk a charge of prejudice, more than a little "woolly." Indeed, Babbitt's task (which More finally gave up, embracing instead a Christian view of man) is to establish "a superindividual *telos* or a human universal which is at once our inmost self and transcendent of individuality" (p. 121), without trespassing beyond the realm of the human, without falling into metaphysics or theology. A difficult task enough. In his last phase Babbitt does not deny that a theistic basis *may* be given to his humanism, but he does deny that it is necessary. Mr. Leander contributes a chapter on the psychology of volition the point of which is to show that good empirical grounds may be cited for Babbitt's view, to which, however, he does not commit himself in any final way. Perhaps the central theme of Babbitt's humanism is *voluntas superior intellectu*, by which he is affiliated (but not identified) with the main current of American Pragmatism.

Throughout his earlier course More's development followed closely that of his friend, but during the last decade he moved over to orthodoxy, parting finally from Babbitt on the doctrine of "grace." Mr. Leander sides, on the whole, with Babbitt, who wants "the same ethical and spiritual results" (as those of Christianity) "without . . . a dogma." The question remains, Can he have what he wants?

RALPH E. STEDMAN.

Readings in Political Philosophy. By FRANCIS WILLIAM COKER, Alfred Cowles Professor of Government, Yale University. Revised and enlarged edition. (New York and London: The Macmillan Company. 1938. Pp. xviii + 717. Price 17s.)

"The aim of this volume is to furnish a handy collection of readings from foremost political philosophers. In furtherance of this design it has seemed wise to include substantial parts of a few pre-eminent works rather than to cover a wide range of writings with brief passages from each." This, in Professor Coker's own words, is the aim and gist of the book. It is an anthology of political theorists, starting with Plato and Aristotle, Polybius and Cicero, and coming down through the medieval thinkers (St. Augustine, John of Salisbury, St. Thomas Aquinas, Dante, Marsiglio of Padua, and Nicholas of Cusa) to modern times. The sixteenth century finds adequate representation in Machiavelli, Luther, Calvin, Bodin, Hooker, and the *Vindiciae contra Tyrannos*; the seventeenth century, in Grotius, Milton, Hobbes, Harrington, Locke. The eighteenth century is represented only by Montesquieu, Rousseau, Paine, and Bentham. A serious omission from such a catalogue is, surely, Edmund Burke, who would have been a more fitting climax to this lineage than is Bentham. It is a pity, too, that a sample of David Hume could not have been included; though when so many treasures have been collected between two covers, it is perhaps churlish to ask for more.

Teachers of political theory at Oxford and Cambridge have for years past been conscious of the need to persuade students to read the actual texts of politics, rather than summarized expositions of them or second-hand criticisms of their ideas. A book of this nature should prove invaluable for this purpose. It was first published in America twenty-four years ago, but has scarcely been used in this country. It is to be hoped that a revised and enlarged edition may lead to its more extensive adoption by students in English Universities; for I know of no counterpart to it.

The recurrent themes of discussion are, inevitably, the origin and nature of state and society, the basis of law and liberty, the grounds and limits of political obligation. The selection from the writings of each man is admirably made with a view to embodying his essential approach to these problems, as well as exemplifying the general tendency of his thought. The result is one vast symposium, in which the greatest minds of Europe all play a part. And one becomes acutely aware of the real continuity of political theory. Thus Aristotle and Cicero refer back to Plato, Augustine to Cicero, Harrington to Machiavelli and Hobbes, Montesquieu to Harrington, and so on. Rapid consecutive survey has a value of its own; it offers a hill-top view, whence rivers and tributaries can be seen in relationship.

The necessary accompaniment of chronological selection is an index giving logical, rather than chronological, cross-references. This has been attempted, but is not always adequate. Thus, for example, the reference to Tom Paine's remarks on sovereignty (p. 682 f.) does not appear in the Index under "sovereignty"; nor do the remarks of Nicholas of Cusa on representation (p. 267 f.) appear under "representation" in the Index. The reference to Harrington's ideas on property (p. 503) would also be better made under "property"—along with the references to Aristotle and Locke—than under the separate heading "land-ownership." I would suggest, therefore, that in a future edition the already valuable index be made still more valuable by elaboration along these lines. The selected bibliographies appended to each excerpt are excellent, and leave nothing to be desired.

DAVID THOMSON.

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"TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR PHILOSOPHIE"

The foundation of a new Dutch philosophical periodical is being announced, the title of which will be *Tijdschrift voor Philosophie.*

The new periodical will be at the service of the strongly increasing philosophical movement in the Dutch-speaking countries, and it is especially intended to improve the relations with the international philosophical activity. Contributions of the most representative foreign philosophers will regularly be published in this periodical in the original language (English, French, German, Italian).

The object of the periodical includes the philosophical problem in its entire scope. Its spirit will be positively a constructive one. The editors consider this enterprise as an attempt to co-operate in the spiritual renovation which is being performed in present philosophy.

Each number will contain articles and critical studies, a chronicle, annual reports which will give a critical and complete survey of the philosophical literature, and finally a complete bibliography (books, articles from periodicals, reviews of books).

Moreover, the editors expect to print unpublished old texts and also symposiums concerning the actual problem of methods in the different branches of philosophy. These symposiums too will have an international character.

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The periodical will be published four times a year, the first in February 1939; each number from 250 to 300 pages, size 24 × 18. Editorship and direction are established in Ghent (Belgium), Hoogstraat, 39. Rates of subscription: for Belgium 90 Fr. (18 belgas); abroad, 110 Fr. (22 belgas).

CORRESPONDENCE

To the Editor of *Philosophy*

Sir,

I should like to comment upon Dr. Bourke's article, "Responsibility, Freedom, and Determinism," appearing in *Philosophy* for July 1938. His argument, which in its inception and early stages gave promise of shedding significant light on the problem of freedom, seemed to me to lose, at its climax, all claim to validity. Yet if this part of his argument were sound, it would set at naught, at the very outset, any attempt to defend the determinist's view. So apparently devastating an argument merits examination.

A crucial point, Dr. Bourke contends, in the defence of freedom and responsibility against the strictures of the determinist is made by attributing to the determinist an inconsistency in the very holding of the view that freedom and responsibility are not real. Merely to maintain the non-existence of responsibility, he observes, is already to admit its existence, for the reason that one cannot hold any position without thereby taking responsibility for the holding of it. One imagines that a determinist would very quickly reply to this argument that his "responsibility" for adopting this or any other view would not be a "genuine" responsibility in the sense of one resulting from a free choice among possible alternatives, but only the kind of responsibility that any member of a causally productive series of events would have in performing its causal function. So that the determinist in maintaining his determinism is himself determined by antecedent events in such a fashion that given these events, only the act of maintaining determinism could have eventuated. Such an explanation, it would be insisted, would be free from involvement in self-stultifying inconsistency.

But Dr. Bourke's case against the determinist, it appears, goes farther than this. The determinist's denial of all responsibility, Dr. Bourke says, involves the further denial that it is possible to distinguish between what is true and what is false. Conviction that a certain theory is true comes only when one is able actively to pronounce in favour of it as against other possible theories. If theories are "merely mechanical processions of events," then they are "all equally valuable and valueless," and the determinist is "not entitled to prefer and put forward his own theory as claiming truth any more than any other."

Are these really the implications of determinism? Does it make it impossible for any theory to be either more or less true than another? Does it destroy the foundations of knowledge? Does it prevent the determinist from even arguing his own case? It must be insisted at once that even if the determinist could not consistently claim to know that a theory is true, that fact would not militate against the theory's *being* true. It may be that Dr. Bourke does not mean to allege that it would, but his language at times comes close to suggesting something very like this. In any case it seems evident that the truth of a theory does not rest with the ability of a person to maintain that theory—except in the special case where the theory in question is precisely the theory that the person *can* (or cannot) maintain that theory. And it is no part of the determinist's thesis that he can maintain (in the sense of freely choosing from among alternatives) the theory he is proposing.

But what reply can be made to the contention that the determinist theory, if it be true, cannot be known to be true? Certainly conviction of truth comes in other fashions than by free and intelligent reflection. Compare William James's famous "anaesthetic revelation" produced by the dentist's nitrous oxide. A view of things obtained in this highly deterministic manner might well be held and asseverated with great vigour.

But conviction, it will rightly be held, is not knowledge. Knowledge involves discrimination, selective attention, sifting of evidence, reflection. Are these possible under determinism? In one sense in which these terms may be taken it is true

that they are not. It is in this sense that the determinist denies that we have knowledge. But the terms have their deterministic interpretations in accordance with which the determinist holds that knowledge exists. Even in a deterministic universe we turn our attention to objects, we look at evidence, we find some evidence more relevant and compelling than other evidence, we draw conclusions: though all this takes place according to deterministically operative laws of cause and effect. Laws such as these that govern the thinking organism in its relation to its environment are, the determinist would maintain, fundamental for knowledge. Unless evidence—fact—does *compel* the mind's acceptance—as the Stoics would describe the relation between known object and knower—there is no real knowledge. Ultimately knowledge goes back to the direct deterministic relation of fact-compelling-mind. To see a fact is to be unable not to acknowledge it as fact. This may involve a kind of lack of freedom (though many would regard it as of the very essence of freedom), but it is what knowledge reduces to in the last analysis.

If the non-determinist objects finally that those who hold theories based on such knowledge are not really responsible for them, that the theories are not really *theirs* to maintain, the determinist replies that if this means that such people have had the theories thrust upon them by forces beyond themselves, then, in all instances of genuine knowing, these forces can only be facts. But to free the mind from the pressure of facts is equivalent to dooming it to utter ignorance, and hence utter irresponsibility. So that responsibility is not inconsistent with, but rather dependent upon, the compulsion of facts. And this view of responsibility the determinist believes he may maintain without refuting himself in so doing.

Yours faithfully,

LUCIUS GARVIN.

OBERLIN COLLEGE,
OBERLIN, OHIO, U.S.A.

November 22, 1938.

TO THE EDITOR OF *Philosophy*

SIR,

In the very interesting article, "The Relations of Philosophy," by Professor Jared S. Moore, in the last July number of this Journal (Vol. XIII, No. 51), he says: "Religion is unlike both Philosophy and Science in that it is a *way of living*, whereas Philosophy and Science are *theories* about life. In other words, the aim of Philosophy and Science is knowledge, the aim of religion is personal fellowship with God and the inspiration of daily life." May I here point out that in India, which has devoted thousands of years to the pursuit of religion and philosophy, the *opposite view* is held. In India, philosophy is *pre-eminently* "a way of living." It is knowledge based upon life and life based upon knowledge. Philosophy is *nothing* if not *lived*. It is theology, dogma, scholasticism and the like, so often mistaken for Philosophy, that are mere "theories" or "opinions," and they contradict each other. Religious beliefs being based upon faith, and mystic life are likewise held to be of the nature of opinions (*matam*) in so far as their experiences contradict each other and are not ordinarily verified or verifiable. Philosophy is what is based upon Truth (*Tattvam*) actually verified or verifiable, by ordinary facts of Life, as being something beyond contradictions, like two plus two are equal to four.

Philosophy being an interpretation of the facts of life, it is of value in India *solely* as that which *enables* one to make attempts to *live* a life as perfect as possible, it being based on a knowledge of the Truth of All Existence. This Truth is tested only in practical life, taken as a whole. Every kind of activity, social, political, religious, intellectual, and emotional, is comprehended in life, as interpreted and lived by the Philosopher. This Truth is illustrated in Indian Philosophy from the lives of rulers, politicians, warriors, tradesmen, hunters, butchers, menials, priests, ascetics, housewives—nay, men, women, and even children, in all walks of life. In fact, the greatest and the most widely known philosopher of India was a king and a warrior who taught Philosophy on the *battle-field*. Philosophy in India is *most emphatically* no theory, no speculation.

Religious beliefs, on the other hand, are opinions formed by men according to "*tastes*," "*temperaments*," and "*capacities*." Such opinions have undoubtedly their influence on men's lives, which makes men feel religion to be a necessity. This influence is, however, limited to individuals or groups only. It often becomes an endless source of hostilities among men, when they become conscious of the differences in their beliefs. In spite of the contacts that men are said to make with Gods, in their religious life, it is the religious differences that have been the causes of a larger number of wars, a greater amount of bloodshed, cruelty and homicide in the world, than mere economic distress or other circumstances. The unimpeachable facts of history point to the fact that it is not Religion that helps most to promote the social good of humanity *in general* or *as a whole*, but Philosophy, whose objective is Truth, verified in *actual* life, as known to all, here, in this world, not in the next or a different world. One's *life* is the best exposition of one's philosophy, as understood in India. Philosophy is not the spinning of yarns out of one's own mind from within.

In the same issue of this Journal is published another thoughtful article on "The Concepts of Politics," by Mr. J. D. Mabbott. It deals specially with the implications of the terms "Society" and "Common Good." Though modern Indian Philosophy has not much to contribute to discussions relating to such topics, yet her ancient wisdom appears to contain something that may be found useful.

The ancient Indian goal in political life is summed up in such formulae as "*Sarve* janah sukhino Bhavantu," "*Sarve* Satwa sukho hitah," "*Sarva* bhuta hite ratah," and so forth. They indicate that individuals *cannot* attain any *real* or lasting good unless the community, society, or State attains it, and that the community, society, or State cannot attain it unless all humanity (*Sarve Janah*) attain it. In other words, no individuals or groups can attain *real* or lasting good unless they realize that all human beings form a single "body." It may be remembered by some of your readers that this was the message sent to the last International Congress of Philosophy, held in Paris, by His Highness the Maharaja of Mysore (India), as the message of *Indian* Philosophy.

This shows that the concept "society" acquires wider and wider significance as man progresses till it comprehends the whole of humanity. We are now somewhere on the way. So are the Totalitarians at the stage of the "State," and they have yet to reach that of "*all humanity*."

Next, the term "common good" takes us further. Since "good" and "common" are topics dealt with in pure Indian Philosophy, I shall not go into that subject here. It will be enough to refer to the Indian view that *ultimately* the "individual" implies the "all." As such, unity is always implied in multiplicity. It is only what is "good" for all that is good for the individual. Otherwise the "good" is not "real." "Common" implies "unity." Hence Indian Philosophy holds that "common good" is not what is good only for a body of individuals as a body, but to each and every one. It is good to each *in the same degree*. Here also there are different stages through which man passes before he realizes this Truth. The *real* "common good" is attained only when every individual realizes his identity *with all* humanity. This looks like mere theory, and that of a most impracticable kind. But that it can be most practicable will be evident only when we go deep into *Philosophy*—not religion, which is beyond the scope of this note.

V. Subrahmanya Iyer.

Mysore, India.
September 29, 1938.

To the Editor of *Philosophy*

Dear Sir,

Professor Turner, in his review of my *Beyond Humanism*, has somewhat misunderstood the view there suggested of the relation of God to nature. I did not mean to deny, but to assert, what he describes as the "traditional theistic view" that God is to all nature (including past "cosmic epochs") as a man is to the few cubic feet and years of nature occupied by his body. This view, which is too complex in its implications to be easily understood (think of the various mind-body theories),

has been bitterly combated in most Protestant and all Roman Catholic theologies. True, some of the older theologians accepted it, such as Spinoza and Schleiermacher, but to my mind they ruined it by such assumptions as determinism, which Professor Turner also accepts. It is essential to the "new theology" that the parts of the body, its cells in the widest sense, can react upon the mind of the whole, and that the latter is not "pure actuality," but *passive* as well as active. The primary question is whether or not God is completed perfection in every sense, therefore incapable of change or of being acted upon, or of having genuinely individual active parts. Many of the most distinguished Protestant theologians of our time hold, at least implicitly, the doctrine that God is perfect only in righteousness, wisdom, and power; while his aesthetic value, his happiness or bliss, is capable of endless increase, to which we may contribute, how *much* depending upon our free action. This view, many now admit, is in accord with the Bible, but it certainly is not traditional in technical theology, though I hope and believe that it is fast becoming so.

Against Professor Turner's pronouncement in favour of determinism, I am moved to be equally dogmatic. If by "reaches of philosophy" is meant schools of philosophy, then no doubt some of them will be ruined by determinism, but if it is branches of the subject, such as ethics, metaphysics, or logic, then, on the contrary, since philosophers have largely abandoned determinism (Boutroux, James, Peirce, Whitehead, Ward, Bergson, even Santayana), these subjects have been doing rather well. Professor Turner is an able representative of a tenet which in two hundred years very nearly did destroy philosophy (in Comte, Nietzsche, Mill, and their immediate successors). Has not the subject been enjoying one of its greatest renaissances precisely since determinism ceased to be the generally accepted philosophic view?

That a doctrine acceptable to men like Whitehead, Bohr, Jordan, and many others of high competence in the philosophy of science spells the ruin of science, requires stronger support than I find even in Professor Turner's vigorous discussions of this matter.

Yours very truly,

CHARLES HARTSHORNE.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO,
October 16th, 1938.

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LECTURE COURSES for the Lent Term, Session 1938–39:—

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"SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY," a class by The Director of Studies, on Wednesdays, at 5.45 p.m., at University Hall, 14 Gordon Square, W.C.1, in the Michaelmas and Lent Terms. The class will be resumed in the Lent Term on January 18th (omitting January 25th). Fee for the Session, £1 1s. Terminal, 12s. 6d. Members free.

The EVENING MEETING for the Lent Term of the Session will be held at University College, Gower Street, W.C.1, at 8.15 p.m., on the following dates:—

Tuesday, January 17th: "The Present Relations of Science and Religion." Professor C. D. Broad.

Tuesday, February 14th: "The Permanent Significance of Hume's Philosophy." Professor H. H. Price.

Tuesday, March 14th: "Ethics and the Supernatural." The Very Rev. W. R. Matthews, K.C.V.O., D.D., D.Litt., Dean of St. Paul's.

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THE BRITISH INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY

Appeal for New Members and Donations

The Council appeals to members to do all in their power to introduce new members in order to extend the benefits of the Institute and to increase its revenue.

The Institute has no endowments, and its work, which includes lecture courses and meetings for discussion in the various Centres, as well as the conduct of the Journal, cannot be carried on from revenue derived solely from subscriptions of £1 1s. per annum. The Council, therefore, appeals for donations, small or large, from sympathizers with the Institute's aims.

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